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INTRODUCTION
During the first two years of the Carter administration, the
executive and legislative Branches engaged in the most systematic
governmental review and revision of the federal civil service system
since the enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883.1 The result was
the Civil Service Reform Act of 19782 (CSRA), which created new
institutions and processes for personnel management.
Early judgment on the successes and failures of such a signif-
icant restructuring of governmental organization likely guarantees
deeply flawed impressions. Federal managers and employees who
must work under the newly established systems, administrators
charged with responsibility for breathing life into the bare bones
frameworks created by Congress, and the courts responsible for
discovering, extrapolating, and protecting the congressional design
must have time to adjust to the new environment that faces them
and, where discretion exists, experiment in ways necessary to carry
out the purposes that animated the movement for reform. How-
ever, a decade has passed since the CSRA became law. Sufficient
experience does exist that can reliably form the basis for conclu-
sions regarding whether further legislative or regulatory changes
are necessary at this time. Within the limited compass of this
study, the basic finding is that the system is working reasonably
well, though some modifications should be considered by both
administrators and legislators.
3
This report focuses exclusively on the processes now in place
for adjudicating a wide variety of disputes between federal man-
agers and their employees. The occasions for such disputes are
The Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§ 1101).
2 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, P.L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as 5 U.S.C.
§ 552).
, See infra notes 482-600 and accompanying text. For more radical proposals for
statutory change, see Feder, "Pick A Forum-Any Forum": A Proposal forA Federal Dispute
Resolution Board, 39 LAB. L.J. 268 (1989).
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multifarious, including dismissal from federal employment, reduc-
tion in pay or grade level, denials of promotion or within grade
increases, and decisions concerning various benefits and awards.
The framework for handling these controversies is characterized
by overlapping jurisdiction among various agencies-specifically,
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Federal Labor
Relations Authority (FLRA), and the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC)-and the employee's ability to choose
from more than one remedial route. Further complications are
introduced by the fact that the availability and nature of admin-
istrative relief vary depending on the employee's status and the
type of personnel action taken by management. This elaborate
framework of inclusion and exclusion has created much litigation
regarding the availability of extra-statutory judicial remedies, in-
cluding a considerable number of recent Supreme Court and court
of appeals opinions.
While a detailed examination of each of the processes available
to protest an action taken by management that directly impacts
an individual employee would doubtless be illuminating, this ar-
ticle concentrates on the principal structural issues that are pre-
sented by the existing system for handling personnel complaints,
grievances, and appeals. These issues include the following: Is the
negotiated grievance process available to employees included in
collective bargaining units working acceptably well? Should em-
ployees retain the number of choices they now have among appeal
routes for certain types of matters? Should they be able to pursue
more than one avenue of relief, as is currently the situation re-
garding cases raising claims of discrimination? Can the multiple
levels of review available in cases of discrimination that prolong
and complicate cases be justified? Should the MSPB be given
exclusive jurisdiction in certain types of cases raising claims of
discrimination? Should the FLRA retain jurisdiction to review
arbitral awards in personnel actions? Does the Office of Personnel
Management have sufficient access to the reviewing courts in cases
raising important issues of personnel law? Various limitations on
this study and the reasons for them are noted at several points in
the narrative.
In approaching the federal personnel complaint, grievance, and
appeal system in this fashion, it is essential to realize that two
factors powerfully shaped the basic contours of the legal topog-
raphy created by the 1978 CSRA. First of all, there was concern
that the responsibility for implementing and safeguarding federal
1989-90]
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sector equal employment opportunity programs be placed securely
in the hands of an institution sympathetic to those statutes. Sec-
ond, statutory recognition and expansion of the rights of federal
unions and those they represented were crucial to the 1978 reform
effort. In the political environment thus created, simplicity of
process design and implementation of a unified federal personnel
law did not prove to be legislative goals that were pursued uncom-
promisingly. Moreover, despite the passage of a decade, it is
unlikely that the continued importance of the forces that shaped
the 1978 legislation can be discounted by anyone proposing changes
to the current system, at least if the proponent expects some
success in his or her efforts at reform.
This article moves from descriptions of the evolution prior to
1978 of the framework for handling federal employee complaints
and the principal features of the 1978 CSRA that create the
structural issues under examination, to a discussion of empirical
data and other information that fleshes out the actual workings
of the various appeal routes and identification of the potential
problems in the system, and finally to some proposed recommen-
dations for statutory and regulatory reform.
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND TH GROUNDWORK FOR
REFORM
A. The Civil Service Commission and the Merit System
The history of the federal civil service system to 1978 has been
exhaustively described elsewhere. 4 For present purposes, only a
brief synopsis is necessary. The Pendleton Act of 18835 established
a merit system to regulate the appointment of personnel. The
newly created Civil Service Commission was directed to provide
for competitive examinations, fill vacancies on the basis of the
results of those examinations, and insure that civil service was not
used for political purposes.
The reformers tended to think that if the front door, or
entrance to civil service, was protected from political influences,
then the back door, or the question of removals, would take care
4 See, e.g., R. VAucHN, PRn pcimas oF CrvI. SERviCE LAW ch. 1 (1976). The two major
histories of the American civil service are P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF TBa UNrrED STATES
Cwnm SERvicE (1958) and F. MosmR, DEmoCRAcY mm THE Pumuc SERVICE (1968).
1 The Civil Service Act of 1883, supra note 1.
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of itself. Theoretically, there would be no incentive for a politically
appointed or elected executive to remove an otherwise competent
employee if he or she could not be replaced by a political cohort.
Accordingly, the Pendleton Act of 1883 contained no protections
against removals except in the case of the refusal of an employee
to engage in political activity. The reform movement leaders ac-
tually supported quite openly management's absolute prerogative
of removal. George William Curtis, one of the founders in 1881
9nd later the president of the National Civil Service Reform League,
was supportive of management's unimpaired discretion. In com-
menting upon removal restrictions, he declared that
it is better to take the risk of occasional injustice from passion
and prejudice, which no law or regulation can control, than to
seal up incompetence, negligence, insubordination, insolence, and
every other mischief in the service, by requiring a virtual trial at
law before [an] .. .incapable clerk can be removed.
6
Viewed historically, the persistent abuse of management's pre-
rogative of removal led to its curtailment. The new federal civil
service law was hardly in effect when it became obvious that
removals were being made for partisan reasons. The Civil Service
Commission reported that it was common for employees of one
political faith to be dismissed for offenses that were allowed to
pass unnoticed or with a slight reprimand when committed by
employees of the opposite party.1 In addition, there developed the
increasingly common practice of removals based upon secret
charges, especially in the post office department. This led the
highly influential National Civil Service Reform League, in 1886,
to advocate placing the reasons for all removals in the public
record.8
However, it was not until July 27, 1897, that an Executive
Order of President McKinley provided that removals of employees
in the classified service were not to be made except for "just
cause." 9 In addition, covered employees had to be afforded a
written statement of the reasons for the action and the right to
6 P. VAN RiPER, supra note 4, at 102.
7 L. Wmn-, THE REPUBucm ERA, 1869-1901: A STUDY iN ADmnanAmnvE HISTORY
341 (1958).
1 F. STWART, Tm NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE REFoRm LEAGUE: HISTORY, Acmvmms,
AN PRO mAS 207 (1929).
1 UNrrED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT XVIII, 282 (1901).
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make a written reply.' 0 In 1912, Congress both enacted these
protections into law and expanded them in the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act." Henceforth, classified service personnel could not be re-
moved "except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service."' 12 The act further provided for a written notice of
reasons, a reasonable time to reply, and the opportunity to submit
affidavits in support of the reply. " Moreover, employees were
expressly permitted to petition Congress directly' 4 on employment
conditions and their right to affiliate with approved unions was
recognized.
Under this statutory scheme, the Civil Service Commission
initially conducted a procedural review, at most, of the removing
officer's decision.15 However, in 1930, it created a Board of Ap-
peals and Review that ultimately assumed an expanded jurisdiction
to review the merits of significant personnel actions.
6
In 1944, the Veterans Preference Act'7 gave veterans statutory
protections that went beyond those of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.
Covered veterans could not be "discharged, suspended for more
than thirty days, furloughed without pay, reduced in rank or
compensation or debarred from future appointment except for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."' s The
employee was to have at least thirty days advance written notice
stating the reasons in detail, a reasonable time to answer both
personally and in writing and to furnish affidavits in support of
the answer, and the right to appeal on the merits to the Civil
Service Commission. In addition, the veteran was to have the right
to make a personal appearance or an appearance through his or
,o 15 CSC Report 70 (1897-1898) (Rule II, Sec. 8).
" Lloyd-LaFollette Act, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539 (1912) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §
5595).
2 Id. at 555.
13 Id.
14 This provision negated President Theodore Roosevelt's so-called "gag orders," "ex-
ecutive orders in 1902 and 1904 that forbade federal employees, on pain of dismissal, to seek
pay increases or to attempt to influence legislation before the Congress, either as individuals
or as members of organizations, except through the heads of their departments." J. SHAFnz,
THE DoRSEy DIcTONARY OF AMERCAN GovERNMENT AND PoLMcs 239 (1988).
IS See Guttman, The Development and Exercise of Appellate Powers in Adverse Action
Appeals, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 323, 331-32 (1970).
16 Id. at 332-34.
"7 Veterans Preference Act, ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387 (1944), amended by Act of June 22,
1948, ch. 602, 58 Stat. 575; Act of June 10, 1948, ch. 447, 58 Stat. 354; Act of March 30,
1966, 80 Stat. 94 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
1" Veterans Preference Act, 58 Stat. 390.
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her representative before the Commission. After investigation and
consideration of the evidence, the Commission was to submit its
findings and recommendations to the proper administrative offi-
cer. 19 Subsequently, the Act was amended to require agencies to
take the corrective action recommended by the Commission and
to give back pay to prevailing employees.
20
Since more than half of the postwar federal service consisted
of veterans, this changed the whole nature of removal proceedings.
According to the second Hoover Commission, the impact of the
Veteran's Act "was to close the 'open back door' which had
always existed in the Federal Civil Service System." 2' For the first
time department heads and their assistants had to approach dis-
missal actions with the thought that they might have to justify
such actions to neutral third parties or to have their actions
reversed.
As things stood in 1961, competitive (formerly classified) serv-
ice employees who were not veterans were entitled only to the
protections of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act and procedural review by
the Civil Service Commission. Removals, including suspensions
without pay for any period, were within the purview of that
statute. Veterans in the competitive service were entitled to the
same protections for the types of personnel actions not governed
by the Veterans Preference Act, e.g., suspensions for thirty days
or less. Regarding the types of personnel actions listed by the
Veterans Preference Act, the veteran (whether competitive service
or excepted service) was entitled to the procedural and substantive
protections of the 1944 Act. In short, the type of procedural
protection and appeal rights turned not only on the type of em-
ployee but also on the type of action taken.
As a result of congressional pressure, Executive Order 10,988
of January 17, 1962, extended the protections of the 1944 Veterans
Preference Act to all federal employees in the competitive service.
22
At the same time, President Kennedy authorized an appeals system
within federal agencies in accordance with regulations issued by
the Civil Service Commission.23 The principal exclusions from the
9 Id. at 390-91.
2 Pub. L. 80-741 (June 22, 1948); see supra note 17.
21 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force
Report on Personnel and Civil Service, 95 (1955).
2 Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63).
11 Exec. Order No. 10,987, 3 C.F.R. 519 (1959-63).
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substantive and procedural protections were probationers and non-
veterans in the excepted service.
A multi-level appellate system resulted. A competitive service
employee or veteran in the excepted service could appeal the type
of adverse action defined by the Veterans Preference Act to an
agency first level appellate office or directly to the Commission's
first level appeals office. If the employee elected to appeal to the
first level agency appellate office, he or she then could appeal, if
unsuccessful, to either the first level Commission office or the
second level agency appellate office. If he or she went the latter
route, there was no appeal to the Commission. If the appellant
appealed from the first level agency appeals office to a Civil
Service Commission first level office, he then could appeal, if
unsuccessful, to the Commission's second level appellate office
(the Board of Appeals and Review). An appellant could obtain a
hearing before an appeals examiner at both the agency and the
Commission's first level offices. The Commissioners retained the
authority to reopen the Board of Appeals and Review decisions.2 4
The appeals system that had grown up over the years did not
escape criticism.25 One of the most significant criticisms was the
dual role assumed by the Commission as the federal government's
central personnel agency and the guardian against improper re-
moval and discipline of federal employees. 26 In addition, critics
argued that "hearing procedures and officers needed to have more
a judicial/legalistic orientation", that "decisions should be guided
by the general body of the law and make reference to it", and
that the Commission's decisions should be reported. 27
In response to criticism, the appellate structure was reorganized
in 1974. A Federal Employee Appeals Authority was established,
consisting of several regional headquarters and first level appeals
offices. The Board of Appeals and Review was renamed the Ap-
peals Review Board, with the authority to correct errors and
mistakes in field office decisions and to handle certain original
jurisdiction cases. The Commissioners, however, retained the dis-
cretion to act as the final level of review in those cases where they
24 Case, Federal Employee Job Rights: the Pendleton Act of 1883 to the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, 29 How. L.J. 283, 292-93 (1986).
1 See, e.g., Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA.
L. R-v. 196 (1973).
2 See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 15, at 340-48.
2 See Case, supra note 24, at 294-95.
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felt such action was warranted. Agency appellate offices were
abolished.
28
Despite these and other modifications in the Commission's
method of operation, criticism did not abate. Concern continued
over the combination in one agency of the power to both regulate
federal employees' conduct and adjudicate appeals from discipli-
nary actions taken against them, and also the lack of formality in
the hearing procedures and the decision-making process.29
B. Labor Relations and the Grievance Process
In 1962, the Presidential Task Force on Employee-Management
Relations in the Federal Service recommended issuing an executive
order granting federal employees limited bargaining rights.3 0 Ex-
ecutive Order 10,988, issued on January 17, 1962, laid down the
parameters of labor-management cooperation in the federal sec-
tor.3 1 For present purposes, the most significant aspects of these
administrative directives lie in their provision for negotiated griev-
ance procedures and arbitration of employee complaints.
32
The 1962 executive order provided that collective bargaining
agreements could contain provisions designating procedures for
the consideration of grievances. For various matters, employees
had a choice between negotiated procedures and agency-established
procedures. However, adverse actions continued to be appealable
to the Civil Service Commission. There was a provision for arbi-
tration in those instances where the grievance process did not
satisfactorily resolve the dispute. The results of arbitration were
advisory only; all determinations were subject to the approval of
the agency head. Moreover, arbitration was limited to the inter-
pretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement.
33
Federal unions continued to press for limiting grievance reso-
lution to the negotiated grievance procedures. In 1969, Executive
n Id. at 295-96.
2 Id. at 296.
"o PREsIDENT's TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL
SERVICE, A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION N rME FEDERAL SERVICE (1961).
1, Exec. Order No. 10,988, supra note 22, at 525.
32 The historical description of the growth of grievance arbitration in the federal sector
is taken largely from Smith & Wood, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: A
"Perfect" Order?, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 855 (1980); Comment, Federal Sector Arbitration Under
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1976, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 857 (1980).
31 Smith & Wood, supra note 32, at 859-60.
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Order 11,49114 provided that the negotiated procedure would be
the exclusive procedure available to grievants when the bargaining
agreement so specified. Arbitration was no longer advisory. Rather,
an award was final and binding subject to review by the Federal
Labor Relations Council (FLRC). The FLRC's rules indicated that
an award would be overturned where it violated "applicable law,
appropriate regulation, or the order, or other grounds similar to
those upon which challenges to arbitration awards are sustained
by courts in private sector labor-management relations. ' 35 At the
same time, adverse actions continued to be subject to the statutory
appeals procedure.
36
Some further changes were introduced in 1971 by Executive
Order 11,61637 and in 1975 by Executive Order 11,838.18 Hence-
forth, grievance procedures were to be negotiated entirely by the
parties and were not subject to civil service requirements. 39 The
employee was to be represented by the exclusive union or someone
approved by that union, unless the employee chose to represent
himself or herself.40 Adverse actions, subject to statutory appeal
procedures, continued to be excluded from the negotiated griev-
ance process. 41 Finally, arbitration could be invoked only by the
agency-employer or the exclusive representative, not solely by the
aggrieved employee.
The negotiated grievance/arbitration system that functioned
under the aegis of these Executive Orders did not escape criticism.
Concern was voiced over the absence of an "independent, impar-
tial" body to oversee various aspects of the federal sector labor-
management program, the exclusion from the negotiated proce-
dures of matters subject to statutory appeals, and the limitation
on arbitrators' authority to fashion remedies. 42
C. Equal Employment Opportunity
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not extend its
protections to federal employees. However, Title VII did provide
34 Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. §§ 861, 870 (1966-1970).
31 5 C.F.R. § 2411.32 (1978).
36 See Smith & Wood, supra note 32, at 860-61.
" Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. § 605 (1971-1975).
m Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1971-1975).
11 Exec. Order No. 11,616, supra note 37, at 606-07.
40 Id. at 607.
41 See Smith & Wood, supra note 32, at 861-62.
42 See Comment, supra note 32, at 861-62.
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that federal sector employment decisions were to be free from
discrimination. 4 Various executive orders to carry out this policy
were issued, pursuant to which the Civil Service Commission es-
tablished a regulatory system for considering complaints of dis-
crimination. Still, "the availability of judicial remedies for
discrimination in federal employment was doubtful because of the
defense of sovereign immunity." 44
In the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,45 Congress
formally extended the protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to the federal government. All personnel actions
affecting employees or applicants for employment were to be made
"free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 46 The House of Representatives bill would
have given jurisdiction for administrative enforcement to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).47 This was
prompted by a perceived conflict if the Civil Service Commission
was responsible for both implementing federal personnel policies
and practices and deciding appeals concerning allegations that
those same policies and practices were discriminatory. 48 Ultimately,
the House proposal was dropped because of Civil Service Com-
mission opposition and concerns that the EEOC already had too
great a work load.49 The Civil Service Commission was given
authority to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions through
appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of em-
ployees with or without back pay, and to issue implementing
regulations. 50 Within certain designated time frames, following
agency action or inaction on a discrimination complaint, or Com-
mission action on appeal from an agency decision, an aggrieved
employee or applicant could bring a civil action for appropriate
relief.51 In Chandler v. Roudebush5 2 the Supreme Court held that,
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1) (1982).
" See Laponsky, Procedural Problems and Considerations in Representing Federal
Employees in Equal Employment Opportunity Disputes, 29 How. L.J. 503, 504-05 (1986).
4 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at various sections
of 5 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
46 Id. at 141.
,' Laponsky, supra note 44, at 505-06.
"See id.
41 See Ralston, The Federal Government as Employer: Problems and Issues in Enforcing
the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 10 GA. L. REv. 717, 717-18 (1975-76).
10 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, supra note 45, at I11.
5 Id. at 112, § 717(c).
' 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
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in such proceedings, federal employees were entitled to a trial de
novo.
Under its authority to establish regulations to carry out the
legislation, the Civil Service Commission created a four-step ad-
ministrative complaint process: pre-complaint counseling, investi-
gation of a complaint, hearing and final agency decision, and,
finally, an optional appeal to the Appeals Review Board of the
Commission. 3 The investigators were employed by the agency, but
complaints examiners, who made recommended decisions to the
agency decision-maker, were employed by the Commission.5 4 In
Morton v. Mancari,55 the Supreme Court held that the purpose of
the 1972 Act was to make the substantive law of Title VII appli-
cable to federal employment.
In 1974, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was
amended to encompass complaints of discrimination made by fed-
eral workers over forty years of age.56 As in the case of the 1972
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Civil Service Commission
was given remedial and rulemaking authority to carry out the
purposes of the legislation.5 7 Unlike the 1972 Act, there was no
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
filing a civil action to enforce the age discrimination protection.
5 8
In 1978, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was amended. Hence-
forth, no "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" was to be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity con-
ducted by any executive agency or the United States Postal Serv-
ice.5 9 The remedies, procedures, and rights established by the 1972
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, including both the exhaus-
tion requirement and the right to de novo review, were made
applicable in the case of handicap discrimination 0
The Civil Service Commission complaint process was also the
object of some familiar criticism, some of which sounded a fa-
miliar note. Critics noted the apparently conflicting responsibilities
of the Commission, the limited scope of the post-complaint inves-
11 See Ralston, supra note 49, at 724-25.
14 Id. at 731.
5 417 U.S. 535, 547 (1974).
-' Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 633a (1982)).
Id. at 75 § 15(b).
Id. at 75 § 15(d).
Act of Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794).
60 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1982).
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tigation, the lack of provisions for the appointment of counsel to
assist employees, the complexity of the procedures, the fact that
agencies were "judges in their own cases" following the required
hearing, and various departures from Title VII law as applied by
the courts.
6 '
D. The Personnel Management Project and the Enactment of
the Civil Service Reform Act
By 1977, dissatisfaction with the personnel appeals, complaint,
and negotiated grievance systems had a long history and similar
problems infected each. In June 1977, President Carter established
the Personnel Management Project to study the federal civil service
system. The Project, while formally situated in the Civil Service
Commission, made a decided effort to reach out to all federal
agencies. There were a variety of study task forces, an Assistant
Secretaries Advisory Group, public meetings, and a large number
of informal meetings to which agency representatives were in-
vited-all in an effort to maximize the involvement of career
federal managers, representatives from the private sector, and
academic specialists. Nevertheless, the actual drafting of proposed
legislation was dominated by careerists under the direction of the
Civil Service Commission leadership appointed by President
Carter.6
2
The result of this effort was a Final Staff Report issued in
December 1977.63 The Report reiterated many of the previously
mentioned problems and identified others. For example, the Re-
port emphasized the confusing, complex, and time-consuming na-
ture of the existing procedures. 64 Sources of complexity were found
to lie in the wide range of appealable actions, the large number
of appellate units and their unclear jurisdictional scheme, and
finally, the possibility of pursuing certain actions in more than
one forum.6 5 The result was a network of processes seen as intim-
idating to employees who might, therefore, be discouraged or
11 See, e.g., Ralston, supra note 49, at 726-35.
62 For the history, see Huddleston, The Carter Civil Service Reforms: Some Implications
for Political Theory and Public Administration, POL. SCL Q. 96 (Winter 1981-82); Kramer,
Seeds of Success and Failure: Policy Development and Implementation of the 1978 Civil
Service Reform Act, Rs-v. oF PuB. PERsoNNEL ADnm. 2 (Spring 1982).
1 PREsMIErr's PEmsoNNm MANAGEmENT PROJECT, FINAL STAFF REPORT 1 (Dec. 1977)
[hereinafter FINAL STAFF REPORT].
6, Id. at 58.
6 Id.
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defeated in the attempted exercise of their rights. Alternatively,
confronted by a system that imposed a burden to show an ac-
ceptable basis for an action in the context of proceedings that
might drag on for years, some managers might avoid taking nec-
essary actions to discharge or discipline employees. 66 The combi-
nation of functions of the Civil Service Commission as both the
instructor and advisor of managers and the appellate organ for
employee appeals was noted with concern. 67 Focusing on the dis-
crimination complaint process, the Project noted the inadequacy
of resources devoted to the system, the susceptibility of the system
to misuse for nondiscriminatory matters, and the need for low
cost or subsidized representation during certain stages of the proc-
ess. 6
8
The Final Staff Report made various recommendations for
change69 and President Carter sent Congress a proposed bill to
amend the civil service laws in March, 1978. On October 13, 1978,
he signed the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. While there was
substantial similarity to the proposals of the Personnel Manage-
ment Project, the final legislation also differed in important ways.
II. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMPLAINT, GRIEVANCE, AND
PERSONNEL APPEALS PROCESSES
A. The Institutions: Regulatory, Adjudicative, and Investigatory
1. The Office of Personnel Management
As the successor to the administrative functions of the Civil
Service Commission, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
has statutory responsibility for executing, administering, and en-
forcing civil service laws, rules, and regulations other than those
under the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Protection Board.70
OPM's multifarious and far-reaching authority and responsibilities
6 Id. at 41.
67 Id. at 53, 73.
2 PREsmENT's PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT, FNAL. STAFF REPORT 1, 19, 24 at
Appendix IV (Dec. 1977).
FNAL STAFF REPORT at 60-63.
10 S. Rm,. No. 95-969, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 S. REPORT]; see
5 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(5) (1982).
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make this agency the most powerful of the institutions created in
1978. For example, it adopts regulations for the release of em-
ployees in a reduction-in-force 7 1 prescribes the parameters for
agency performance appraisal systems 7 2 and establishes the system
for competitive examinations73 and appointments to positions in
the civil service. 74 The Office sometimes operates in an appellate
capacity. It reviews classifications of positions on the request of
agencies or employees 7 5 the termination of grade or pay retention
benefits following a reduction-in-force, 76 and examination rat-
ings .
77
The OPM Director may petition the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit for review of a decision of the Merit Systems
Protection Board "where the Director determines, in his discre-
tion, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule,
or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's
decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule,
regulation, or policy directive." ' 78 While OPM may petition for
appeal, the granting of the petition is within the discretion of the
Federal Circuit and the statute imposes no express limits on this
discretion. 79 As the practice has evolved, the Federal Circuit grants
OPM petitions for review only where the court independently
believes that the Director's determinations are correct. 80 There is
language in the legislative history to support the court's position.
81
2. The Merit Systems Protection Board
Responding to concerns regarding the conflicting roles of the
former Civil Service Commission as both management agent for
the President and protector of the merit system from abuse
8 2
Congress established the three-member Merit Systems Protection
71 5 U.S.C. § 3502 (1982).
- 5 U.S.C. § 4302 (1982).
- 5 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1988).
- 5 C.F.R. § 2.2.
75 5 C.F.R. § 511.603.
76 5 C.F.R. §§ 536.101-536.307.
5 C.F.R. §§ 300.101-300.707.
78 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d) (1982).
7 Id.
0 See, e.g., Homer v. Garza, 832 F.2d 150 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Devine v. Sutermeister,
724 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
SI 1978 S. Report at 69.
81 1978 S. Report at 5.
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Board (MSPB)83 to function as an independent, quasi-judicial body
adjudicating those matters placed within its jurisdiction by statute
or regulation.8 4 Other than various cases falling within its original
5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
- 5 U.S.C. § 1205(a)(1) (1982). Creation of the MSPB was not a sudden development.
Demands for widespread reform had been growing since the 1930s when the President's
Committee on Administrative Management chaired by Louis Brownlow made many recom-
mendations for reform of the institutional structures of the federal civil service.
Overall, the Committee recommended a major reorganization of the executive branch.
The President agreed, and appropriate legislation was submitted to the Congress in 1938. But
the Congress, in the wake of the President's efforts to "pack" the Supreme Court and fearful
of too much power in the Presidency, killed the bill. The President resubmitted a considerably
modified reorganization bill the following year, and the Congress passed the Reorganization
Act of 1939, authorizing the President, subject to congressional veto, to redistribute and
restructure executive branch agencies. This allowed President Roosevelt to subsequently create
the Executive Office of the President. For histories, see B.D. KARL, ExacUTnvE REORGANIZA-
TION AND REFoRM iN THE NEw DEAL (1963); R. PoLENBERG, REORGANIzING RoosEvELT's
Gov'RjaiENT: Tam CoNTRovEPsy OvER ExEctaw REORGANIZAniON, 1936-1939 (1966).
See President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies
(1937). The Brownlow Committee's 1937 report was highly critical of the U.S. Civil Service
Commission as a central personnel agency. After examining the Commission's various struc-
tural deficiencies, the Brownlow Committee recommended that
[t]he Civil Service Commission ... be reorganized into a Civil Service Admin-
istration, with a single executive officer, to be known as the civil service admin-
istrator, and a nonsalaried Civil Service Board of seven members appointed by
the president. This board would be charged not with administrative duties but
with the protection and development of the merit system in the government.
Id. at 9-10. While this proposal had the support of President Roosevelt, Congress would not
adopt it until the same idea was resubmitted forty years later by President Carter.
What finally brought about this reform was a series of scandals during the latter part of
the Nixon Administration that so discredited the U.S. Civil Service Commission that Congress
was ready to act. It was demonstrated in a variety of congressional hearings that the Com-
mission had presided over wholesale evasions of merit system requirements in order to make
the federal civil service more politically responsive. See, e.g., Documents Relating to Political
Influence in Personnel Actions at the General Services Administration. Subcommittee on
Manpower and Civil Service, Print no. 93-22, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974); Violations and
Abuses of Merit Principles in Federal Employment Part 1; Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Manpower and Civil Service, Serial no. 94-19, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Violations and
Abuses of Merit Principles in Federal Employment Part I. Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Manpower and Civil Service, Serial no. 94-20, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); Violations and
Abuses of Merit Principles in Federal Employment. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Manpower and Civil Service, Serial no. 94-48, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Documents Relating
to Political Influence in Personnel Actions at the Small Business Administration. Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service, Print no. 94-4, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); Violations and Abuses of Merit Principles in Federal Employment. Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Post Office and Civil Service, Serial no. 94-49, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975). Finally, the Commission's own internal investigation, known as the Sharon
Report (after Milton I. Sharon, the investigation's team director) confirmed allegations "that
high-ranking officials of the Commission had had prior knowledge that politically oriented
employment systems were in operation and had done nothing to stop them." Merit Staffing
Review Team, A Self-Inquiry Into Merit Staffing 2 (United States Civil Service Commission,
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jurisdiction,"5 the MSPB's "appellate" jurisdiction extends over
the most significant types of personnel actions, including reduc-
tions in grade or removal for unacceptable performance, removal
from the civil service or lesser sanctions for disciplinary reasons,
and separations due to reductions-in-force.
8 6
To denominate the Board's jurisdiction as "appellate" may be
somewhat misleading. It generally adjudicates cases coming to it
on a de novo basis. Where an employee or applicant for employ-
ment is the subject of an action that is "appealable" to the Board
under some statute or regulation, the "appellant" has the right to
a hearing at which a transcript will be kept and to be represented
by an attorney or other person.8 7 In the manner of a judicial body
regulating the conduct of cases to come before it, the Board has
prescribed its procedures for hearing "appeals" in elaborate detail.
The statute authorizes it to generally refer cases to designated
employees of the Board, now called administrative judges, for
hearing. 8 These administrative judges operate out of eleven re-
gional offices, while the Board sits in Washington, D.C. The
Board's rules prescribe the content of petitions for appeal and
agency responses, lay down the conditions for intervention, con-
solidation of cases, and substitution of parties, authorize discovery
of various kinds and impose limitations thereon, and prohibit ex
parte communications.
89
If dissatisfied with the initial decision of the administrative
judge, the employee or agency may petition the full three-member
Board for review. 9° While the Board may reopen and reconsider
an initial decision on its own motion, the Board generally will
grant petitions for review only when it has been established that
May 1976). Of course, only a minority of individuals engaged in corrupt behavior, but that
was enough to ruin a reputation. The Commission's "good name" could not be salvaged.
"The stigma was so great that the reformers went so far as to formally assert that it was not
the giant Office of Personnel Management that would be the successor agency to the Com-
mission, but the little Merit Systems Protection Board. OPM would be a totally new entity-
an organization without a history starting with a clean slate." J. SHA rrz, A.C. HYDE, D.H.
RosrrNLooM, P-asoNn¢ MANAGEmENT IN GovERNmENT 21 (3rd ed. 1986). Thus, the MSPB,
which the good government reformers of the Brownlow Committee recommended be created,
would not be born until the Civil Service Commission, by its ineptness and corruption,
destroyed itself.
" For example, actions against administrative law judges under 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982).
86 See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3 (1988).
- 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(I)-(2) (1982).
- 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b).
" See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.11-1201.113 (1988).
- 5 U.S.C. § 1201.114(a) (1988).
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new and material evidence not available when the initial hearing
record was closed has become available, or the decision of the
administrative judge was based on an erroneous interpretation of
statute or regulation.
Employees or applicants for employment adversely affected by
a final order or decision of the Board may, except in cases in-
volving alleged discrimination, 91 obtain judicial review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 92 That court may
set aside Board action found to be arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion, procedurally flawed, or unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence. 93
Cases otherwise within the Board's jurisdiction that involve
discrimination of particular types are subject to special procedures
that will be described more fully below.
94
3. The Office of Special Counsel
As specified in the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
95
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), first created in 1978,96 has
the primary role of protecting employees from "prohibited per-
sonnel practices ' 97 by seeking corrective actions and the discipline
of employees who commit such practices. 98 The OSC has a variety
of statutory powers and duties. Only the most obviously relevant
for current purposes will be discussed here.
The OSC must receive any allegation of a prohibited personnel
practice and must investigate to the extent necessary to determine
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that such a prac-
tice has occurred, exists, or is to be taken.99 The Special Counsel
can also, on his or her own initiative, institute such an investiga-
11 See infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
- See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1), (b)(1) (1982).
- 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
11 See infra notes 198-202, 206-10, 218-79 and accompanying text.
91 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989)
[hereinafter Whistleblower Act].
9 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, supra note 2.
The term "prohibited personnel practice" will be discussed infra, at notes 146-54 and
accompanying text. For current purposes this can be taken to refer to various breaches of
merit system principles.
9 See Whistleblower Act, supra note 95, at § 2(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(C).
Id. at § 3(a)(11) (adding 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(1)(A)) (1982). Employees may be able to
sue to force the OSC to conduct an "adequate" investigation. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Devine,
771 F.2d 1515, 1524-25 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Wren v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867,
875-76 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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tion. °° If the Special Counsel determines that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a prohibited personnel practice has oc-
curred, exists, or is to be taken, and corrective action is required,
he or she must report that determination along with any findings
or recommendations to the MSPB, the Office of Personnel Man-
agement, and the agency involved. 01 If, after a reasonable time,
the agency has not acted to correct the prohibited personnel prac-
tice, the OSC may request the MSPB to order corrective action.10
2
At that point, the Board can order corrective'action it considers
appropriate and adversely affected employees may obtain judicial
review of the Board's action in the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.103 Where the Special Counsel terminates an inves-
tigation not of his or her own initiation, he or she must prepare
and transmit to the person who made the allegation a written
statement notifying that person of the termination of the investi-
gation, summarizing the facts ascertained by the OSC and the
reasons for the termination.: 4
In addition, the OSC is directed to conduct an investigation
of any allegation concerning "activities prohibited by any civil
service law, rule, or regulation" and "involvement by an employee
in any prohibited discrimination found by any court or appropriate
administrative authority to have occurred in the course of any
personnel action.' 0 05 However, the obligation to investigate the
latter is excused where the Special Counsel determines that the
allegation may be resolved more appropriately under an adminis-
trative appeals procedure.l ° The Special Counsel may seek correc-
tive and disciplinary action from the MSPB based on the conduct
investigated. 107
The Special Counsel may request from the MSPB a stay of a
personnel action where there is reason to believe that the action
was taken as a result of a prohibited personnel practice. 08 Also,
he or she may determine that disciplinary action is warranted
M 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(5).
lot 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(2)(A).
-- 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(2)(B). See Barnhart, 771 F.2d at 1526 ("[There is] limited judicial
review of the OSC's determination that the complaint does not merit the Board's considera-
tion.").
5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(b)(4)(A) and (C).
5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(2)(A).
"' 5 U.S.C. § 1216(a)(4), (5).
' 5 U.S.C. § 1216(b).
"' 5 U.S.C. § 1216(c)(2).
'o 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(1)(A)(i).
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against a federal employee for engaging in a prohibited personnel
practice or violating other laws or regulations within OSC juris-
diction, in which case the Special Counsel must prepare a written
complaint and present that to the MSPB. 109 After a hearing before
the Board, the MSPB may impose various sanctions including
removal, reduction in grade, debarment from federal employment
for up to five years, or a civil penalty. 110 Judicial review of orders
imposing disciplinary action are reviewable in the Federal Cir-
cuit.',
4. The Federal Labor Relations Authority
Responding to a variety of concerns, including the need for
an impartial body to oversee federal labor-management relations
and to eliminate the existing fragmentation of authority between
the Department of Labor and the Federal Labor Relations Coun-
cil,112 the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) was created
in 1978.113 In many ways it was modelled on the National Labor
Relations Board. Its responsibilities include determination of the
appropriateness of units for labor organization representation,
supervising and conducting elections to determine whether a labor
organization has been selected as the exclusive representative by
employees in a unit, resolving issues relating to the duty to bargain
in good faith, conducting hearings and resolving complaints of
unfair labor practices, and resolving exceptions to arbitration
awards arising from disputes subject to negotiated grievance pro-
cedures. 114
The General Counsel of the FLRA is charged with the duty
of investigating allegations of unfair labor practices, though he or
she has the discretion whether to issue a complaint and proceed
with a hearing before the FLRA." 5 Where a complaint is filed, an
adjudicatory hearing is held before an administrative law judge"16
109 5 U.S.C. § 1215(a).
110 5 U.S.C. § 1215(a)(3).
"1 5 U.S.C. § 1215(a)(4).
212 1978 S. Report at 7-8.
,3 See 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1982).
114 5 U.S.C. § 7105.
I's 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a) (1982). See also American Federation of Government Employees
v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a decision by the General Counsel not
to issue an unfair labor practice complaint was not a final order of the Authority subject to
judicial review).
126 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(6). See also 5 C.F.R. § 2423 (1989).
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that may result in a cease and desist order and a requirement to
reinstate an employee with back pay. 17 The FLRA is authorized,
but not required, to petition a United States Court of Appeals for
enforcement of its orders.1 Judicial review of the FLRA's orders
takes place in the regional courts of appeal. 119
Employee grievances subject to negotiated grievance proce-
dures contained in collective bargaining agreements may result in
arbitration awards.120 Generally, any party to arbitration may file
with the FLRA an exception to an award. Still, the award may be
overturned only if the FLRA finds that it is contrary to "any law,
rule, or regulation" or that it is deficient on "grounds similar to
those applied by Federal courts in private sector labor-management
relations.'' If no exception to an award is timely filed, it is
"final and binding" and the agency must take the actions required
by it.12 The FLRA's action with regard to an arbitration award
is not subject to judicial review unless the order involves an unfair
labor practice.'2
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978124 and the 1978
Civil Service Reform Act, 25 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) inherited from the Civil Service Commission
the responsibility for enforcing Title VII and other anti-discrimi-
nation statutes in federal employment. 2 6
Regarding personnel actions not appealable to the MSPB where
discrimination is alleged, the EEOC regulations for processing
"1 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(7).
it 5 U.S.C. § 7123(b) (1982).
219 5 U.S.C. §§ 7123(a), (b).
' See infia note 193 and accompanying text. See also 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (1982).
121 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (1982).
-- 5 U.S.C. § 7122(b).
'- 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). See also Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding
preclusion of even district court review, though leaving open possibility of review of clear
violations of statutory authority under Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 154 (1958) as well as of
constitutional claims); Overseas Educ. Ass'n v. FLRA, 824 F.2d 61 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (focusing
on the reviewability of FLRA orders involving unfair labor practices). If certain types of
discrimination are alleged as the basis for the personnel action, judicial review may be available
at the request of the employee.
124 92 Stat. 3781 (codified at 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978)), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1155
(1982).
"I Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, supra note 2.
' See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7702 (1982).
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complaints mirror to a great degree those of the former Civil
Service Commission. 127 Generally, a person who believes that he
or she has been discriminated against because of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap condition must first
consult with an EEOC counselor within his or her agency who
will make whatever inquiry is deemed necessary, seek a solution
on an informal basis, and advise the employee concerning "the
issues in the matter.' 12 Following counseling, the employee may
file a formal complaint with his or her agency, 129 which may be
rejected for various procedural reasons such as timeliness or the
pendency of an identical complaint. 30 The agency then must des-
ignate an employee or other person to conduct an investigation of
the circumstances of the complaint. 31 Following the completion
of the investigation and the complainant's review of the investi-
gation file, the agency must provide an opportunity for adjustment
of the complaint on an informal basis. 32 If no adjustment takes
place, the complainant is informed of the proposed agency dis-
position of the complaint and of the right to a hearing and then
a decision by an appropriate agency official.133 Any hearing is
conducted generally by an administrative judge who is the em-
ployee of the EEOC. 34 That presiding official is charged with
determining whether further investigation is needed before a hear-
ing is held and then with insuring that all pertinerft facts are
brought out at the hearing.1 35 If the administrative judge deter-
mines that there are no issues of material fact,\he or she may
decide the case without a hearing. 3 6 The hearing officer recom-
mends a decision that may be accepted or rejected by the agency
head or his or her designee.1 37 Complaints are to be resolved within
180 days after their filing.1 38
There is a right of appeal from the agency to the Office of
Review and Appeals (ORA) of the EEOC, which also may remand
1, See Laponsky, supra note 49, at 506 n.21.
Ms 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213 (1988).
M 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214.
W 29 C.F.R. § 1613.215.
M 29 C.F.R. § 1613.216.
132 29 C.F.R. § 1613.217(a).
M 29 C.F.R. § 1613.217(c).
1- 29 C.F.R. § 1613.218.
133 Id.
1- 29 C.F.R. § 1613.218(g).
.37 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.218(g), .221.
M 29 C.F.R. § 1613.220.
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a complaint to an agency for further investigation or rehearing. 139
The regulations do not specify the scope of ORA review, though
it appears to be de novo on the record made below. The Com-
missioners may reopen ORA decisions on their own motion or
petition. 40 Corrective action ordered by the ORA or the Commis-
sion is "mandatory and binding" on the agency,14' though the
EEOC only has the statutory authority to notify the complainant
of his or her right to file a civil action for enforcement of that
decision. 
1
42
Delays in processing complaints, as well as the completion of
various stages in the administrative consideration of a complaint,
activate the right to file a civil action in the United States district
courts at various specified times. 143 The above description of pro-
cedures does not apply to discrimination complaints that move
through the negotiated grievance process or those presented in the
context of actions appealable to the Merit Systems Review Board.
These will be discussed later.' 44
B. Prohibited Personnel Practices
The 1978 Act (supplemented by the Whistleblower Protection
Act of 198914) proscribes certain types of conduct that were deemed
so inimical to either the merit system or personnel management in
general that their discovery and prosecution should be a matter of
the gravest importance and result in important sanctions. These
are the so-called "prohibited personnel practices."' 1  The first
139 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.231, .234.
29 C.F.R. § 1613.235.
29 C.F.R. § 1613.237(a).
1,2 29 C.F.R. § 1613.239(c).
143 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281.
-" See infra notes 198-202, 206-10, 218-79 and accompanying text. There are also pro-
cedures for class complaints, on which this article does not focus. See also 29 C.F.R. §§
1613.601-.643 (1988).
'41 Supra note 95.
'- 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1982). Employees with authority to take personnel actions of various
types are forbidden in the exercise of that authority to:
1. discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
age, marital status, political affiliation, or handicapping condition;
2. solicit or consider recommendations with regard to employees under
consideration for a personnel action unless the recommendations are based on
first-hand knowledge and are directed to certain matters such as qualifications
and character;
3. coerce the political activity of employees;
4. deceive any person with respect to the right to compete for employment;
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prohibited practice, discrimination on various bases, largely Mir-
rors the type of conduct that is within the EEOC's jurisdiction. 47
5. influence any person to withdraw from competition for a position in
order to improve or injure the prospects of another for employment;
6. grant any preference or advantage not authorized by law to any
employee or applicant in order to improve or injure the prospects of any
particular person for employment;
7. engage in nepotism;
8. take reprisals for "whistleblowing," that is the disclosure of information
by an employee who believes that the law is being violated or there has been
gross mismanagement, gross waste of public funds, abuse of authority, or a
substantial danger to the public;
9. take reprisals for an employee's exercise of appeal, complaint or
grievance rights granted by law or regulation, testimony on behalf of or assis-
tance to an employee in connection with such rights, disclosures to the Special
Counsel, or refusing to obey an order requiring violation of the law;
10. discriminate against any employee or applicant on the basis of conduct
that does not adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant or
the performance of others; and
11. take any other action if it would "violate[ ] any law, rule, or regulation
implementing, or directly concerning, the merit system principles."
5 U.S.C. § 2302, as amended by Pub. L. 101-12.
-, Discrimination on the basis of marital status and political affiliation does not fall
under the jurisdiction of the EEOC. Many of the other prohibited personnel practices were a
direct response to the scandals that the Civil Service Commission lived through during the
early and mid 1970s-and the enormous notoriety of the "Malek manual," which openly
advocated "the rape of the merit system."
When Fred Malek was the chief of the Nixon Administration's White House personnel
office, he occasioned the drafting of the Federal Political Personnel Manual. Frank J.
Thompson wrote that "the Malek manual is to personnel administration what Machiavelli's
The Prince is to the broader field of political science." CLASSics oF Punuc PEasoNNEL PoUcy
113 (F. Thompson ed. 1979). Malek's infamous manual did not specifically advocate the
violation of any law; rather, it encouraged the systematic and widespread abuse of the spirit
of the federal merit system. A good way to understand how useful the "Malek manual" was
to those who wished to subvert merit selection principles is to read its own "example of the
rape of the merit system."
Let us assume that you have a career opening in your Department's personnel
office for a Staff Recruitment Officer. Sitting in front of you is your college
roommate from Stanford University in California who was born and raised in
San Francisco. He received his law degree from Boalt Hall at the University of
California. While studying for the bar he worked at an advertising agency
handling newspaper accounts. He also worked as a reporter on the college
newspaper. Your personnel experts judge that he could receive an eligibility
rating for a GS-11.
The first thing you do is tear up the old job description that goes with that job.
You then have a new one written, to be classified at GS-11, describing the duties
of that specific Staff Recruitment Officer as directed toward the recruitment of
recent law graduates for entry level attorney positions, entry level public infor-
mation officers for the creative arts and college news liaison sections of your
public information shop, and to be responsible for general recruiting for entry
level candidates on the West Coast. You follow that by listing your selective
[VOL. 78
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It is treated specially in those parts of the 1978 Act that establish
a complex system of interjurisdictional appeals.
14
The "personnel actions," as to which conduct thus defined is
proscribed, include removals for performance or disciplinary rea-
sons, promotions, appointments, transfers, decisions concerning
pay, benefits and awards, and "any other significant change in
duties or responsibilities which is inconsistent with the employee's
salary or grade level.' ' 49 Positions covered by this part of the
statute include, with limited exceptions, any position in the com-
petitive service, 50 career appointees in the Senior Executive Serv-
ice,'51 and positions in the excepted service.
152
With regard to enforcement of the prohibitions of Section
2302 of Title 5, several are of particular relevance here. As indi-
cated previously, the Office of Special Counsel has the duty to
investigate allegations of prohibited personnel practices and may
ask the Merit Systems Protection Board for disciplinary and cor-
rective action. 53 Moreover, agency personnel actions involved in
cases coming before the Merit Systems Protection Board, and
criteria as follows: Education: BA and LLB, stating that the candidate should
have extensive experience and knowledge by reason of employment or residence
on the West Coast. Candidate should have attended or be familiar with law
schools, and institutions of higher education, preferably on the West Coast. The
candidate should also possess some knowledge by reasons of education or
experience of the fields of college journalism, advertising, and law.
You then trot this candidate's Application for Federal Employment over to the
Civil Service Commission, and shortly thereafter he receives an eligibility rating
for a GS-I1. Your personnel office then sends over the job descriptions (GS-I1)
along with the selective criteria which was based on the duties of the job
description. When the moment arrives for the panel to "spin the register" you
insure that your personnel office sends over two "friendy" bureaucrats. The
register is then spun and your candidate will certainly be among the only three
who even meet the selective criteria, much less be rated by your two "friendly"
panel members as among the "highest qualified" that meet the selection criteria.
In short, you write the job description and selective criteria around your can-
didate's Form 171.
"There is no merit in the merit system!"
White House Personnel Office, "Malek Manual," in Select Committee on Presidential Cam-
paign Activities, Executive Session Hearings, Watergate and Related Activities: Use of Incum-
bency-Responsiveness Program, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974). The "Malek manual" is also
reprinted in Classics of Public Personnel Policy, infra at 172-200.
'41 See infra notes 198-202, 206-10, 218-79 and accompanying text.
S1 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2).
'- See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B). See infra note 211.
" See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B). See infra note 213.
5 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B). See infra note 212. But see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii),
and (C) for agencies and employees beyond the coverage of the section.
"1 See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
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before arbitrators exercising authority pursuant to negotiated
grievance procedures, cannot be sustained where the agency deci-
sion was based on a prohibited personnel practice.
154
C. A Thematic Overview of the Structure for Considering
Employee Complaints, Grievances and Appeals
Although an express purpose of the 1978 Act was to simplify
the framework for disposition of employee complaints, grievances,
and appeals, 155 the complexity of the new structure is such that an
evaluation of the success of the reform efforts in terms of that
goal alone would result in a finding of abject failure on the part
of Congress. Only close scrutiny of the statutory product discloses
that the complexity was created in large part by the simultaneous
pursuit of three rather straightforward concerns: adequate protec-
tion of employees from discrimination of various types, uniformity
in federal personnel management, and solidifying and expanding
the place of arbitration as a mechanism to resolve federal employee
grievances. Their implementation in the real world of politics
demanded a variety of compromises.
First of all, Congress wanted to insure that federal employees
could obtain adequate protection against employment discrimina-
tion of the types forbidden by federal law in the private sector.
1 56
As noted above, this suggested that, in 1978, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) should inherit much of
the authority of the Civil Service Commission regarding adminis-
tration and enforcement. 157 Moreover, bargaining unit employees
were given the option of either eschewing the grievance/arbitration
process in favor of the statutory processes for considering discrim-
ination claims, or, following resort to the negotiated grievance
process, obtaining EEOC review of the arbitration results. 58 Fi-
nally, regardless of the non-judicial route initially chosen by the
employee, Congress retained a right to a trial de novo on discrim-
ination claims in the United States district courts. 5 9
Procedurally, the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act insured that,
in certain instances, federal employees have not less but more
5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B) (1982).
See, e.g., 1978 S. Report at 9-10.
"1 See generally Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, S. Rep. No. 95-750, 95th Cong. 2d
Sess. 6-7 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 SENATE REORGANIZATION REPORT].
I" See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
158 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d) (1982).
"I But see infra note 273.
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protection than their counterparts in the private sector. Both types
of employees may resort to the courts despite the presence and
invocation of alternative remedies, whether administrative or ar-
bitral.160 However, only federal employees have a federal statutory
right to both a full trial-type administrative hearing (at the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) with discretionary review of its
decision by the EEOC) and a de novo hearing in a federal district
court where certain types of important personnel actions (such as
disciplinary or performance removals) are challenged.1 61 Moreover,
the EEOC has direct authority to review and reverse various
employment actions by agencies and give appropriate remedies to
federal employees. 62 In private sector cases, the EEOC may in-
vestigate and seek to eliminate an unlawful practice "by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.' ' 16 Failing
in that endeavor, it must resort to the federal courts to enforce
the anti-discrimination statutes. 64However, parity in the treatment
of federal and other employees is not always departed from to the
advantage of the federal worker. For example, as noted previously,
the EEOC has not been given power to sue on behalf of federal
employees. 161
The second concern (though somewhat less aggressively pur-
sued) was uniformity in personnel management. Congress created
an Office of Personnel Management that, despite its authority to
delegate many of its important functions to agency heads, 66 was
vested with overall responsibility for the execution, administration,
and enforcement of civil service statutes and rules. 67 Of federal
agencies, only the Office of Personnel Management has direct
access to the federal courts to overturn an administrative or ar-
bitral order in a personnel case. This access, however, is limited
to instances where the administrative or arbitral decision involves
an error in the interpretation of civil service law that may have
system-wide impact.
68
,61 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); 5 U.S.C. § 7702
(1982).
161 See infra notes 198-202, 206-10 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.237-.239 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
" See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
See 5 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982).
167 5 u.s.C. §§ 1103(a)(5), 1104(b)-(c).
1- 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d) (1982).
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The MSPB's independence was intended to guard against fu-
ture politicization of the civil service and to counterbalance the
increased discretion given federal managers and political appoint-
ees regarding personnel actions. 169 For the principal performance-
based and disciplinary actions against federal employees, there was
a right (limited to certain employees) to appeal to the MSPB.
170
This access was assured even where a collective bargaining agree-
ment established a grievance/arbitration process to cover those
types of actions. 7 1 Furthermore, with regard to these cases, Con-
gress expressly mandated certain procedural uniformity between
the MSPB and the negotiated grievance process'7 2 and seems to
have intended that the same substantive rules apply in both fora,
with the apparent expectation that the Board would hold the
laboring oar in establishing the governing principles. 73 In 1978,
regional court of appeals review of the MSPB and arbitration
decisions was seen as an adequate mechanism in enforcing unifor-
mity of treatment of the major personnel actions. 74 This goal was
further assured through the creation in 1982 of the Federal Circuit
vested with exclusive jurisdiction to review both MSPB and arbi-
tral decisions in the principal performance and disciplinary cases
outside the discrimination context.
17
In short, the mandated procedural and substantive uniformity
in treatment of important personnel actions, vesting the Office of
Personnel Management with the right to request judicial review in
cases of system-wide importance, along with the creation of the
Federal Circuit, represented in part Congress' attempt to assure
some degree of unity in personnel management. Such uniformity
would reduce potential confusion by managers regarding limits on
their discretion and distinctions in the legal treatment of employees
subject to personnel actions, both of which might flow from the
ability of some (but not all) employees to forum shop for favorable
law.
The pursuit of uniformity proved to be a particular challenge
in the case of those major performance and disciplinary actions
16 See 1978 SENATE REORoANizATION REPORT, supra note 156, at 11.
• See 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303(e), 7513(d) (1982).
171 See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1) (1982).
1- 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(2).
'7 See infra notes 397-400, 414-16 and accompanying text.
17, See 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at 52, 63, 111.
"I See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1988)).
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appealable to the MSPB also involving allegations of discrimina-
tion. These are known as mixed cases. The difficulty that they
posed in 1978 and continue to create resides in the impossibility
of always clearly separating pure "personnel law" issues from
issues of discrimination. 76 While the House in 1978 proposed
giving the EEOC ultimate authority in these matters, the Senate
feared that such a solution would severely weaken the newly-
established MSPB by suggesting it was not to be trusted to fully
protect employee rights under the anti-discrimination statutes . 77
The Senate also emphasized the need for consolidated treatment
of mixed cases given the nature of the issues they presented and
to avoid inconsistent decisions in similar matters. 178 The solution
devised to address these problems was to give the MSPB initial
administrative jurisdiction (including appellate jurisdiction over
mixed cases moving from the negotiated grievance process), to
give the EEOC the right to review MSPB decisions from the point
of view of discrimination law, and to refer disputes between the
agencies to a Special Panel composed of three members (an out-
sider, a Board member, and an EEOC Commissioner).1
79
This attempt to create unified treatment of the legal and fac-
tual issues of mixed cases stopped at the administrative border,
however. Congress' decision to retain the right to a trial de novo
in the district courts in mixed cases, following exhaustion of the
administrative remedies, meant that the regional circuits would be
confronted with issues of personnel law even after the creation of
the Federal Circuit in 1982.180 Moreover, the government's ability
to obtain direct judicial review of personnel law issues at its
request was severely limited-and nonexistent in some cases-
where alleged discrimination formed part of an employee's claim.
This situation, in conjunction with the statutory rights of employ-
ees to choose among several appeal routes-both in mixed and
pure discrimination cases-almost guaranteed that different legal
rules might be applied in the various adjudicatory fora. 181
The goal of uniformity in personnel administration was com-
promised further by the third congressional concern: the desire to
176 See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
'" See 1978 SENA REORGANIZATION REPORT, supra note 156, at 11.
'17 Id. at 11-13.
7 See infra notes 227-55 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 271-79 and accompanying text.
,' See infra notes 579-81 and accompanying text.
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provide a firm statutory basis for, and expand the role of, collec-
tively-bargained grievance processes in federal work-place dispute
resolutions. Congress expressly sanctioned a broad scope for these
processes, which included major performance and disciplinary ac-
tions as well as discrimination claims (though granting the em-
ployee the option to eschew these processes for the MSPB and the
EEOC). 182 While appeal from arbitrator decisions in performance
and disciplinary actions generally lay in the courts of appeal and
(after 1982) in the Federal Circuit, other arbitration awards were
to be reviewed solely by the new Federal Labor Relations Author-
ity, whose decision was final absent an unfair labor practice or
discrimination.
Thus, several aspects of the statute tolerated disuniformity. In
the case of the major performance and disciplinary actions, despite
the express statutory requirement for some procedural uniformity
and the implicit suggestion for uniformity in terms of the substan-
tive rules applied, the informal nature of the arbitral process-
including the lack of the type of procedural opportunities available
in a judicialized process and its function as an extension of the
collective bargaining process-practically guaranteed that the re-
sults in MSPB and arbitral cases would differ.181 Moreover, the
Federal Circuit has tempered its approach to arbitration awards
with much the same type of deference paid by courts reviewing
arbitral awards in the private sector. 184 This deference is also
observed by the MSPB and the EEOC when reviewing the results
of the arbitral process in discrimination cases. 85
Finally, regarding those arbitral awards where it has the final
say, the Federal Labor Relations Authority has not deemed itself
bound to MSPB precedent where similar legal issues arise, though
it does take MSPB decisions into account in making its own
determinations.186 Inconsistencies in the approach to personnel law
have resulted, though to date they have been relatively minor.18 7
The statutory structures created in 1978 and elaborated upon
by agency regulation create a Byzantine maze of appellate routes.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d)-(e).
185 See infra notes 401-12 and accompanying text.
'u See infra notes 422-23 and accompanying text.
,s' See, e.g., Carr v. Dep't. of the Air Force, 32 MSPB 665 (1987); Robinson v. Dep't.
of Health & Human Services, 30 MSPB 389 (1986); and Denson v. Veteran's Admin., 30
MSPB 383 (1986).
"9 See infra note 460 and accompanying text.
I" See infra notes 461-63 and accompanying text.
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The by-products have been delay in final resolution of cases,
confusion for managers, employees, and even the agencies respon-
sible for administering the various processes, and more than a
little cynicism regarding the statutory product. While these and
other concerns suggest that structural reform should be consid-
ered-even if it only clears away part of the complexity-such
reform cannot be divorced entirely from judgments regarding past
performance of the entities vested with the responsibility for ad-
ministering these processes. To take perhaps the principal example
of this, while most federal employees have the option to use the
negotiated grievance process to contest the major performance and
disciplinary actions, the MSPB appears to remain the adjudicatory
"cornerstone" of the procedural reforms of 1978 in terms of its
share of the docket load of these types of cases, even where
discrimination is alleged. 188 The ability to eliminate some of the
complexity is, therefore, dependent upon the Board's performance
in its role as independent adjudicator and the perceptions regard-
ing its performance. 18 9
D. Roadmap for the Uninitiated (Also Perhaps Helpful for the
Expert)
A brief summary of the complaint, grievance and appellate
structure will assist those who are making their first acquaintance
with this subject. It may even benefit those who deal with the
system on a regular basis. At the same time, bearing in mind that
simplicity of description can mislead in some respects, the follow-
ing should appropriately be accompanied by a Surgeon General-
type warning: "Taking this summary without a few grains of salt
may be dangerous to your health."
For the purposes of the discussion, the following background
notes and definitions are necessary:
1. "Discrimination" refers to discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and handicapping
condition.
2. "Chapter 75 action" refers to a removal, suspension for
more than 14 days, reduction in pay or grade, or furlough for 30
days or less [with regard to certain covered employees] based on
"the efficiency of the service."'190
I" See infra notes 384-92 and accompanying text.
119 See infra notes 431-39 and accompanying text.
1- 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513 (1982).
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3. "Chapter 43 action" refers to a removal or reduction in
grade [of certain covered employees] based on "unacceptable per-
formance."
91
4. Prior to taking final action against an employee under
Chapters 43 or 75, the agency must generally provide notice of
the proposed action and some opportunity for response by the
employee.192
5. "Mixed cases" are those involving actions which are of the
type appealable to the Merit Systems Protection Board and where
discrimination is alleged as having been a basis for the action.
6. "Negotiated grievance procedure" (NGP) is the process
established by collective bargaining agreement which incorporates
the opportunity for the employee, union and agency to first resolve
a controversy informally and, following an adverse agency decision
on the grievance, submission by the union (not at the sole request
of the employee) or agency of the dispute to binding arbitration. 9 3
7. "Agency administrative grievance system" is the internal
agency process for considering employee complaints which do not
fall within an NGP194 and which are not subject to other statutory
or regulatory appellate and complaint systems (e.g., EEO com-
plaints and MSPB appeals). 9 5 Certain types of employees196 and
certain types of employment actions' 97 are, however, exempt from
coverage by these systems whose design is subject to OPM regu-
lation.
EMPLOYEES NOT WITHIN BARGAINING UNITS OR
ACTIONS EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF A
NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Actions not involving alleged discrimination (Chart 1).
a. Chapters 43 and 75 actions (along with other matters within
MSPB subject matter jurisdiction such as reductions-in-force) are
adjudicated by the MSPB with the right of appeal to the Federal
Circuit.
191 5 U.S.C. § 4303.
-- 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303(b), 7513(b).
'9' 5 U.S.C. § 7121.
5 C.F.R. § 771.204 (1988).
5 C.F.R. § 771.206(c)(1)(ii).
19 5 C.F.R. § 771.206(b).
19 5 C.F.R. § 771.206(c).
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b. Other actions (e.g., award decisions and some removals of
excepted service employees) may fall within the scope of agency
administrative grievance systems. If not, no administrative reme-
dies are available other than resort to the Office of Special Coun-
sel.
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Actions involving allegations of discrimination (Chart 2).
a. Chapters 43 and 75 actions (and other MSPB appealable
actions) are adjudicated by the MSPB with the option to initially
process these through a modified EEO process (the "mixed com-
plaint" process'98) within the agency (with no right to a hearing
before an EEOC administrative judge prior to the agency
decision' 99) and with potential review of the MSPB decision on
matters of discrimination law by the EEOC and a Special Panel2°°
where the MSPB and EEOC differ.
b. Other actions not appealable to the MSPB (e.g., promotion
decisions) fall within the EEO process which includes initial agency
counseling, investigation, hearing, recommended and final decision
and appeal to EEOC's Office of Review and Appeals.
20 1
c. Following exhaustion of administrative remedies, there is a
right of the employee to a de novo proceeding on the discrimi-
nation issues in federal district court. No Federal Circuit review
is available at the employee's request if a discrimination issue
remains in the case after any MSPB review.
20 2
See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.401-.421 (1988).
I" 29 C.F.R. § 1613.405(e). With the issuance of the agency decision, the employee has
the choice of suing immediately in federal district court on the discrimination claim or asking
for a hearing at the MSPB. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(2) (1988).
See infra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
1* See supra note 198.
That an employee's choices turn on the "MSPB appealability" of the underlying action
raises the specter of a ping-pong match between the MSPB and the EEOC which could
consume considerable agency and employee resources and time. The employee might file in
the ordinary EEO process without regard to the MSPB appealability of his or her matter,
only to be eventually told by the EEOC to start again before the MSPB. Conversely, the
employee might file in the MSPB process and later find out that the underlying action was
not appealable and the ordinary EEO process was the only route available. (These prospects
assume fding deadlines are tolled in such instances.) These scenarios have in fact occurred,
see, e.g., infra note 262, though their frequency is not documented statistically. Since outside
the area of constructive discharge, the MSPB appealability of an action is generally clear as
a legal matter, misfiling and/or incorrect processing would generally be attributable to em-
ployee or agency mistake. Whenever the differing jurisdictional prerequisites for several appeal
routes make each the exclusive one for matters within their particular coverage, such confusion
may arise.
See infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
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EMPLOYEES WITHIN BARGAINING UNITS WHERE THE
NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE COVERS THE
ACTION AT ISSUE
20 3
Discrimination not alleged (Chart 3).
a. Chapters 43 and 75 actions may, at option of employee, be
adjudicated by the MSPB with appeal to the Federal Circuit or
processed through the negotiated grievance procedure, which in-
cludes arbitration at the option of the union and appeal of right
by the employee to the Federal Circuit.
2
0
4
b. Other actions (e.g., within-grade denials) fall exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the negotiated grievance process with a
right of appeal to the FLRA but not judicial review of its decision
unless an unfair labor practice is involved.
20 5
- It is always possible, of course, that a personnel action, such as a removal, might be
animated by anti-union animus or otherwise have the characteristics of an unfair labor practice
as defined by the statute. Where there is a statutory appeals procedure available-as in the
case of a Chapter 43 or 75 removal even where such an action may fall within the scope of
an NGP-the matter may not be raised before the FLRA through the unfair labor practice
proceedings. Rather the statutory procedure or, where applicable, the negotiated procedure
are the only routes available. Where a statutory appeals procedure is not available (as where
the personnel action at issue is not taken under the authority of Chapter 43 or 75 and no
discrimination of the type within EEOC jurisdiction is alleged) an employee has the option of
pursuing matters through the NGP or the FLRA procedures for remedying unfair labor
practices, but not both. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116(d) (1988).
In Bodinus v. Dep't of the Treasury, 7 M.S.P.B. 385 (1981), the Board held that while
it did not have jurisdiction over unfair labor practices so called, it could consider evidence of
anti-union animus as proof of some prohibited personnel practices. In construing the word
"matter" found in Section 7121(d) (which is also found in Section 7116(d)), the Authority
has held that it refers to the personnel action involved, not the "issue" of discrimination. See
U.S. Department of Justice, United States Marshalls Service and International Council of
U.S. Marshalls Service Locals, AFGE, 23 F.L.R.A. No. 78 (1986).
Since agency actions cannot be sustained before the MSPB if "not in accordance with
law," see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(C) (1988), and since "grievances" which may be covered by
an NGP include "any claimed violation ... of any law," 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(c)(2)(C),
7103(a)(9)(C)ii), an employee would appear to have available (absent a bargaining agreement
to the contrary) as defensive matters whatever he or she could raise in an unfair labor practice
proceeding on the argument that conduct constituting an "unfair labor practice" is by virtue
of Section 7116 contrary to law.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e), (f) (1988).
See 5 U.S.C. § 7123.
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Discrimination is alleged (Chart 4).
a. Chapters 43 and 75 actions may, at option of employee, be
adjudicated by the MSPB or processed through the negotiated
grievance procedure.
2
0
6
1. Where the former (MSPB) is chosen, the employee may opt
immediately for MSPB review or have his or her charge processed
initially through the agency in a modified EEO procedure (the
"mixed complaint" process) with the hearing after the agency
decision at the MSPB. Following an MSPB decision, there may
be EEOC and Special Panel review.
2. Where the latter (NGP) is chosen, the MSPB, the EEOC
and Special Panel may review the arbitrator's resolution of the
discrimination issue, though the MSPB restricts the scope of its
review to matters of legal interpretation and not fact finding. 20 7
3. Any judicial review of the administrative or arbitral deter-
minations takes place not in the Federal Circuit but in the district
- See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d).
21 See, e.g., Carr v. Dep't of Air Force, 32 M.S.P.B. 665 (1987); Robinson v. Dep't of
Health and Human Services, 30 M.S.P.B. 389 (1986). Section 7121(d) of the statute speaks
of MSPB "review" and this was, in part, the basis for the Board's decision regarding the
scope of its examination.
The Board reviews the entire case, not just the allegations of discrimination and in doing
so relies on Board precedent at least if the underlying action is a Chapter 43 or 75 matter.
See Robinson, 30 M.S.P.B. 389.
Cases coming to the Board from the NOP may include Chapters 43 and 75 actions where
FLRA review is not available so the last step before Board review will be arbitration. In other
instances there may be an FLRA order. The Robinson case involved a Chapter 43 action
where there is statutory option to proceed initially via the NOP or appeal to the MSPB. It
was in this context that the Board held that it would rely on Board precedent, basing its
reasoning on the statutory mandate of some uniformity between arbitration and Board
proceedings in Chapter 43 matters. See infra notes 396-412 and accompanying text. Since the
presence of alleged discrimination allows employees the initial choice of the statutory routes
over the NGP for MSPB appealable actions even when Chapters 43 and 75 are not involved,
the Board might rely on the need to avoid forum shopping to justify the application of Board
precedent in all mixed cases coming from the arbitral process. Of course, because of the lack
of de novo review of the arbitral award, forum shopping between the NGP and the statutory
appeal process, instead of being motivated by differing bodies of "law," might instead be
motivated by differing scopes of MSPB review. In mixed cases coming to the Board from the
statutory route, the Board conducts a de novo review. (Some of the holdings of Robinson
may need some modification where the MSPB gets the case following FLRA review.)
Appellants are not required to submit a transcript or verbatim record of the arbitration
hearing with the request for review. See Denson v. Veterans Admin., 30 M.S.P.B. 383 (1986).
Denson rejected the contention that lack of a transcript or tapes of the arbitration hearing
entitled the appellant to a new hearing before the Board. The record thus submitted is similar
to that used by the FLRA in reviewing arbitration awards. It is an interesting question whether
the Board should, in the case of a mixed appeal from the FLRA, see itself as reviewing the
FLRA's review of the arbitrator or as taking some other stance.
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court in a de novo proceeding on the discrimination issues and an
administrative record review on the personnel side. 20 8
b. Actions (other than those under Chapters 43 and 75) of the
type which are within the jurisdiction of the MSPB (e.g., reduc-
tions-in-force) but fall within the scope of the negotiated grievance
process are treated like Chapters 43 and 75 actions with the
exception that if the negotiated grievance process is chosen, FLRA
review of the arbitral award is available before any MSPB/EEOC/
Special Panel review.
c. Actions which are not of the type appealable to the MSPB
(e.g., promotion decisions) may, at the option of the employee,
be processed through the ordinary EEO process with appeal of
any agency decision to the EEOC Office of Review and Appeals. 209
Alternatively, they may be processed through the negotiated griev-
ance procedure with the opportunity to have the FLRA and EEOC
review any arbitral award though that review is restricted largely
to matters of legal interpretation. 210 Following this there is a right
(though disputed by some agencies) of the employee to a de novo
proceeding in the district court regarding the discrimination issue.
21 See infra notes 271-79 and accompanying text.
- See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.219 (1988).
210 29 C.R.F. §§ 1613.219, 1613.231(b).
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E. A Note on the Scope of Procedural Protections
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 followed the prior
historical pattern of modulating the scope of the statutorily-guar-
anteed procedural protection accorded federal employees (both
before and after the employing agency's decision to take a per-
sonnel action) according to:
1. the employee's position (e.g., competitive service, 21' ex-
cepted service, 212 or senior executive service21 3);
2. the characteristic of the incumbent (e.g., veteran 2 4 or
probationer 215); and
3. the type of personnel action (e.g., removal216 or suspension
for fourteen days or less217).
Generally, non-probationary competitive service employees and
veterans in the excepted service receive the greatest degree of pre-
action and post-action protection.
F. The Special Problem of the Mixed Case
In addressing actions alleging discrimination which would, ab-
sent that element, fall within the MSPB's jurisdiction, the House
and Senate versions of the 1978 legislation differed substantially.
The House bill allowed the EEOC to delegate to the MSPB au-
thority to make a preliminary determination in an adverse action"
raising discrimination issues, but it directed the EEOC to make
the final determination. 218 The statute, as enacted, largely adopted
211 See 5 U.S.C. § 4303(e) (1982) (MSPB appeal rights of competitive service employees
in Chapter 43 actions).
212 See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B) (1982) (non-preference excepted service employees not
covered by Chapter 75 procedures). See also Dep't of Treasury v. FLRA, 873 F.2d 1467 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Services v. FLRA, 858 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1988)
(the negotiated grievance process may not be extended to cover discharge under Chapters 43
or 75 of bargaining unit, non-preference excepted service employees).
213 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7541-7543 (protections relating to removal of career SES employees).
21- See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B) (preference eligibles in excepted service protected by
Chapter 75 procedures).
215 See 5 U.S.C. § 4303(0(2) (probationary employees in competitive service positions
excepted from Chapter 43 procedural protections).
21 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512-7513.
217 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7504 (suspensions for 14 days or less).
2I See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Report of the Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, H.R. REP. No. 95-1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978).
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the Senate version, 219 an approach dictated by the character of
most mixed actions.
The Senate report explained:
In [personnel cases involving issues of discrimination law and
pure personnel law] questions of the employee's inefficiency or
misconduct, and discrimination by the employer, will be two
sides of the same question which must be considered together.
Any provision denying the Board jurisdiction to decide certain
adverse action appeals because discrimination is raised as an
issue would make it impossible for the government to have a
single unified personnel policy which took into account the re-
quirements of all the various laws and goals governing Federal
personnel management. In the absence of full Board jurisdiction,
forum shopping and inconsistent decisions, perhaps arising out
of the same set of facts, would result.220
To create a system whereby an employee could successfully
protest his or her removal to the EEOC on discrimination grounds
and yet could lose before the Board when it considered only the
performance aspects of the case would hardly have represented
reform in a meaningful sense. But the problem of mixed cases is
broader than this.
A simple example may help to bring this point home. Assume
an employee is removed under Chapter 43 for allegedly inadequate
performance. He or she argues that the real motivation behind the
firing was racial discrimination. If the agency's proof of inade-
quate performance is particularly weak, the designated fact-finder
reviewing the agency action permissibly could rely on this very
weakness to suggest the presence of a discriminatory motive. This
is analogous to the way a Title VII action is tried in the district
courts. Following the plaintiff's prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the government to articulate a legitimate reason for the firing;
if the government fails, then the plaintiff prevails on the discrim-
ination issue. 221 In short, an adequate assessment of a personnel
action allegedly involving discrimination requires a consideration
of all the factual evidence if the goals of personnel and discrimi-
nation law are to be achieved.
219 See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. No. 95-1717, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 CoNFEPCNE REPORT].
2 See 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at 53.
=2 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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However, it is not just at the factual level that mixed cases
defy neat segregation into "personnel law" aspects and "discrim-
ination" law aspects. This problem also appears at the level of
legal doctrine. While in the abstract it might be easy in some cases
to identify a particular statute or regulation as one of the "civil
service" regime and another as one occupying the regime of "dis-
crimination law," the actual interrelationship of the two bodies
of law has hardly been comprehensively thought out by Congress.
How are these two bodies of law to fit together? For example, in
the handicap area, to what extent does the duty of "reasonable
accommodation" cut into the discretion or lack thereof possessed
by agency managers under "civil service" rules in choosing and
structuring the nature of the work force under their control?m2
This legal inseparability of mixed cases is particularly impor-
tant from a "political" point of view. Since the meshing of
discrimination statutes and civil service rules is largely a policy-
making exercise, little constrained by express or conscious con-
gressional design, the orientation of the entity having the last (or
almost the last) word is of particular importance. To the extent
that the EEOC was seen as insensitive to personnel management
considerations, resistance to vesting final administrative control
there in 1978 was to be expected. To the extent the MSPB was
feared to be more "management oriented" or less concerned by
nature with equal employment opportunity goals, opposition to
MSPB control was a foregone conclusion. This was particularly
true given MSPB's position as the inheritor of part of the authority
of the former Civil Service Commission, which was not viewed as
overly aggressive in the discrimination sphere. 23
The Senate response to these tensions, a response that laid the
foundation for the ultimate legislative compromise, was to create
an administrative structure that would assure that:
[N]either the Merit Systems Protection Board, nor the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, will be able to overrule
the other. Instead, the powers of the Board and the Commission
are carefully balanced one against the other. The committee felt
that it was absolutely essential to the success of the overall civil
service reform effort that there be this creative balance between
See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1988).
22 See FiNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 63, at 237.
[VoL. 78
FEDERAL PERSONAL COMPLAINT SYSTEMS
the authority of the Board and the Commission because of the
unique nature of the issues involved .2
4
Given this explanation for the background for the Special Panel
procedures (Section 7702 of Title 5), the "uniqueness" of the
resulting administrative scheme comes as no surprise.
225
1. The Statutory Provisions
Mixed cases are funnelled to the MSPB prior to EEOC deci-
sional involvement on the merits. If the case proceeds through the
agency in the EEOC mixed complaint process, the agency must
issue its decision within 120 days, but there is no requirement of
appeal to the MSPB prior to filing a civil action in district court.
226
If the action is filed initially with the MSPB, the MSPB must
decide the case within 120 days.2
7
Following a final MSPB decision, the employee may (but need
not) petition the EEOC to consider the MSPB's decision. 2 8 If the
EEOC accepts the petition, it may supplement the record. 229 In
any event, within sixty days of its acceptance, it must either concur
in the MSPB's decision or issue another decision differing from
the MSPB's to the extent that the EEOC finds that the MSPB
decision constitutes an incorrect interpretation of the discrimina-
tion statutes administered by the EEOC or that the MSPB decision
involving such statutes is not supported by the record. 2 0 If the
EEOC does not concur, it must refer the matter to the MSPB,
which, within thirty days, must either concur in the decision of
the EEOC or find that that decision constitutes an incorrect inter-
pretation of civil service law or is not, as to such law, supported
by the record.? 1 If the MSPB does not concur, it must reaffirm
its initial decision, with appropriate revisions. 232 Such a reaffirm-
2, 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at 52-53. See also 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 219, at 139.
See generally McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments
of Political Control, 3 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 243, 255 (1987) ("mhe coalition that forms to
create an agency ... will seek to ensure that the bargain struck among the members of the
coalition will not unravel once the coalition disbands").
- 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(2) (1982).
5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(I).
5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1).
5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(4).
5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(3)(A), (B).
-1 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(5), (c).
- 5 U.S.C. § 7702(c)(2).
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ance by the MSPB results in mandatory certification of the matter
to a Special Panel comprised of one EEOC member, one MSPB
member, and a chairperson (an outsider), appointed by the Pres-
ident with the advice and consent of the Senate. 233 This Special
Panel is to review the record and decide the issues in dispute
within forty-five days of the certification. 234 It must "give due
deference to the respective expertise of the Board and the Com-
mission in making its decision.
' '235
The statutory provisions described above seem to draw a rabbit
out of the hat. How can an EEOC decision constitute an incorrect
interpretation of civil service law when a case is referred to the
commission for its views on the meaning or applicability of dis-
crimination law? The explanation is, of course, the close relation-
ship between civil service law and discrimination law and their
inseparability in many cases.
In this complicated fashion, EEOC involvement was insured
as a hedge against the possibility that the MSPB might not be a
sympathetic forum for discrimination claims on the facts or that
the MSPB might fail to give appropriate consideration to discrim-
ination law in its legal interpretations.
2. The Special Panel in Practice
To date, there have been only three Special Panel proceedings,
none of which resulted from a case processed through the nego-
tiated grievance procedure.
Seven years after the enactment of the 1978 Civil Service
Reform Act, the first certification to the Special Panel occurred.
The case, Ignacio v. United States Postal Service,236 involved the
removal of an employee for unfitness for duty as a letter carrier.
The dispute between the MSPB and the EEOC centered on an
issue of law, not fact: whether an agency was required to consider
reassignment of a handicapped employee as part of the "reason-
able accommodation" to which the employee was entitled by law.
In its final decision, 237 the Special Panel accepted the EEOC's
affirmative resolution of this question, and no further discussion
of the merits is necessary here. Rather, Ignacio is important to
-3 5 U.S.C. § 7702(d)(1), (6).
5 U.S.C. § 7702(d)(2)(A).
-5 5 U.S.C. § 7702(d)(2)(B).
23 28 M.S.P.R. 337 (Spec. Pan. 1985).
30 M.S.P.R. 471 (Spec. Pan. 1986).
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this study since, as the first proceeding of its type, the Panel felt
obliged to construe Section 7702 and define (or create) various
procedures to be applied in future Panel proceedings. 238 In this
regard, it would appear that complication breeds complication,
for the rules adhered to by the majority of the Panel depart
substantially from what a simple-minded (though not for that
reason incorrect) reading of the statute suggests-'"decide the is-
sues [i.e., the merits] in dispute [one way or another] and issue a
final decision" 239 in accordance with that determination.
Since a dispositive treatment of the "law of the Special Panel"
is not appropriate here, a brief summary of the rules established
by the Ignacio majority is sufficient. The apparent purpose of the
rules is to extricate the Special Panel from deciding the merits of
the issues presented regarding civil service law and discrimination
law unless it is absolutely necessary. This approach is curious, to
say the least, in view of the congressional history behind the
legislative compromise. Accordingly, the Special Panel will:
1. accept the EEOC's decision if the MSPB was wrong in its
conclusion that the EEOC had misinterpreted civil service law
and the EEOC's conclusion that the MSPB misinterpreted dis-
crimination law is reasonable;
2. accept the MSPB decision on reference back from the
EEOC where the MSPB was correct in its finding that the EEOC
misinterpreted civil service law and the EEOC was "unreasona-
ble" in its determination that the MSPB was incorrect in con-
struing discrimination law; and
3. decide the "merits" of the case only where the MSPB
was correct in its decision regarding EEOC's misreading of civil
service law and the EEOC was correct in its finding that the
MSPB was wrong on the discrimination law issue.
4. ask if the EEOC based its decision on civil service law
"as the necessary premise for its conclusion" in determining
whether the MSPB was correct in finding that the EEOC decision
"constituted" an incorrect interpretation of civil service law. 24°
The Panel found that the MSPB was wrong in finding that
the EEOC decision constituted an incorrect reading of civil service
Im Id. at 483.
-9 5 U.S.C. § 7702(d)(2)(A)(1979). This more straightforward approach seems to be the
one that was advocated by the Chairman of the Panel, Herbert E. Ellingwood. See 30 MSPR
487-491.
30 M.S.P.R. at 483-86.
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law (thereby resulting in an acceptance of the EEOC decision).241
A wag might observe that the first Special Panel thereby estab-
lished that it should never have been empaneled to begin with and
the weight of its decision should be determined accordingly.
A close reading of the Ignacio rules discloses that they basically
demand a reexamination of the required statutory findings that
are conditions precedent to certification to the Panel. According
to the Ignacio Panel, the rules are designed "to prevent either
agency from forcing a Special Panel review on the merits of issues
in the other agency's area of primary expertise without a sufficient
basis to do so." ' 24 2 In other words, the underlying assumption is
that if an agency cannot by itself have the authority to resolve all
issues according to its own views, it will opt for a decision by a
special body where it at least has some input by virtue of its
membership. The role of the Special Panel is allegedly to restrict
this option. Of course, if the Ignacio majority is correct regarding
the disposition of the agencies, it would be difficult to construct
any statutory scheme to avoid attempts of overreaching3 3 That
such attempt should be assumed and dictate the complicated rules
adopted by Ignacio is debatable at best.
244
Moreover, the approach of the majority in Ignacio overlooks
the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the realm of civil service
law from that of discrimination law. To take the position that the
Panel will defer now to one agency and then to another based on
its determination whether the MSPB was "correct" in some ab-
stract sense that the EEOC's decision constituted a misinterpre-
tation of civil service law is to avoid one of the central problems
that called for an independent review by the Special Panel.
245
The delays involved in the Ignacio case should not escape
attention. Mr. Ignacio was removed by his agency in December
1980. In September 1983, the full Board issued its decision revers-
ing the presiding official and sustaining the removal. The second
Board decision, both differing with the EEOC decision and certi-
fying the matter to the Special Panel, was issued in January 1985.
2' Id. at 486.
30 M.S.P.R. at 483 n.11. See also id. at 484.
2A1 There is some suggestion in the legislative record that at least the Senate had similar
doubts. See 1978 S. Report at 59 (mandatory certification to the court of appeals).
In fact, the Senate's apparent concern for overreaching resulted not in a proposal to
hedge the court of appeal's authority but rather to mandate jurisdiction in the case of
disagreement. Id.
211 This is basically Chairman Ellingwood's argument. See 30 M.S.P.R. at 488-491.
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Finally, in February 1986, the Special Panel handed down its
decision.2
Stating that the statutory deadlines under section 770224 were
missed is a gross understatement. The 1978 Conference report
indicated that the deadlines were "to assure the employee the right
to have as expeditious a resolution of the matter as possible" and
that the Committee "expect[ed] the agencies to devote the re-
sources and planning necessary to assure compliance with these
statutory deadlines.' '248 Of course, being the first case going the
whole route, some delay might have been expected as the "kinks"
in the system were "ironed out." However, as will be noted
below,249 delays have also affected subsequent proceedings.
Unfortunately, the second Special Panel proceeding, Lynch v.
Department of Education,25° was ill-starred as well. In early 1982,
an employee was removed for inadequate performance. The action
was affirmed by a presiding official of the MSPB. The EEOC
accepted a petition to consider this decision. The EEOC's subse-
quent opinion differed with the MSPB's on the basis that the
presiding official failed to analyze properly the issue presented
(handicap discrimination). The EEOC offered what it considered
to be the appropriate line of legal analysis without applying it to
the facts of the case. On reference back, the Board agreed with
the EEOC's general statement of discrimination law but found
that the presiding official should have sustained one of the per-
formance-related charges. 211
In short, there was no dispute between the MSPB and the
EEOC regarding the applicable law and there was no dispute
between the two agencies regarding the law's application since the
EEOC did not apply the law to the facts. Of course, it was such
disputes that the Special Panel was intended to resolve. Neverthe-
less, accepting the MSPB's certification as binding on it, the Lynch
Panel decided the case anyway, while admitting that its designed
role was to resolve disputes between the MSPB and EEOC. 25 2 (The
Panel decision was handed down in August 1986 after having been
certified in January of that year, thus substantially missing the
w Id.
See supra notes 228-35 and accompanying text.
20 1978 Conference Report at 141.
z, See infra notes 250-65.
21 31 M.S.P.R. 519 (Spec. Panel 1986).
2' Id. at 527-30.
31 M.S.P.R. at 525.
1989-90]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
statutory forty-five day period for disposition.) The Panel viewed
its role at this point as having to accept the MSPB decision if it
was reasonable, which the panel found it was. 253
Almost a year later, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia vacated the decision of the Lynch Special
Panel and the MSPB decision that certified the case to the Panel.2 54
It did so on the basis that the Board lacked authority in the
reference back to it from the EEOC to basically reopen the initial
decision of the presiding employee and issue a new decision.255 In
May 1988, on remand from the court, the Board determined that
the employing agency had not made reasonable accommodation
for Mr. Lynch's handicap and ordered his restoration and back
pay. 256 After the Board denied its petition for reconsideration in
December 1988, the OPM petitioned the Federal Circuit for judi-
cial review of the Board's decision. Thus, seven years after the
employee's removal, a final disposition has yet to be achieved.
Moreover, even after a Federal Circuit decision, the employee may
sue de novo in district court if the administrative process has not
provided relief.
Encouragingly, the third Special Panel proceeding, Shoemaker
v. United States Department of the Army, 257 neither injected ad-
ditional complications into the life of the administrative structure
nor ended in total futility. Finding that the MSPB was indeed
correct that the EEOC had misinterpreted a civil service rule, the
Special Panel accepted the Board decision under the second rule
of Ignacio.258 Delay plagued this case, however, with the contested
removal occurring in May 1983, and the Special Panel issuing its
decision in September 1987 after an MSPB certification in April
1987.
On its apparent way to a Special Panel, another recent case,
Gubisch v. Secretary of the Treasury,2 59 ran amuck. The case
illustrates some additional confusion surrounding the application
of Section 7702. An employee appealed his removal to the MSPB,
expressly not raising an issue of handicap discrimination. He lost
21 Id. at 525.
11 Lynch v. Bennett, 665 F. Supp. 62 (D.C.D.C. 1987).
2 Id. at 66.
Lynch v. Dep't of Educ., 37 M.S.P.R. 12, 15 (1988).
34 M.S.P.R. 597 (Spec. Panel 1987).
- Shoemaker v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 34 M.S.P.R. 597, 602 (Spec. Panel 1987).
-9 36 M.S.P.R. 634 (Spec. Panel 1988).
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his MSPB appeal. 260 Soon after filing his appeal to the Board, he
amended a pending EEO complaint to allege that his removal was
based on discrimination. After the agency found no discrimina-
tion, an appeal was taken to the EEOC and, in addition, a petition
under section 7702 was filed for EEOC consideration of the MSPB
decision on the removal. The EEOC issued a decision finding a
failure to afford the employee reasonable accommodation.
261
On reference back to the Board, the MSPB refused to consider
the case under Section 7702 because it was allegedly improper for
the employee to invoke mixed case procedures without having
raised the issue of discrimination before the Board. Accordingly,
the EEOC's acceptance of the petition for review was improper
as was the EEOC's issuance of a decision on that petition.262 The
Board reaffirmed its earlier decision upholding the employee's
termination. 263 The Board noted that the current EEOC mixed case
regulations 26 prevent the severing of issues that apparently were
the cause of the parallel proceedings and confusion in this case.
The EEOC later accepted that the Board was correct in its finding
that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction to consider the employee's
Section 7702 petition.265 The Commission reopened its previous
decision on the EEO appeal from the agency decision on the
removal and reversed its finding of discrimination. However, in
April 1989, the United States District Court for the District of
- Gubisch v. Sec. of the Treasury, 36 M.S.P.R. 634, 635 (Spec. Panel 1988).
26, Id. at 636.
See also Davis v. Dep't of the Navy, 37 M.S.P.R. 120, 88 F.M.S.R. 885180 (June
3, 1988) (Gubisch extended to case where some discrimination claims, viz., race and age, were
raised before MSPB but not the one at issue, i.e., handicapping; Evcic v. Department of the
Navy, 37 M.S.P.R. 9 (1988) (Gubsch extended to waiver of discrimination claim initially
raised before MSPB).
Compare O'Neal v. U.S. Postal Serv., 37 M.S.P.R. 125 (1988) (after initial MSPB
decision rejecting handicap claim and EEOC decision accepting it, full Board decision, more
than 3 years after the initial one, found that the underlying action was not MSPB appealable
and therefore Section 7702 was inapplicable); Maiorana v. U.S. Postal Serv., 38 M.S.P.R.
665 (1988) (seven years after allegedly improper restoration and after EEOC, on appeal of an
agency decision on EEO complaint, found that the personnel action was MSPB appealable,
the Board dismissed the employee's appeal to it finding the action was not MSPB appealable
and thus not a mixed case, and, in addition, that the EEOC/MSPB disagreement was on a
matter of "jurisdiction" and not within the cognizance of the Special Panel). See also Marenus
v. Dep't Health & Human Serv., 39 M.S.P.R. 498 (1989) (Board waives time limits for appeal
from negotiated grievance procedure in a mixed case where appellant mistakenly filed appeal
with EEOC first).
Gubisch, 36 M.S.P.R. at 638-39.
2" See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
See Gubisch v. Baker, Request No. 05870472.
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Columbia held that the EEOC could not reopen its prior decision
and ordered full relief for the complainant.
266
There is no indication in the EEOC's second Gubisch opinion
that, despite section 7702, the EEOC considered itself without the
power-on direct appeal to it-to award relief to the employee,
even though his termination was MSPB appealable. Nor did the
district court opinion enforcing the result in the initial EEOC
appeal question the agency's authority in that regard. Other EEOC
decisions suggest that the EEOC does consider it has the authority,
at least in the absence of timely objection by the employing agency,
to deal with MSPB appealable matters.
For example, in Saenz v. Baker2 67 an employee filed an EEO
complaint stating that his retirement was the result of a reprisal
against him for having filed two prior EEO complaints. The
agency accepted the complaint and there was an investigation and
hearing by an EEOC complaints examiner. The agency then re-
jected a proposed finding of discrimination. The decision was
reversed on appeal to the EEOC, which ordered reinstatement.
268
The agency requested that this decision be reopened on the basis
that constructive discharge and the remedy of reinstatement made
the case mixed and within the initial jurisdiction of the MSPB.
The EEOC's prior decision was, accordingly, said to be a violation
of section 7702. The EEOC, in not deciding the merits of that
argument, found that the jurisdictional objection was untimely
and the agency itself had treated the matter as non-mixed. The
Commission then left its previous decision in place.
Discussion of Ignacio and subsequent cases, including those
mixed cases that never came before the Special Panel, illustrates
several points regarding the administrative scheme for handling
mixed cases: the potential for delay (despite the statutory com-
mands to the contrary) while the cases move through the various
steps; 269 the conflict and confusion regarding the appropriate (i.e.,
the congressionally intended) role of the Special Panel and, on the
part of those responsible for administering section 7702 (i.e., the
Gubisch v. Brady, C.A. No. 88-2031 (April 20, 1989), 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Can.
(BNA) 1063 (D.D.C. 1989).
m EEOC Request No. 05870534 (June 9, 1988).
2 Id.
26 See, e.g., Gomez v. Dep't Air Force, 869 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1989) (in absence of
clear assertion of power by EEOC to sever discrimination claims in mixed cases, statutory
time limits for commencing civil action in district court applied to EEOC disposition of entire
case).
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MSPB and EEOC), regarding when that provision applies and
what their authority under it is; and confusion, or at least inat-
tention, within the agencies in sorting out mixed from non-mixed
cases for processing. These difficulties place in consideration the
question of whether the costs justify the benefits achieved by
retaining the current structure. Certainly, even if some form of
Special Panel proceeding is retained, modifications-including
statutory ones-are most assuredly required. In considering these
matters, it should be noted that the Conference Committee in 1978
did not expect that a Special Panel proceeding would be a frequent
occurrence. 270 Fortunately, expectations of Congress have not been
disappointed in that regard.
3. Judicial Review in Mixed Cases
The preceding discussion of mixed cases avoided the question
of judicial review in instances where an employee is dissatisfied
with the results of the administrative process. Both the statutory
language271 and the legislative history272 unambiguously indicate
the intent to preserve existing rights to a trial de novo in the
United States District Courts. 273 Where exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is required, actions may be brought after certain
steps have been completed in the administrative processing of the
mixed case or after the passage of various specified time intervals
where the required administrative action has not occurred.2 74 The
prevailing employee may obtain attorney's fees.275 Moreover, the
court has the authority to appoint an attorney to represent the
2" 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 219, at 142.
5 U.S.C. §§ 7702(e)(1), (3) (1982).
See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 219, at 139, 141.
23 Apparently some agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services,
take the position that employees pursuing mixed cases through the negotiated grievance process
waive a right to trial de novo. Since § 7121(d) clearly contemplates that mixed cases can be
processed through the negotiated grievance process to the MSPB for review under § 7702,
which is structured in many ways on the assumption that judicial review is available following
the administrative process, it is difficult to accept an argument that would in essence put
federal employees in a worse situation than employees of private employers who are not
barred from trial de novo in the district courts following arbitration. See Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Cf. Atchison Topeka & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557
(1987); Barrentine v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
v4 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(2), (e) (1982). See also 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 219, at 141-42; 29 C.F.R. § 1613.421 (1988).
"' In MSPB and EEO processes, attorneys fees are also available. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)
(1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(d) (1988).
1989-901
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
employee under appropriate circumstances. 276 These statutory pro-
visions may assist individuals who might otherwise bear the dis-
advantages of litigating pro se.
An employee may sue in the district court in a mixed case and
argue that the agency action was not supported on the merits (i.e.,
the personnel side), and alternatively, that it was motivated by
discrimination. The Federal Circuit has been found to lack juris-
diction over any part of a mixed case where the employee seeks
to challenge the MSPB's decision on the discrimination issue.
277
Presumably the lack of jurisdiction exists regardless of whether or
not the MSPB alone, the MSPB and EEOC, or the Special Panel
have issued decisions. All these decisions are expressly denomi-
nated judicially "appealable actions" by section 7702.278
Curiously, the district court apparently is expected to conduct
a "record" review on the personnel side of the case (assuming
prior MSPB adjudication) using the deferential standards appli-
cable in Federal Circuit review of the MSPB in non-mixed cases
and a de novo review on the discrimination side. 279 How this
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), 16(2) (1982).
See, e.g., Williams v. Dep't of the Army, 715 F.2d 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (involving
a case where the MSPB had made a decision); Doyle v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.
1985) (involving a case where the time limits for administrative processing had lapsed and the
plaintiff filed in district court). But see Wall v. United States, 871 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989)
(holding that Federal Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction to review an MSPB finding of lack of
jurisdiction in a case where the claimant alleged but Board did not find an involuntary
retirement and where that finding might, according to the court, in effect dispose of the
discrimination claim on the merits).
It is not clear, however, what should happen if the employee appeals to the Federal
Circuit solely on the personnel issue and then sues in District Court on the discrimination
claim. The courts have not yet answered to what extent administrative findings that have been
judicially reviewed are binding in the district court if preclusion would impact on the de novo
hearing.
- 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702(a)(3), (b)(5)(A), (c), (d)(2)(A) (1982). An interesting question is
whether, if there is a Special Panel, the OPM can obtain review of the results in the Federal
Circuit. After the Panel issues its decision, the MSPB is required to order the employing
agency to carry it out. Id. § 7702(c)(3). § 7703(d) authorizes the OPM to file a petition for
judicial review in the Federal Circuit of "any final order or decision of the Board," that
would seem to fit these cases, though the preconditions to filing, e.g., error of the Board,
seem only awkwardly applicable to Special Panel proceedings. Since the reason that mixed
cases end up in the district court is the statutory right to trial de novo of the employee, there
would appear to be no reason why the Williams case should be applicable to OPM. Cf.
Moore v. Devine, 780 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1986). See also infra text accompanying notes 575-
78. Nevertheless, the statutory language of § 7703(d) may not be sufficient as a basis of
OPM's authority to petition the Federal Circuit in these cases. This is merely one aspect of
the broader issue of the government's right to judicial review in discrimination cases, See infra
notes 572-79 and accompanying text.
2" See, e.g., Ahr v. Nelson, 632 F. Supp. 148 (S.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 802 F.2d 454;
Tickles v. Hodel, 38 F.E.P. Cases 272 (D.D.C. 1985).
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operation is to proceed is one of the more problematic aspects of
the mixed case phenomenon.
If the court first proceeds to conduct a typical limited record
deferential review of the MSPB decision and sustains it, it will
then proceed to the discrimination issue. In presenting its side of
this matter, the plaintiff will attempt to establish that the real
reason for the firing was discrimination and that the agency's
articulated reason was mere pretext. But here the court will be
confronted by its prior finding that the agency in fact had a
sustainable basis for the firing, including perhaps the necessary
predicate that the MSPB resolution of the discrimination issue
was, if not correct, at least permissible. Of course, notwithstanding
that the agency may have had a legitimate basis for removing the
employee, the real reason for its action may have been to discrim-
inate on prohibited grounds. Nevertheless, a prior finding of ad-
equate support for the administrative action must have some
inhibiting effect on the court's willingness later to make its own
finding of discrimination. The upshot may be that the district
court may proceed to the discrimination issue first where the
record is made de novo. The agency is allowed to produce more
material supportive of its action, to rebut the plaintiff's attempt
to prove pretext, than is contained in the administrative record
allegedly supporting the personnel action. If the agency succeeds
in defeating the plaintiff's prima facie case on the discrimination
issue, it is possible it will still lose on the personnel side because
the administrative record may be weak, lacking the material that
is before the court on the discrimination charge.
If a case proceeds not through the administrative process but
through the negotiated grievance process with or without MSPB
review of the arbitrator's or FLRA's decision, it is simply not
clear how the district court is to conduct its review of the pure
"personnel" aspects of the case. Presumably, some deference to
the arbitral findings on the personnel side is required.
Anomalies abound with regard to mixed cases, so such prob-
lems may not be overly surprising. Again, the factual and legal
relationship of the personnel aspects of a case and the discrimi-
nation aspects create real difficulties in case management.
G. The Role of the Office of Special Counsel and Extra-statutory
Remedies
The complicated system of appellate routes, the availability of
which is determined by the type of personnel action and type of
1989-90]
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employee (including his or her inclusion or exclusion from a bar-
gaining unit), requires careful scrutiny to determine what, if any,
express statutory and regulatory procedures are available to a
particular employee. The bargaining unit member must, in addi-
tion, consider the terms of the applicable collective bargaining
agreement.
With respect to at least some types of actions, scrutiny will
disclose that some employees are afforded only minimal protec-
tion. In the case of the probationary member of the competitive
service, as an example, termination for inadequate performance
or misconduct cannot, as a matter of law, be covered by the
negotiated grievance process.8 0 If discrimination is not involved,
the EEO process is unavailable. Neither is the agency grievance
system available if removal is for unsatisfactory performance.
281
Also, appeal rights to the MSPB are nonexistent for probationary
employees except in very limited circumstances.
282
Employees in this or similar positions, as well as others who
choose not to rely solely on the formal appeal routes, may be able
to obtain some assistance through the Office of Special Counsel
[OSC]. Pursuant to the powers and duties of the OSC,283 the
Office is required to investigate allegations of prohibited personnel
practices and other civil service law violations. 2 4 The OSC may,
in its discretion, seek both corrective action from the MSPB and
disciplinary action against an employee engaged in that type of
practice. 285
The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act specifically requires the
Office to investigate prohibited personnel practices, including dis-
crimination that falls within the jurisdiction of the EEOC. 28 Not-
withstanding that fact, the OSC's regulations have consistently
provided that, in view of the existence of the EEO administrative
complaint process, the Office "will normally avoid duplicating
those procedures and will defer to those procedures rather than
initiating an independent investigation. ' ' 28 7 Deferral will not, how-
210 See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 709 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. FLRA, 848 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
See 5 C.F.R. § 771.206(c)(1)(xiii) (1988).
See 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 (discrimination for partisan political reasons or marital status;
agency failure to comply with mandated procedures).
m See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
m' Id.
- 5 U.S.C. §§ 1206(a), (c) and 2302(b)(1) [as amended by Whistleblower Act in 1989].
- See 5 C.F.R. § 1251.3 (1988).
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ever, occur "where it appears that the agency is not processing
the complaint consistent with provisions of applicable statutes and
regulations." s The Office asserts that, where appropriate, in lieu
of investigating, it will monitor the processing of a complaint. 2
89
The legality of this policy remains to be determined.
Regarding the types of corrective action available, the existence
of a prohibited personnel practice such as nepotism may not mean
that the complaining employee or applicant will obtain the position
or benefit that was denied as a result of the illegal conduct. The
statute speaks only generally of corrective remedies and does not
define the type that may be granted by the MSPB. Arguably, if
the MSPB sustains a charge such as nepotism, the ordinary pro-
cedures for selection or promotion will be followed thereafter. The
result may be that the complaintant is still not chosen for the
position.
Moreover, the scope of the OSC's authority to obtain correc-
tive action from the MSPB is not unlimited: there must be an
allegation of a prohibited personnel practice or a violation of
other civil service laws.290 This scope of authority is sufficiently
broad, however, to encompass most cases where an employee has
been subject to a personnel action that he or she wants to con-
test.291 The proscription of prohibited personnel practices applies
to positions in the competitive, excepted, and Senior Executive
services292 and to a wide spectrum of significant personnel ac-
tions .293
For example, take the classic case of the probationary member
of the competitive service who is discharged. The employee is not
protected by Chapters 43 or 75 procedures and appeals. 294 It nev-
ertheless is a prohibited personnel practice to "discriminate for or
against any employee ... on the basis of conduct which does not
adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant or
the performance of others." 295 In this instance, the employee might
- Id. at § 1251.3(a).
- Id. at § 1251.3(b).
See supra notes 99-107 and infra notes 591-95 and accompanying text.
21 See Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text and supra notes 150-52 and accom-
panying text.
2 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
- 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (1988). See generally Harvey v. M.S.P.B., 802 F.2d 537 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). But see Garrow v. Gramm, 856 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting this provision
as a sufficient basis to create a "property interest" subject to due process protection).
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allege that the basis for the dismissal was his or her conviction of
a crime such as reckless driving, purportedly having absolutely no
bearing on his or her official duties. While the probationer has in
these circumstances no right to resort to the MSPB, EEOC, or
the negotiated grievance process (though the agency administrative
grievance system may be available here), the employee can ask for
the OSC's assistance and perhaps obtain an MSPB order of rein-
statement and back pay.
But what might happen if the employee asks for the OSC's
assistance, an investigation is conducted, and the OSC decides not
to seek MSPB corrective action? One option is to seek judicial
review of the OSC's decision not to take the case to the MSPB,
but, after Heckler v. Chaney 296 such a suit may be doomed to
failure.
297
Another option for an employee-one that might be attempted
regardless of whether or not the OSC and MSPB lack jurisdiction
to provide any relief-is suit in federal district court seeking
judicial review of the employing agency's decision 298 under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 299 Alternatively, the suit might in-
voke a so-called "implied right" of action theory based on the
civil service statutes.300 In fact, much litigation relying on these
approaches has been brought since 1978.
The Supreme Court recently issued a decision that has pro-
foundly affected this type of litigation. In United States v. Fausto,
30
1
a non-preference eligible member of the excepted service, sus-
pended for misconduct, filed suit in the Claims Court under the
Back Pay Act. 30 2 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, took
note of the absence in the Civil Service Reform Act of any pro-
vision expressly affording administrative or judicial review in the
- 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (agency's decision not to take enforcement action unreviewable
without congressional intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion).
"I See, e.g., Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (indicating that the only
judicial review available relates to the OSC's investigation and its adequacy).
21 In such a suit, the employee seeking declaratory and/or equitable relief may allege,
for example, that the personnel action was "arbitrary" or "capricious" as a factual matter
or "not in accordance with law" in the sense that it was infected by a "prohibited personnel
practice." See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
5 U.S.C. chap. 7 (1982).
300 In such a suit, whether brought against the agency or agency officials individually,
for declaratory, injunctive or monetary relief, the argument might be that the personnel
decision was infected by a prohibited personnel practice.
01 484 U.S. 439 (1988).
- 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1982).
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circumstances and the "comprehensive nature" of the statutory
scheme including the pattern of inclusion and exclusion of specific
employee classes with regard to procedural protections. 303 Justice
Scalia concluded that the judicial remedy sought was unavailable
in the plaintiff's case.3°4
Earlier, Justice Scalia, as a member of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, had authored the court's
opinion in Carducci v. Regan. 30 5 In that case, an employee pro-
tested his reassignment through the agency grievance procedures
and then to the Office of Special Counsel without success. He
then sought APA review in the district court. The court of appeals
rebuffed this attempt, relying on other cases arriving at similar
results. 30 The outcome of Carducci and of many other appellate
decisions indicates that the Office of Special Counsel may be the
last (and, in some instances, the only) resort for an employee
seeking to contest a personnel action. 30
7
An exceedingly clear statement by Congress that no rights and
remedies exist outside of those expressly granted in the civil service
law would, except in a case where such a preclusion is unconsti-
tutional, settle these arguments once and for all. The likelihood
3o United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 668 (1988); see also Webster v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) (national security termination not subject to APA review on non-
constitutional grounds). The extent of influence of Fausto is seen, for example, in recent cases
limiting extension of the NGP process to removals of non-preference eligible excepted service
employees. See Dep't of Treasury v. FLRA, 58 U.S.L.W. 2170, No. 88-1159 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See also Karahalios v. Nat'l Federation of Fed. Employees, .. ____U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1282
(1989) (no private cause of action by federal employees for breach of union's statutory duty
of fair representation-relying in part on Fausto).
Fausto, 108 S. Ct. at 677.
- 714 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
106 Id. at 173, citing Borrell v. U.S. Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), and Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
' See, e.g., Booher v. U.S. Postal Serv., 843 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1988) (probationary
employee may not sue unless clear disregard of agency regulation shown); Harrison v. Bowen,
815 F.2d 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But cf. Lynch v. Bennett, 665 F. Supp. 62 (D.D.C. 1987)
(permitting APA review for procedural errors in second Special Panel proceeding). Compare
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (national security suspension, if based on constitutionally
impermissible policy, is judicially reviewable) with Schweiker v. Chilicky, .. U.S. _ , 108
S. Ct. 2460 (1988) (Bivens remedy not available to claimants allegedly denied Social Security
benefits unconstitutionally). See also Spagnola, 859 F.2d 223 (en banc per curiam opinion)
(rejecting Bivens remedies for constitutional violations but preserving equitable remedies, citing
cases both pro and con). See generally Note, The Scope of Bush v. Lucas: An Examination
of Congressional Remedies for Whistleblowers, 88 CoLum. L. REv. 587 (1988) (dealing with
the right to raise constitutional claims). See generally U.S. Mamrr SYsTms PROTECTION BOARD,
THE OFFICE OF SPEcIAL. COUNSEL: JUDICIAL VIEWS ON PROSECUTION OF PRoMrrED PERSONNEL
PRAcTI c s (1987).
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that Congress will be willing to do so in the near term at least is
fanciful. At the same time, the potential existence of "implied"
judicial remedies cannot be ignored in examining the overall struc-
ture of federal employee appeal rights. Judicial remedies impact
both the managers' willingness to exercise their discretionary func-
tions and the duties imposed on them by civil service law as well
as increase the costs of governmental operation in numerous ways.
Because of the lack of empirical and other evidence, this article
can only mention the issue of extra-statutory remedies and urge
that any statutory reform take those remedies into account.0 8
III. THE VARIous APPEAL SYSTEMS IN OPERATION
Statistics rarely tell the whole story but they cannot be ignored
in judging the need for and feasibility of reform. The statistics
reported herein were either contained in agency annual or special
reports or furnished at the author's request by agency officials.
Unfortunately, the statistical record is incomplete in a variety of
arguably important respects. Much of the other information con-
tained in this section was gleaned from interviews with agency and
union officials, arbitrators, and private attorneys.
A. Merit Systems Protection Board
During the 1988 fiscal year, there were 6,402 initial appeals
decided on procedural or substantive grounds by MSPB adminis-
trative judges.3°9 Fifty-two percent, or 3,348, involved adverse
actions (basically Chapter 75 matters), and four percent, or 273,
were Chapter 43 proceedings.310 During the six year period of 1983
to 1988, while the total number of initial appeals decided declined
from 8,076 to 6,402, the percentage of adverse actions and per-
formance-based actions decided by the Board remained largely
stable. 3
11
The settlement rate of initial appeals is very high indeed, partly
in response to the Board's announced policy in favor of informal
resolution of disputes. Since 1984, the rate has risen steadily from
See infra note 598 and following text.
U.S. MERm SYSTEMS PRoTECTioN BoARD, ANmuAL REPoRT FiScAL YEAR 1988 [here-
inafter 1988 MSPB ANNuAL REPORT] at 30.
310 Id. at 31.
3" Id.; U.S. MRrr SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, A STuDY OF CASES DEcnan BY Tim
U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD iN FIScAL YE. 1987 [hereinafter 1987 MSPB CASE
REPORT] at 11.
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six percent of cases that are not dismissed on procedural grounds
to forty-eight percent in 1988.312 Settlements may include accep-
tance by the employee of his or her dismissal in return for cleans-
ing the employment record of various particulars or mitigation of
the initial agency-imposed sanction. In examining settlement rates
for particular types of action, in fiscal 1987, forty-eight percent
of adverse action appeals and fifty-six percent of performance
actions were settled.31 3 In 1988, sixty-three percent of adverse
action cases and sixty-seven percent of performance actions were
settled. 31
4
Some private practitioners and agencies have been critical of
the Board's emphasis on settlement. Critics believe that this em-
phasis has encouraged overly aggressive pursuit of pre-trial reso-
lution by administrative judges. 31 5 Those officials receive
performance awards in part based on their respective settlement
rate.
With regard to the cases that were not settled or dismissed but
rather were adjudicated on the merits, the rates for initial decisions
affirming employing agencies' actions remained relatively constant
between fiscal years 1983 and 1988. The affirmation rates have
ranged from a high of 80.3 percent in 1988 to a low of seventy
percent in 1985 .316 However, when all initial decisions issued are
considered, thirty-two percent modified the agency action in some
way.31 7 This appears to be in large part the result of the MSPB
settlement initiative. 3
18
The MSPB has adopted a policy that all initial appeals (whether
or not discrimination is alleged) be decided within 120 days from
the date of filing.319 Given the pre-1978 history of delay in adju-
dication of employee appeals, 320 Congress in the Civil Service
312 1988 MSPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 39.
"1 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 9.
3" U.S. MER=T SYSTEMS PROTECTION BoARD, A STuDy oF CASES DECIDED By THE U.S.
MEmRT SysEMs PROTECTION BoARD iN FIsCAL YEAR 1988 [hereinafter 1988 MSPB CASE
REPoRT] at 9.
"I See, e.g., McCullough v. U.S. Postal Service, 40 M.S.P.R. 476, 89 F.M.S.R. 895158
(May 9, 1989) (in response to petition for review of initial decision, Board concluded that
there was insufficient evidence to conclude that administrative judge coerced settlement).
"1 1988 MSPB ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 31; 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra
note 311, at 11.
"1 1988 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 314, at 13.
318 Id.
3,9 See, e.g., id. at 5.
3 See 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at 10.
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Reform Act required the Board to establish clear deadlines for
case disposition.3 21 The act dictates that the deadlines are to be
"consistent with the interests of fairness. ' 322 As a result, the time
to process an initial appeal has dropped from an average of 199
days in fiscal year 1983 to seventy-three days in fiscal year 1988.
32
3
In 1988, 99.6 percent of initial appeals were decided within the
120 day period. 324 This compared to 99.8 percent in 1987.25
Some though not all private practitioners and even some agency
officials interviewed found that the emphasis on the 120 day limit
interferes with their ability to prepare for more complex cases.
3 26
Mixed cases, requiring discovery and trial time to probe witnesses
in order to present inferential proof of improper motive, would
be an example of a complex case. Of course, with mixed cases the
statute itself imposes a 120 day deadline for MSPB disposition.
327
Violation of that deadline allows the appellant to file a suit in the
District Courts under the anti-discrimination statutes. 328 The point
of some of the interviewees was, however, that if an employee
wants to proceed through the administrative process, the Board
and the presiding officials should be more flexible.
With regard to representation at the MSPB, pro se appellants
constitute a very significant portion of the total. For example,
from January 1 to September 30, 1987, appellants were represented
by private attorneys about thirty-one percent of the time and by
unions about sixteen percent of the time. On the other hand,
forty-five percent represented themselves and nine percent were
represented by friends, family members, or co-workers with pre-
sumably little or no legal training. 329 In 1988, only fifty-five per-
cent of appellants were represented by an attorney, union
321 5 U.S.C. § 7701(i)(1) (1982).
32 Id.
32 1988 MSPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 30; 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra
note 311, at 13.
324 1988 MSPB ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 30.
31 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 12-13.
326 But see U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTING OmrcE, MERrr SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD: CASE
PROCESSInG TnMELuEss AND PARTIciPANTs' VIEws ON BOARD AcTIvrrms, GAO/GGD-87-97 at
22-23 (indicating some dissatisfaction with time limits but seeming to suggest that shorter
rather than longer time limits were favored by most respondents to survey). See also Biberstine
v. Dodds, DC 07528710301 (July 1, 1988) (granting a continuance that will cause a case to
go beyond the 120 limit is not in itself reason to deny an otherwise proper continuance in a
non-discrimination case).
- See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1) (1982).
:28 5 U.S.C. § 7702(e)(1)(B).
29 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 14.
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representative, or other person.330 The available statistics do not
disclose the extent to which the percentage of pro se appearances
varies depending on the type of case, e.g., adverse action versus
a retirement decision, and the particular MSPB regional office,
though there is some indication that such variances indeed occur.
For example, apparently in the Washington, D.C. Regional Office,
appellants in Chapters 43 and 75 actions are generally represented
by counsel. It also appears that, for reasons now obscure, hearings
are held in fewer cases where legal representation of the appellant
is absent (twelve percent) than in others (thirty-one percent).
331
Regarding mixed cases, the available EEOC and MSPB statis-
tics were, unfortunately, less than complete. Of the 6,512 initial
MSPB appeals decided during fiscal 1987, there were 1,682 (twenty-
six percent) where discrimination was alleged. 332 During 1988, in
1,898 of the 6,402 initial appeals decided (thirty percent) there
were allegations of discrimination. 333 These figures apparently rep-
resent all of the mixed cases that came before the MSPB whether
as mixed appeals or cases that originated with a mixed complaint
in the EEO process. 334 In 305 of the cases in 1987 and 945 of the
cases in 1988, the allegations of discrimination were withdrawn. 335
Of the 2,540 initial appeals not dismissed or settled in 1987, one
percent (fifteen) of the cases involved reversal of agency action on
the basis of a discrimination finding. 336 During 1987, of the 1,377
initial appeals in which decisions were issued on allegations of
discrimination, a finding of discrimination was issued in four
percent (fifty-three) of the cases. 337 In 1988, of the 2066 initial
appeals not dismissed or settled, one percent (fifteen cases) in-
volved reversal of the agency action on the basis of a discrimina-
tion finding.33 8 Of the 953 cases in which decisions were issued in
1988 on allegations of discrimination, a finding of discrimination
was issued in two percent (22) of the cases. 339
3" 1988 MSPB ANNuAL REPoaRT, supra note 309, at 31.
311 1988 MSPB CAsE REPORT, supra note 314, at 19.
M 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 13.
33 1988 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 314, at 17.
34 See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
311 1987 MSPB CASE REPoRT, supra note 311, at 13; 1988 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra
note 314, at 17.
3- 1987 MSPB CAsE REPORT, supra note 311, at 8-9.
" Id. at 13.
33 1988 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 314, at 10.
31 Id. at 16.
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Almost seven hundred mixed case appeals were decided by
Board presiding officials during the 1983 fiscal year, about 1250
in 1984, and over one thousand in 1985, with the processing time
in the regions decreasing at a rate similar to that experienced in
other categories of cases. Finally, in only fourteen instances in
1986, eight in 1987, and thirteen in 1988 did the Board review
arbitration awards in mixed cases.3 4 Prior to 1986, no cases moved
to the Board from the negotiated grievance process.
The other important statistics relating to mixed cases in the
MSPB process relate to those that move from the MSPB to the
EEOC and back again. The MSPB typically "sends" to the EEOC
about 190 cases a year (161 in 1988).341 This number is approxi-
mately ten percent of the number of mixed cases decided by the
MSPB in 1987. Generally, the EEOC accepts a petition absent
procedural defects, despite the scope of discretion given the Com-
mission under the statute not to accept a petition. 342
In 1983, eleven mixed cases, 343 and, in 1984, nine cases, were
remanded by the Commission to the Board. 344 In 1987, twenty-
four cases, 345 and, in 1988, four cases were remanded.3 " Estimated
average processing time by the EEOC has been steadily reduced
to an average of about eighty-two days in 1987. The cases where
disagreement has been most likely to occur are in the handicap
discrimination area.
In evaluating these statistics, it is important to note that the
EEOC is not statutorily authorized to conduct a fully de novo
review of MSPB decisions. The EEOC may differ with the Board
only if the MSPB was incorrect in its interpretation of discrimi-
nation law (presumably de novo examination is available here) or
if the MSPB decision on the facts with respect to the discrimina-
tion issue "is not supported by the evidence in the record as a
whole. ' 347 The latter standard is apparently construed by the EEOC
to suggest a "substantial evidence" approach in the manner of
Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board:3 48
341 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 26; 1988 MSPB ANNuAL REPORT, supra
note 309, at 37.
341 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 27.
342 See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(2) (1982).
3,3 MERrr SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 1983 ANNuAL REPORT at 23.
MERrI SYSTEMS PROTECTION BoARD, 1984 ANNuAL REPORT at 25.
", 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 27.
34' 1988 MSPB CAsE REPORT, supra note 314, at 36.
- See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(3)(B)(ii) (1982).
- 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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could a "reasonable man" come to the conclusions on the facts
reached by the MSPB, not whether the EEOC on its own would
reach those same results.34 9 No statistics are available indicating
how often the EEOC differs with the MSPB on purely legal issues
and how often on factual findings.
On reference back to the MSPB, the Board generally concurs
with the EEOC's decision. For example, in 1987, the Board dif-
fered with the EEOC only once in the twenty-two cases decided
that year.350 In 1988, the Board adopted the EEOC finding in
eight of the twelve cases decided. 351 Finally, as noted previously,
there were only three certifications to Special Panels between 1979
and 1988.
B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The statistics currently compiled by the Commission do not
segregate mixed from non-mixed cases. Accordingly, at this time,
it is impossible to determine with accuracy the frequency with
which claimants use the mixed case complaint process in lieu of
filing initially with the MSPB where the personnel action is MSPB
appealable.
Quite a few interviewees felt that often the EEOC process acts
as a catchall for complaints where discrimination is not really at
issue but there is no other avenue through which the employee
can obtain the intervention of a third party to express a judgment
on the merits of his or her dispute with management or to other-
wise become involved in the resolution of the matter. A similar
perception existed in 1978.352
The volume of claims moving through the EEO process is truly
staggering. Table 1 presents statistics for 1986, 1987, and 1988353
3" That EEOC review should be deferential is supported by the legislative history. See
1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 219, at 140:
In making a new decision the EEOC must determine that: (1) the MSPB decision
constitutes an incorrect interpretation of any law, rule, or regulation, over which
the EEOC has jurisdiction; or (2) the application of such law to the evidence in
the record is unsupported by such evidence as a matter of law (emphasis added).
0 1987 MSPB CAsE REPORT, supra note 311, at 27.
' 1988 MSPB CAsE REPORT, supra note 314, at 36. In the remaining four, no certifi-
cation to the Special Panel occurred because the Board found that the cases did not fall within
the purview of § 7702.
I See PpsmENr's PmNsoNE MANAGEMENT PROJECT, APPENDIx IV at 19.
33 The statistics for 1986 are from the EEOC's REPORT ON PlE-CoMPAINarr CouNsEL~o
AN CoMPLINr PROCESSING By FamA AEN.cms FOR FisCAL YEAR 1986 [hereinafter 1986
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that, if not entirely typical, give a general sense of the movement
through the system.
Where requested by the claimant, there is a hearing before an
EEO administrative judge.The administrative judge recommends a
decision for acceptance, modification, or rejection by the agency.
35 4
During 1986, agencies acted on 1,405 recommended decisions,
during 1987, 1,478 such decisions, and during 1988 2068 such
decisions. Of the 1,405 in 1986, there were 246 recommended
findings of discrimination; 35 5 in 1987, there were 244 recommended
decisions finding discrimination; 356 and in 1988, there were 323
recommended decisions finding discrimination. 3 7 A recommenda-
Table I
Average Days
Counseling Complaints Complaints Average Days Complaints to
Contacts* Files* Rejected*" to Rejection Cancelled** Cancellation
1986 86,906 18,167 2,572 115 1,701 360
1987 83,416 15,931 2,668 142 1,575 387
1988 79,903 15,972 3,178 84 1,768 482
Average Days Agency Average Days
Complaints to Complaints Average Days Decisions to Agency
Withdrawn** Withdrawal Settled** to Settlement Issued** Decision
1986 3,057 222 5,456 257 5,176 615***
1987 3,519 299 4,828 356 4,424 683***
1988 2,758 272 5,346 396 4,794 607***
* The United States Postal Service has accounted for more than 50% of the EEO caseload
in recent years.
** These figures may not include all complaints filed during the reporting period due to
case backlog.
* Generally, there is a statutory and regulatory limit of 180 days for processing a complaint.
EEOC REPORT]. The statistics for 1987 are from the EEOC's REPORT ON PRE-ComPLINTr
COUNSELINO AND COMPLAINT PROCESSING BY FEDERAL AGENCIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987 [here-
inafter 1987 EEOC REPORT]. The statistic for 1988 are from the EEOC's REPORT ON PRE-
COMPLAINT COUNSEINO AND CoMPLAiNT PRoCEsSING BY FEDERAL AGEciEs FOR FISCAL YEAR
1988 [hereinafter 1988 EEOC REPORT].
For purposes of Table 1, "rejection" refers to dismissal of a complaint generally at the
filing stage for various reasons, including untimeliness. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.215 (1988). Cancel-
lation refers to dismissal after filing for non-prosecution or other reasons. Id.
114 See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
M 1986 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 27.
3M6 1987 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 31.
1" 1988 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 36.
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tion by the administrative judge may be either in favor of or
against a finding of discrimination. Between 1981 and 1988, when
an administrative judge recommended a finding of discrimination,
the agency acceptance rate varied from a high of 52 percent of
these recommendations in 1988 to a low of 37.3% in 1987.358
When the presiding official recommended a finding of no discrim-
ination, -however,the acceptance rate varied from a low of 86.6
percent in 1986 to a high of 97.4 percent (1988).
319
In response to the latter figures, the EEOC noted in its 1986
report:
It is reasonable to expect some differences between the rate at
which an agency accepts Recommended Decisions finding dis-
crimination and the rate at which an agency accepts Recom-
mended Decisions finding no discrimination. However, the
disparities between the number and percentage of Recommended
Decisions accepted where discrimination is found compared to a
finding of no discrimination are too great.360
It is interesting to note that the small rate of agency findings
of discrimination has not changed much over the years. In 1974,
under regulations similar to those currently in existence, federal
agencies found discrimination in only one out of six cases.
361
A comparison of statistics with respect to MSPB findings of
discrimination in initial appeals in mixed cases and findings of
discrimination in EEOC recommended decisions is illuminating.
In 1987, of the 1,377 cases in which initial decisions by the MSPB
were issued on allegations of discrimination, there were findings
of discrimination in four percent or fifty-three of the cases. 362 For
1988, of the 953 cases in which decisions were issued on allegations
of discrimination, a finding of discrimination was issued in two
percent (22) of the cases. 363
3m 1986 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 27-81; 1987 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353,
at 30-31; 1988 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 36.
1" 1986 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 28; 1987 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at
31; 1988 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 36.
-1 1986 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 29. See also 1988 EEOC REPORT, supra note
353, at 36.
'M See PEsImN's PERsoNNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT, APPENDIx IV, at 19 (citing a
congressional study).
'6 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 13. In only 15 of these cases did the
finding of discrimination result in a reversal of the agency decision. Id. at 8. In the remaining
38 there may have been a settlement or reasons other than discrimination for the final MSPB
action.
"1 1988 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 314, at 16. In only 15 of these cases did the
finding of discrimination result in a reversal of the agency action.
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In 1986, there were 5,176 agency decisions disposing of EEO
complaints other than by dismissal or settlement36 and only 1,405
EEOC recommended decisions on which agencies took action, of
which 246 found discrimination. 365 In 1987, there were 4,424 agency
decisions disposing of EEO complaints other than by dismissal or
settlement 36 and only 1,478 recommended decisions on which
agencies took action. 367 Of these, 244 found discrimination. 368 Fi-
nally in 1988 there were 4794 such agency decisions, 369 only 2068
recommended decisions on which agencies took action 37 0 and 323
findings of discrimination. 371 Recommended decisions need not be
accepted by an agency. As noted above, recommended decisions
are often rejected where a finding of discrimination is proposed.
372
For current purposes, assume that all of the recommended deci-
sions are accepted. (This assumption is supported by the fact that,
to some unknown extent, an agency decision with or without a
recommended decision might include a finding of discrimination
and the EEOC does reject on appeal agency decisions finding no
discrimination.) On this basis, of adjudicated EEO cases, in five
percent there was a finding of discrimination in 1986, six percent
during 1987, and seven percent during 1988.
The statistics suggest that a decision favorable to an employee
on a discrimination claim is more likely-but not dramatically
so-to be forthcoming in the EEO process than in the MSPB
process. Aside from general questions of statistical significance,
some care must be taken before a firm conclusion may be drawn.
For example, the statistics regarding EEO cases include only those
decided on the merits (not dismissed or settled). The MSPB figures
are apparently more inclusive. The 1987 MSPB report, for in-
stance, notes that while mixed cases constituted twenty-six percent
(1,682) of the total (mixed and non-mixed) appeals decided
(6,512) 33 the Board's presiding officials decided on the merits
only 2,540374 including both mixed and non-mixed. Unless mixed
3" 1986 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at A-12.
Id. at A-21.
1987 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at A-12.
Id. at A-21.
3" Id. at A-22.
31 1988 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at A-12.
3M Id. at A-22.
3' Id.
3 See supra notes 354-60 and accompanying text.
37 See 1987 MSPB CAsE REPORT, supra note 311, at 13.
17 Id. at 9.
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cases involve substantially lower dismissal and settlement rates
than other cases, it would not be expected that the percentage of
mixed cases decided on the merits would exceed fifty percent of
all appeals decided on the merits when they compose only one
quarter of all cases "disposed of."
Moreover, the types of cases coming through the EEOC proc-
ess, which do not include the important performance and discipli-
nary actions, may be unique in ways that throw a different light
on the meaning of the comparative figures. There may indeed be
other reasons to question the current statistical base.
Following an agency decision on the merits of an EEO com-
plaint, there is a right of appeal to the Commission itself in non-
mixed cases.37 5 In 1986, there were 3,319 direct commission ap-
peals, in 1987, 3,649, and, in 1988, 3,866.376 The EEOC may also
be asked to review EEO cases that have been initially processed
through the negotiated grievance process. In 1986, there were
forty-five of these, in 1987, thirty-nine, and in 1988, forty-four.
These numbers have remained relatively stable over the years.
The EEOC's Office of Review and Appeals' processing time
for cases received dropped from 285 days in the first quarter of
fiscal year 1988 to 140 days in the last quarter. 377 Almost one half
of the appeals in 1988 came from the Postal Service. 378 In 1988,
the EEOC issued decisions based on procedural grounds (improper
rejection or inadequate investigation) in 3,880 cases.3 79 In 1454
cases (thirty-seven percent), the Commission reversed the agency. 380
In 1988, the EEOC issued merits decisions in 1,881 cases. 381 In
222 cases (twelve percent), the agency decision was reversed or
modified. 38 2
One final note relates to the nature of employee representation
in the EEO process. While there is a dearth of hard data in this
area, the 1986 EEOC complaint processing report recognized that
"[flederal complainants generally complete a complaint form or
" See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
376 Telephone Interview with Ronald Copeland, Deputy Director Office of Review and
Appeals of the EEOC (December, 1988).
77 OFFICE OF REVIEW AND APPEAiS, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYmmT OPPORTUNITY CoMissIoN,
FY 1988 ANNUAL REPORT.
3U Id.
3" Id.
"0 Id.
38 Id.
3 Id.
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letter without assistance from a person who has expertise in the
area of EEO law. A lack of professional assistance at the coun-
seling and filing stages of the process may contribute to the
number of complaints that are rejected and cancelled. ' 383 Inter-
views with private attorneys and agency officials, along with var-
ious other sources, also suggested that there is a very high
percentage of federal employees who proceed through the process
without either union representation (in the case of an employee in
a bargaining unit) or their own attorneys. Unions sometimes do
provide representation, at least to dues-paying members as is the
case in the MSPB process.
C. The Negotiated Grievance Process
The relevant data relating to the use of the negotiated grievance
process includes that data pertaining to the issuance of arbitration
awards and reviews by the FLRA. The available information is
skimpy and undetailed; only the general outlines of process flow
can be ascertained with some degree of confidence.
The parties to bargaining agreements can limit the coverage
by an NGP of personnel actions.1 4 The desire to limit coverage
must be clearly stated by the parties. 385 Thus, the dearth of par-
ticular types of matters processed through a negotiated grievance
process might at first glance be attributed in part to exclusions
from coverage and not employee (or union) choice in particular
cases. At the same time, generally speaking, negotiated grievance
processes do include EEO matters and Chapters 43 and 75 actions.
Relevant OPM statistics are listed in Table 2.
Assuming coverage, a grievance can be disposed of at various
stages. The grievance may be disposed of prior to arbitration or
result in an arbitration award and/or the filing of exceptions with
the FLRA, appeals to the EEOC or, in mixed cases, to the MSPB.
There is simply no data regarding the number of pre-arbitration
withdrawals, settlements, or other resolutions or the type of com-
plaints disposed of in that manner.
OPM attempts to collect all arbitral awards, while estimating
it may get seventy-five to eighty percent of them. OPM's Labor
3 1986 EEOC REPORT, supra note 353, at 13. See also 1987 EEOC REPORT, supra note
353, at 18.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(2) (1982).
W Id.
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Table 2
Statutory Exclusions: Negotiated Grievance Procedure
Records Employees
Total Percent Total Percent
Totals on File 2,283 - 1,305,776 -
1. Excludes Discrimination: 195 8.5% 79,894 6.1%
2. Excludes Discrimination & 432: 18 .78% 5,560 .43%
3. Excludes Discrimination, 432 & 752: 165 7.2% 70,889 5.8%
4. Excludes 432: 13 .56% 4,148 .32%
5. Excludes 752: 46 2.0% 18,235 1.4%
6. Excludes 432 & 752: 11 .48% 2,847 .21%
7. Excludes Discrimination & 752 85 3.7% 51,565 3.9%
Total Exclusions 533 23.22% 233,138 18.16%
Agreement Information Retrieval System (LAIRS) indicates the
following numbers of awards per calendar year (including Chapters
43 and 75 actions but excluding awards in postal worker cases):
602 (1979); 790 (1980); 787 (1981); 731 (1982); 890 (1983); 772
(1984); 611 (1985); 595 (1986); 636 (1987); 480 (1988). In consid-
ering these figures, note that the awards do not necessarily rep-
resent the types of personnel actions that are the focus of this
report. The NGP processes a variety of complaints of varying
nature by either the individual employee or the union. Statistical
information indicating the nature of the underlying disputes giving
rise to these awards was not available in all instances from OPM.
1. Arbitration Awards in Chapters 43 and 75 Actions
OPM does maintain statistics relating to arbitration awards in
Chapters 43 and 75 actions. The numbers with the results (per-
centage affirmed, mitigated, and reversed) of the arbitral decisions
are listed in Table 3.
For comparative purposes, the statistics for the MSPB for 1986,
1987, and 1988 with regard to adjudicated cases (whether disposed
of "on the merits" or procedures and whether or not involving
claims of discrimination) are listed in Table 4.
See, e.g., Homer v. Bell, 825 F.2d 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
' U.S. MmrIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, ANNuAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1986 at 19.
Of the reversals, most were based on the "merits," though some were the results of procedural
errors or findings of discrimination. Id.
m 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 10.
9 1988 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 314, at 12.
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Table 3**
Year Ch. 75 Ch. 43
FY 1984a 83 20
FY 1985a
FY 19860
FY 1987a
FY 19880
The figures do not include awards in postal worker or TVA employee cases.
These reversals are presumably merits and procedural reversals.
The statistics do not disclose how many of these cases are "mixed."
Includes only one case. While agency penalties may be modified by the MSPB or
arbitrators in Chapter 75 actions, an agency penalty imposed under Chapter 43 cannot
be modified. 6
Table 4
Year
FY 19861v
C
I
FY 1987m 1
FY 19888
h. 75 Ch. 43 Aff.
,376* Not Available (75) 76
(N/A) (43) N/A
,167 116 (75) 77
(43) 78
876 78 (75) 75
(43) 78
(percentages)
Mit.
6
N/A
8
0
9
0
Includes 372 decisions in postal workers cases and nineteen in TVA employee cases in
1986. Similar statistics for 1987 were not available.
Prior to 1986, the MSPB statistics for Chapters 43 and 75 ac-
tions-which do not separate mitigations and reversals-were as
listed in Table 5.
"0 U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, STUDY OF MSPB APPEAis DECISIONS FOR
Aff.
(75) 37.0
(43) 50.0
(75) 55.2
(43) 61.6
(75) 51.2
(43) 53.3
(75) 54.1
(43) 53.8
(75) 40.3
(43) 63.6
(percentages)
Mit.
39.7
15.0
32.8
5.5***
22.5
6.6***
33.3
15.3
30.7
0.0
Rev.*
22.8
35.0
11.9
33.3
26.2
40.0
12.5
30.7
28.8
36.3
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Table 5
Decisions on Merits
(percentages)
Year Ch. 75 Ch. 43 Rev./Mit.
FY 1983m 1,791* N/A (75) 16
(43) N/A
FY 19841 1,869* N/A (75) 17
(43) N/A
FY 1985m  1,475* 214 (75) 22
(43) 21
* Includes decisions in postal workers cases, which were 357, 440, and 388 in 1983-85,
respectively, and TVA employee cases, which were thirty-five, thirty-eight, and nineteen in
1983-1985, respectively.
These statistics indicate a marked difference between the results
of the MSPB and the arbitral processes, 393 particularly with regard
to mitigation in Chapter 75 actions. While some individuals inter-
viewed indicated that they considered the MSPB process to be
"management" oriented, others including some union officials did
not share this opinion. 394 There may, in fact, be a vicious circle
involved to the extent the results of cases before the Board appear
more adverse to the employee than the results of arbitration. If,
as some people suggested, unions are more likely to take cases
with good chances of success to arbitration because, among other
things, they view the MSPB process as management oriented, then
the higher agency affirmance rate and lower mitigation rate before
the MSPB might be explained at least in part by the weaker nature
of the employees' cases presented to the Board for decision. The
FY 1983, Appendix I (non-air traffic controller appeals). See also 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT,
supra note 311, at 21, 23, 25.
- See U.S. Mmu-r SYsTms PROTECTION BoARD, STmY OF MSPB APPEAiS DECISIONS
FOR FY 1984, Appendix 2 (non-air traffic controller appeals). See also 1987 MSPB CASE
REPORT, supra note 311, at 12, 14, 15.
392 U.S. MmuT SySTEms PROTECTION BoARD, STuDY OF MSPB APPEAs DECISIONS FOR
FY 1985, Appendices 6, 9, 10 (non-air traffic controller appeals).
391 While there may be appeals from initial decisions to the full Board, of the cases
appealed (one in five), the Board leaves the administrative judge's decision standing almost
90% of the time, see 1988 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 314, at 25, 28, and even where
changes are made, they may be in favor of the agency. Id. at 28-30.
m For a somewhat similar reflection of views, see U.S. Gm;ERAL AccoUNTmIo OFFICE,
N SYsTEMS PROTECTION BOARD: CASE PROCESSING oF TasaumS AND PARTICIPANrS' Vmws
ON BOARD AcTrvrrms, GAO/GGD-87-97.
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inevitable loss rate at the MSPB would then reinforce union and
employee aversion to the Board process. By the same token, if
management looks at the same statistics, it might conclude that
arbitrators are "kinder" to the union than the Board and this
could create hostility to arbitration on the basis of "union bias."
This is not to say, however, that misperception alone is ac-
countable for the apparent widespread union aversion to use of
the MSPB process and the differing statistics. The nature of ar-
bitration itself, including its informality, the characteristics of
arbitrators, and the fact that arbitration is intimately linked to the
collective bargaining process and the evolving labor-management
relationship, inevitably means that results are likely to differ from
the legalistic process of the MSPB. The MSPB, as an agency,
stands apart from direct involvement in the union-management
dialogue. One prominent and well-respected federal sector arbitra-
tor, during an interview, expressed his conception of his role as
focusing on the facts of the particular case before him, while he
saw the Board as more concerned with the development of legal
doctrine. Since it would be difficult to argue that Congress in
1978 did not realize the way arbitration generally functions, an
apparently divergent pattern of results between the MSPB and
arbitrators in Chapters 43 and 75 actions does not by itself indicate
that the arbitration system is going awry. Rather, it is likely
operating in the fashion intended (or at least foreseen) by the
authors of the 1978 CSRA.
Many interviewees, including those intimately involved with
the negotiated grievance process, expressed the opinion that arbi-
trators, more often than not, "split the baby," giving something
to both sides (e.g., a reprimand rather than removal). However,
others noted that if an arbitrator was perceived as doing that
consistently, ultimately he or she would be stricken from the lists
because neither party would want their good cases compromised
in that fashion. 95
Ironically, the efforts at the MSPB to settle cases, which may
often mean that agencies must accept results that only partially
vindicate their positions, are likely bringing the MSPB process and
" See R. Valtin, A Word to the Arbitrator in Training, ARBrrRATIoN IN PRACTCE 1, 4
(1984) ("Splitting for the sake of retention of acceptability is awful."). Such compromise also
runs afoul of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes of the National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association and
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (I.A.2.).
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the arbitral process much closer together than the statistics relating
to adjudicated cases suggest. If the results of the MSPB process
are not viewed as compromising the vindication of merit system
principles (a matter that is disputed), it is difficult to argue that
arbitration is a worse offender in that regard even if in fact
arbitrators are "splitting the baby" in a substantial number of
instances by, for example, mitigating agency-imposed penalties.
2. Statutori!y Mandated Uniformity Between the MSPB and
Arbitral Processes in Chapters 43 and 75 Actions
In Chapters 43 and 75 actions that go to a hearing, where the
statute attempts to assure some degree of uniformity between the
MSPB process and arbitration, 396 apparent differences in patterns
of results may be attributable to several factors. For example, the
difference may result from the divergent perspectives from which
the purely factual elements are viewed. In other cases, one forum
may apply a different procedural approach or legal principle.
Regardless, this disuniformity may encourage forum shopping.
In Cornelius v. Nutt,397 the Supreme Court held that arbitrators
must follow the statutory "harmful error" rule3 98 as interpreted
by the MSPB. However, in dicta, the Court noted that "Congress
clearly intended that an arbitrator would apply the same substan-
tive rules as the Board does in reviewing an agency disciplinary
decision" in order to promote consistency and to avoid forum
shopping.399 This statement has provoked disputes regarding the
extent to which the arbitral proceeding must be a mirror image of
the Board's processes. 400
Exact congruence in all regards was certainly not intended by
Congress in 1978. The fact that the CSRA expressly mentions
certain procedures to be applied by both the MSPB and arbitrators
suggests that arbitrators are free to depart from the MSPB format
regarding matters not mentioned. The "consistency" referred to
3- See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121(e)(2), 7701(c)(1) (1982) (burdens of proof-substantial evidence
in Chapter 43 actions and preponderance of evidence in other cases), § 7701(c)(2) (defenses
including harmful error rule).
472 U.S. 648 (1985).
'' Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(a), where an agency has sustained its burden of
proof, its decision may not be upheld if the employee shows that harmful error occurred in
the application of the agency's procedures in arriving at the decision.
"' Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 660 (1985).
See, e.g., Fishgold & Jacksteit, Implications of Cornelius v. Nutt for Federal Sector
Arbitrators, 43 ARB. J. 14 (March 1988).
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in the legislative history is consistency in treatment of those aspects
of procedure that the statute makes expressly applicable to both
the MSPB and arbitration. 40' As the Supreme Court acknowledged
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,402 it is the characteristic
informality of arbitration that enables it to function in an efficient
and expeditious fashion, though this very informality may mean
that the results of a judicialized process and arbitration will dif-
fer.40
3
Congress provided that judicial review of arbitration in Chap-
ters 43 and 75 actions would be conducted "in the same manner
and under the same conditions" as review of MSPB orders. 404 In
this fashion, "conformity between the decisions of arbitrators with
those of the Merit Systems Protection Board" 45 would allegedly
be achieved. Thus, the same courts would review both and, pur-
suant to the same scope of review, examine the decision for
arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, legal error, and lack of substan-
tial evidence.401 However, since the general standard of "reason-
ableness" is the lodestar of review of agency fact-finding and law
application under this type of scope of review, 407 the CSRA al-
lowed for a broad range of permissible decisions in Chapters 43
and 75 actions, thus leaving room for the development of patterns
of different results in the MSPB and arbitral processes. As noted
above, such a pattern has developed, particularly with regard to
mitigation of agency-imposed sanctions in Chapter 75 actions. 408
Moreover, since penalty determinations are generally reviewed with
special deference to the agency, 40 judicial review of mitigations
under an abuse of discretion standard will inevitably establish a
particularly expansive range for differences in sustainable results
in the two processes. Finally, since the government's right to
appeal from both the MSPB and an arbitrator in a Chapters 43
and 75 action is conditioned on the existence of an error in the
interpretation of civil service law that will have substantial im-
41, See 1978 CONtERENcE REPORT, supra note 219, at 157.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
40 Id. at 58-9.
- See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f) (1982).
- Id.; 1987 S. REPoRT, supra note 70, at 111.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1982).
- See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4 See supra notes 387-93 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Miguel v. Dept. of Army, 727 F.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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pact °4 10 Congress further insulated from correction differing pat-
terns of results in cases at the MSPB and before arbitrators where
those are not traceable to errors of legal interpretation.
In short, it might be said that Congress in 1978 intended to
attain as close a match in the end results of Chapters 43 and 75
adjudication as possible given the differing inherent natures of the
MSPB process and arbitration. 41' Yet the same substantive prin-
ciples and statutorily prescribed procedures were also intended to
ensure at least some basic uniformity.4 2 Uniformity in terms of
the substantive rules applied is required in the principal perform-
ance-based and disciplinary actions by the need to avoid inequality
in treatment at the level of legal doctrine on policy (though per-
haps not constitutional) grounds.
3. Judicial Review to Enforce Uniformity
In 1978, the mechanism for enforcement of uniformity was to
place reviewing authority with regard to both the MSPB and
arbitrators in Chapters 43 and 75 actions in the same courts, viz.,
the Courts of Appeals and the Court of Claims, and subject
decisions to the same scope of review.4 13 The Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982 vested exclusive review authority in the
Federal Circuit.41 4 The legislative history of the 1978 Act suggests
that the Federal Circuit require that arbitrators follow MSPB
substantive precedents. 4 5 Given the institutional continuity of the
Board and the fact that civil service issues are the Board's principal
concern compared to the ad hoc involvement of individual arbi-
trators, there is a strong policy argument for deference to the
Board. In fact, the Supreme Court opinion in Nutt supports such
a general approach. 41 6
110 See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d) (1982).
,11 Accord, e.g., Devine v. Sutermeister, 724 F.2d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
412 See also Devine v. Pastore, 732 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (MSPB scope of review of
agency penalty appealable to arbitrator).
411 See 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at 111. The House bill was different. The
Conference Committee accepted the Senate version. See 1978 CoNRENCE REPORT, supra note
219, at 153.
4 P.L. 97-164, Title I, Part B, § 144, 96 Stat. 45 (1982) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 7703 (1982)).
415 See 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at 111: "The provision for judicial review is
intended to assure conformity between the decisions of arbitrators with those of the Merit
Systems Protection Board."
416 See Nutt, 472 U.S. at 659-62.
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Where a Chapters 43 or 75 action involves various types of
prohibited discrimination, matters become more complicated. In
a case that goes to arbitration, direct review by the MSPB of the
arbitrator's decision may assure that the required uniformity is
achieved. 417 But what happens if, rather than invoking such review
or following its completion, a dissatisfied employee sues in district
court claiming a right to trial de novo under the discrimination
laws? 418 The Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction over mixed cases,
419
and the responsibility for ensuring that the mandated uniformity
between Board and arbitral proceedings in terms of the substantive
personnel law applied would devolve on the district court in re-
viewing the personnel side of the case. Similarly, compliance by
the arbitrator with the statutorily required procedures, such as the
harmful-error rule and the burdens of proof, must be enforced as
to the purely personnel issues, though they must be jettisoned
when the court deals with the discrimination issue.4 20 As noted
before, this bifurcated approach presents various administrative
and other difficulties which are hardly less when the decision being
reviewed is that of an arbitrator and not the MSPB.
421
Where an agency loses at the Board or arbitral level in a
Chapters 43 or 75 action (whether or not mixed), the ability of
the government to command the Federal Circuit's attention is
limited to cases where the decision allegedly constitutes an erro-
neous interpretation of civil service law that will have a substantial
impact. 422 The court has rather consistently suggested that review
of an award on OPM's petition with respect to application of
established rules is less appropriate under the statute than deter-
mining whether the arbitrator applied the correct legal principles,
in part to recognize the traditional judicial deference to the results
of arbitration. 423
417 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
411 But see supra note 273.
419 See supra text accompanying note 277.
420 See supra text accompanying note 279.
421 Id.
42 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
" See, e.g., Devine v. Sutermeister, 724 F.2d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (questioning
whether the issue of an arbitrator's balancing of the factors concerning mitigation of penalty
is properly appealed by OPM). See also Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Feigenbaum, The Relationship Between Arbitration and Administrative Procedures in the
Disciplining and Discharge of Federal Employees, LABoR L.J. 586 (Sept., 1983) ("[I]f the
allegation is not that the arbitrator ignored the law or applied the wrong provision of the law
but that arguably the arbitrator's judgment in applying the law was incorrect, then no
'substantial impact' should be found.").
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Recently, however, this narrow approach has been taken to an
unfortunate and arguably incorrect extreme. In Homer v. Bell,424
the Federal Circuit applied Nutt to hold that, since the MSPB
could not modify an agency penalty imposed under Chapter 43,425
neither could an arbitrator.426 Following this decision, however, in
Homer v. Garza,427 the same court refused to review an arbitral
award on the petition of OPM where the arbitrator clearly violated
the non-mitigation rule. The explanation offered was that the clear
circuit precedent of Bell and the fact (so the court assumed) that
the award was ultra vires (presumably because it was contrary to
Bell) and thus unenforceable meant that other arbitrators would
not be encouraged to issue similarly infirm awards.4 28 Thus, the
award at issue would be of no substantial impact on the civil
service system.4 29 But if the Federal Circuit's assigned role in the
system does not include the responsibility to enforce, when asked,
its view of the correct legal doctrine-at least in clear cases of
violation-it is very likely that the uniformity on the level of legal
doctrine between Board proceedings and arbitration will not be
obtained in the manner and to the extent intended by Congress.
If the Federal Circuit abstains, the only other authority likely to
undertake vindication of applicable law is the FLRA. But that
agency has to date enforced arbitration awards in unfair labor
practice proceedings without scrutiny of their underlying legality
except in a very narrow category of cases .410 If Garza impels it to
reconsider that position, the ironic result will be to shift respon-
sibility for uniformity between the MSPB and arbitration to the
FLRA. In short, either arbitrators will not have to take the obli-
- 825 F.2d 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
41 See Lisiecki v. MSPB, 769 F.2d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Bell, 825 F.2d at 390.
"2 832 F.2d 150 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
421 Id. at 151.
42 In such a case, the agency might refuse to comply with the award and, in an unfair
labor practice proceeding, try to collaterally attack the award on the basis of the arbitrator's
lack of "jurisdiction". See, e.g., U.A. Cent. Office & AFGE, 27 F.L.R.A. 385 (1987); U.S.
Dep't of Justice v. AFGE, 22 F.L.R.A. 928, 932 (1986). Whether the FLRA would depart
from its usual rule of not hearing a challenge to arbitral awards on the merits in a ULP
proceeding is unclear.
"' See supra note 429. An agency that, in a Chapter 43 or 75 action, loses before the
arbitrator and can generally obtain review in the Federal Circuit only with OPM's concurrence
and the reviewing court's permission, may obtain some review before the FLRA and the
regional court of appeals by refusing to comply with the award. See American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. FLRA, 850 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This also means that in some limited
instances the FLRA's jurisdiction encompasses Chapter 43 and 75 actions.
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gation of uniformity seriously or the FLRA will have to fill a role
for which it was not designed.
4. Choice of the MSPB Over the NGP Route in Chapters 43
and 75 Actions
At this point, we should turn to a comparison of the number
of adverse action and performance-based actions that are decided
by the MSPB and arbitrators. As indicated previously, employees
may choose to take Chapters 43 and 75 actions to either the MSPB
or the NGP.431 During the 1987 fiscal year, initial appeals at the
MSPB in adverse actions totalled 3,303 and performance-based
actions totalled 308 (including mixed cases in both).432 During
1988, the numbers were largely similar: 3,348 adverse actions and
273 performance actions (including mixed cases in both).
433
While the OPM figures cited above434 refer to cases resulting
in awards, and not all matters processed through the NGP (many
of which may be settled or dropped), it appears that many more
Chapters 43 and 75 actions go the MSPB route-unless the pre-
arbitration settlement rate is extraordinary. 435 Is this because there
is no choice by the employee, since the collective bargaining agree-
ment excludes these types of actions (unlikely)? Is this because a
large share of the MSPB actions relate to employees not included
in bargaining units? Could it be that many are weak cases unions
do not want to take to arbitration?
Or is it because the MSPB process is "free" while the union
must pay some of the costs of arbitration and, given the size of
the union treasury, opting for the perceived more favorable arbi-
tration process is simply not feasible? Or because employees avoid
the NGP since it is the union's and not the employee's choice to
invoke arbitration and once a grievance is filed with an agency
the statutory route is generally foreclosed? Is it due to the fact
that the MSPB process, ironically enough, may be faster in some
cases than arbitration despite the traditional wisdom that one of
the benefits of arbitration is its expedition compared to that of a
legalistic process? Or could it be the procedural protections of the
431 See supra text accompanying notes 204, 206.
431 See 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 7.
411 1988 MSPB ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 31.
4 See supra text preceding note 386.
41, This is true even if MSPB decisions in postal workers and TVA employee cases are
disregarded on the basis that the OPM arbitration figures do not include such awards.
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MSPB process? There may be other reasons, including the newness
of the NGP route and the fact that, until 1978, the avenue familiar
to federal workers was the administrative process for adverse
actions. There are no statistics that clearly answer these questions.
Common sense suggests that many of these elements in varying
degrees result in the apparent disproportionate distribution of
Chapters 43 and 75 actions 8between the NGP and MSPB proc-
esses.
5. Choice of the Statutory Over the NGP Route in
Discrimination Cases
Similarly, EEO cases (whether or not mixed) proceed through
the NGP route at a substantially lower rate than through the
statutory processes. (As in the case of Chapters 43 and 75 actions,
there is a statutory right to choose one route over the other despite
the coverage of an NGP 436). Available statistics, along with the
dearth of EEOC and MSPB reviews of arbitral awards in discrim-
ination cases437 confirm this impression, which was gleaned from
interviews with agency and union officials. The reason most often
given for this apparent phenomenon is not that discrimination
complaints do not fall within the scope of collective bargaining
agreements. Rather, the cost-free nature of theEEO process from
the union's point of view is an important consideration, as may
perhaps be a perception that many EEO claims lack substance as
discrimination matters. Table 6, which lists OPM statistics for
1979-89, illustrates the breakdown of reported arbitration awards
that include an allegation of discrimination (including some types
not of concern here such as marital status and whistleblowing).
Since discovery, which may be particularly valuable in cases
of alleged discrimination, is not generally available in arbitration
while in the EEO process both the agency investigator and the
hearing officer have affirmative responsibilities to ferret out the
facts, an employee may feel at a particular disadvantage in filing
a grievance. 43 Moreover, despite its problems-delay being one of
the most evident-the EEO process, having existed prior to 1978,
is familiar to most federal employees.
41 See supra text accompanying notes 206-10.
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 340, 375-77.
411 Once an initial election of the NGP in an EEO case is made, the employee can only
obtain a restricted EEOC or MSPB review of the merits of the award on the discrimination
issue. See supra text accompanying notes 207, 210.
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Employees may, in fact, not entirely trust the negotiated griev-
ance process because EEO allegations may reflect on fellow bar-
gaining unit members or even union officials.
This suggests to the employee that his or her complaint will not
be vigorously pursued. Also, there may be a concern that union
representatives lack expertise in discrimination law.
Finally, there may be a sense that as between an arbitrator
who sits on an ad hoc basis and the EEOC administrative judge,
the latter is more likely to be both sympathetic to and knowledge-
able about the nuances of discrimination law. 439 EEOC review of
the arbitral decision is very narrow and employees may be unaware
of its availability because, for example, the arbitrator's award may
not contain notice of the right to further appeals. These and other
factors are likely all at work to some degree. Where the personnel
action at issue presents a mixed case, there is no doubt a conflu-
ence of the factors present in straight Chapters 43 and 75 actions
along with those peculiar to claims of discrimination that may
point to the MSPB process.
6. Timeliness of Arbitration vs. MSPB Process
While no statistics are available regarding the timeliness of
arbitration, many, if not most, interviewees suggested that the
Table 6
Percentage of
Awards Involving Awards Including
Year Number of All Awards Discrimination Claim Discrimination Claim
1979 602 43 7
1980 790 24 3
1981 787 27 3
1982 731 27 4
1983 890 58 7
1984 772 55 7
1985 611 39 6
1986 595 53 9
1987 636 41 6
1988 480 31 6
4 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-8 and 58 n.19 (1974).
See also Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, AN
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNTrY PRACTICE GumE 152-175 (Fed. Bar Ass'n 1977). But see
PRESIDENT'S PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT, APPENDIX IV TO FnNAL Sr-F REPORT 25
(indicates a favorable attitude toward the use of arbitration or at least a willingness to
experiment given the perceived speed of the process).
[VOL. 78
FEDERAL PERSONAL COMPLAINT SYSTEMS
current MSPB process, with its relatively strict 120 day limit for
initial adjudication, is probably at least as expeditious as arbitra-
tion in most cases. However, appeal of an initial decision to the
full Board, which occurs in about one out of five cases, 440 extends
the time of final disposition in the MSPB process, since it may
take over 150 days on average for the Board to dispose of a
petition for review. 4 1
D. Federal Labor Relations Authority
The FLRA received the following number of appeals of griev-
ance arbitration awards: 60 (1979); 101 (1980); 153 (1981); 150
(1982); 223 (1983); 220 (1984); 210 (1985); 228 (1986); 221 (1987);
and 204 (1988). 442 Comparing these numbers with the OPM's
statistics regarding the number of grievance arbitration awards in
the federal sector, 4 3 approximately thirty percent of the awards
each year are taken to the FLRA on exceptions, a figure that is
relatively close to the number of petitions for review filed annually
with the full Board.4"
As in the case of the Board, the goal of expeditious resolution
of matters presented to it has been a matter of high priority for
the Authority, which has steadily reduced its backlog of pending
cases. It has a six month processing goal applicable to matters
filed with it. On October 1, 1983, its arbitration docket included
248 cases. 44 Three years later, it included 71 cases. 446 During the
1986 fiscal year, the average number of days to close an arbitration
case was 189 as compared to 359 days during fiscal year 1984. 447
In short, the Board and the Authority are very close in their times
of disposition of appeals beyond the initial hearing stage.
Regarding the filing of exceptions and the results, certain
statistics are significant. Between January 13, 1979, and December
*'- See 1987 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 311, at 19.
"' Id. at 23. See also 1988 MSPB CASE REPORT, supra note 314, at 30 (average 184 days
to process a petition for review in 1988).
2 51 Fed. Reg. 45,754 (Dec. 22, 1986) (statistics provided as supplementary information
and thus not codified).
'A See supra text accompanying notes 384-85. Between 1979 and 1988, there were a total
of 1,770 arbitration appeals to the FLRA. OPM figures suggest at least 5,994 arbitration
awards during this period in non-Chapter 43 and 75 actions (assuming 90 Chapter 43 and 75
actions per year, or 900 for 1979-88, which matters are not FLRA appealable).
51 Fed. Reg. 45,754.
' Id.
"6 Id.
"7 Id.
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31, 1988, unions filed with the Authority exceptions in 912 (60.2
percent) cases, agencies filed 589 (38.8 percent), and employees
filed fifteen (one percent). 4 8 During that period, awards were
sustained in over seventy percent of the cases filed by a union and
in over forty-six percent of the cases filed by an agency. 449 Awards
were modified or set aside in 2.3 percent of the cases filed by the
union and 44.5 percent of the cases filed by an agency. 4 0 The
Authority found that the exceptions were untimely in 19.2 percent
of the union appeals and in only 4.9 percent of the agency ap-
peals. 45 1 Moreover, almost always, the ground for modification or
setting aside was that the arbitrator's award violated some law,
rule, or regulation.45
2
From these statistics, an observer might rush to conclude that
the FLRA would not be viewed very favorably by unions, would
be adored by management, and that arbitrators are doing a terrible
job in knowing and applying, as they must, federal law in the
course of disposing of cases. A closer scrutiny of the statistics,
along with the interviews conducted as part of this study, dispels
these impressions to some extent. For example, often agency of-
ficials representing management's side seemed to have a less than
charitable view of the substantive performance of the FLRA, 453
though this may have been due in some cases to the recollection
of a particular case or two that should have been won but was
not.
With regard to the performance by arbitrators, it must be
noted that of the 1,516 cases involving exceptions to arbitration
awards disposed of by the FLRA between 1979 and 1988, the
award was modified or set aside in 286 cases (18.9 percent). 454 In
4, See Memorandum for DOD Component Labor Relations Offices, Decisions of the
Federal Labor Relations Authority on Exceptions to Arbitration Awards Filed Under 5 U.S.C.
7122(a) (Jan. 6, 1988) [hereinafter DOD Arbitration Memorandum]. These statistics count a
case with both union and agency filed exceptions as two cases. For some unknown reason,
the DOD's figures for arbitration appeals (1,516) is less than numbers supplied by the FLRA
(1,770).
While OPM statistics on arbitration awards relate only to grievance arbitration, the DOD
and FLRA data apparently include some (approximately 10) interest arbitration awards (those
which determine the terms of collective bargaining agreements).
"9 Id.
450 Id.
451 Id.
412 Id. See supra text accompanying note 121.
413 This critical view has been expressed by courts and commentators. See Rosenbloom,
The Federal Labor Relations Authority, 17 PoL'Y STrUDIs J. ..- (1988-89).
'" See supra note 448.
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a large majority of these cases, the modification or set aside
occurred on the basis of a violation of a law, rule, or regulation
and involved agency filed exceptions. 455 Given the newness of
arbitration in the federal sector and the steep learning curve ac-
cordingly required of arbitrators, most of whom had not had
experience prior to 1978 with the Federal Personnel Manual and
other civil service regulations, this is a reasonably respectable
record.
456
Moreover, the 286 cases must be compared to the arbitration
awards issued between 1979 and 1988 that were appealable to the
FLRA. OPM's statistics suggest that a total of no less than 6,894
awards were issued during this period and that on an average less
than ninety a year, or nine hundred for this ten year period,
related to Chapters 43 and 75 actions that are not appealable to
the Authority but rather to the Federal Circuit. This reduces the
approximate number of FLRA appealable awards to 5,994. As-
suming that an agency (or union) would appeal an award if clearly
contrary to law, the record of arbitrators in generally following
applicable federal law appears to be even better.
457
Of course, it might be argued that, in many of these 5,994
cases, the real dispute was over the facts and that the content of
applicable legal principles was of minor concern. Accordingly, the
411 DOD Arbitration Memorandum, supra note 448.
4M In the private sector, less than one percent of arbitration awards are challenged and
only a small fraction of these challenges are successful. See Nolan, Federal Sector Labor
Arbitration: Differences, Problems, and Cures, GimBvANCE ARmrrATiINi =a FEami
SmwicE 10 (D. Reischl & R. Smith eds. 1987). As noted supra text accompanying note 443,
30% of awards in non-Chapter 43 and 75 actions were challenged in appeals to the FLRA
and approximately 18% of these were set aside or modified. No statistics were available
indicating how often Chapter 43 and 75 actions result in arbitral awards challenged and, when
challenged, how many were reversed or modified by the Federal Circuit. Given the greater
impingement on the federal arbitrator's discretion imposed by external law as compared to
the situation facing the private arbitrator, along with the fact that arbitration is only newly
arrived in the federal sector and not fully "accepted" by at least some agencies, the dispro-
portionate results in the public and private sector cannot, by themselves, show that arbitration
is working poorly or should be abandoned. See id. at 10 (concluding that there are problems
but also cures).
Of course, the ability of arbitrators to faithfully follow federal law is, to a great degree,
dependent on the quality of the representation of both sides involved in the arbitral process.
The parties should bring relevant authority to the arbitrator's attention, though often they
may fail to do so, not based on design, but ignorance of the relevant law.
4n Moreover, taking the FLRA reversal rate as indicative of "real" errors by arbitrators
might be questioned on the basis of the FLRA's own poor record of surviving appeals of its
decisions (outside the arbitration context) in the regional courts of appeals. See Rosenbloom,
supra note 453.
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argument may go, the lack of appeals and/or reversals by the
FLRA does not necessarily prove that arbitrators are doing well
in determining and applying federal law. But to the extent that is
true, opposition to arbitration in the federal sector cannot be
heavily premised on the inability of federal arbitrators to know
and apply the law.
In talking with various agency officials, it was apparent that,
as a general matter, the more the agency and the union used an
established panel of arbitrators who could thereby accumulate
expertise in federal civil service law, the more likely there was a
perception that arbitrators were adequately applying federal law.
Representation in arbitration varies for both sides. Sometimes
a lawyer may represent the union or the agency or both and
sometimes the representative may be a non-lawyer shop steward
or a labor relations specialist. Some representatives, knowledgeable
about the complicated system of legal regulation that must be
considered by the arbitrator, present relevant statutes, rules, and
cases to the arbitrator for consideration. On other occasions, the
representatives, as well as the arbitrator, apparently work in bliss-
ful ignorance of controlling authority. At times, a knowledgeable
party may "stonewall" by withholding relevant material at the
heating stage, only to introduce it before the FLRA and obtain a
reversal.
Finally, similarities between the FLRA and MSPB jurisdictions
should be noted. The MSPB may be required to construe collective
bargaining agreements in those cases where appellants are bar-
gaining-unit members who opt to go to the Board in Chapters 43
and 75 cases.45 8 The same provisions of those agreements may
come before the FLRA in matters not appealable to the Board.
Moreover, as to those personnel actions that might otherwise be
appealable to the Board, such as denials of within-grade pay
increases and reductions-in-force, the coverage of the action by a
negotiated grievance process means that the FLRA is the reviewing
authority; the FLRA's review searches for legal error based on
many of the same sources that might be construed by the MSPB
in similar actions not covered by an NGP. In addition, the exis-
tence of a prohibited personnel practice is a defense before the
4 1 Cf. e.g., Homer v. Schuck, 843 F.2d 1368, 1372-74 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Board and may likewise be raised in FLRA review of an arbitration
award .
459
Neither any provision of the 1978 CSRA nor the reasoning in
Nutt46° compels either arbitrators or the FLRA in non-Chapters
43 and 75 actions to adhere to Board precedent and procedures
even where the matters might, absent coverage by an NGP, be
appealable to the MSPB. The FLRA has acted consistent with this
view. For example, with regard to the standard for judging within-
grade pay increase denials, the FLRA has refused to hold arbitra-
tors to the Board's approach. 461 Furthermore, unlike the situation
involving the relationship between the EEOC and the MSPB, the
1978 Act established no mechanism to reconcile divergent MSPB/
FLRA views with one possible exception: in a mixed case moving
out of the arbitration process, the MSPB can review at employee
request the matter and, as noted previously, it takes the position
that it will apply Board precedent. 462 Finally, judicial review of
FLRA decisions regarding arbitral awards is largely unavailable.
In fact, however, the potential for substantial conflicting dec-
larations regarding the interpretation of civil service law by the
MSPB and the FLRA has not to date become a reality according
to those persons interviewed as part of this study. Moreover, even
where inconsistency exists (or may in the future arise), it might
not create problems for managers in knowing what to do in a
particular case. If the employee subject to the personnel action is
in a bargaining unit whose NGP covers the matter, the manager
can look to FLRA precedent as governing non-mixed non-Chapters
43 and 75 matters. However, a claim of discrimination allows an
employee to opt out of the NGP initially or following arbitration
and proceed to the Board where the personnel action at issue is
MSPB appealable. A manager, thus, could be put in a quandary
by inconsistent FLRA/MSPB positions due to the inability to
419 For example, an arbitral award might be seen as "contrary to law" where a prohibited
personnel practice infects the personnel action and the arbitrator upholds the action.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 397-400. Nutt emphasized congressional concern
for consistency and avoiding forum shopping in Chapter 43 and 75 actions that do not go to
the FLRA. 472 U.S. at 661.
46 See Fishgold & Jacksteit, supra note 400, at 23-24. The FLRA has held that arbitrators
need not apply the "substantial evidence" burden of proof here; see, e.g., Dep't of Educ.,
Div. of Civil Rights and AFGE Local 3887, 17 F.L.R.A. 997 (1985), which the MSPB, by
regulation, follows in its proceedings.
46 See supra note 207.
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determine at the decisional stage whether a discrimination claim
will later arise.
463
E. Agency Administrative Grievance Systems
If statistics are relatively sparse regarding the negotiated griev-
ance process, they appear to be largely absent when it comes to
the agency administrative grievance systems and their workings.
OPM supplied the author with very rough (and probably largely
understated) estimates that for 1985, 1986, and 1987, the number
of grievances filed was 4,260, 3,645, and 3,660 respectively. In
talking with agency officials, little additional specific data regard-
ing the usage and operation of this appeal route was revealed.
In its 1982 study of selected administrative grievance systems,
4
6
the General Accounting Office noted as problems the untimely
processing of grievances and the apparent lack of formal system-
atic methods (including data collection 465) to determine how well
the systems operated. 4 6 Only recently has OPM undertaken its
own empirical study of these systems, examining both their design
and operation.
467
F. Office of Special Counsel
Since 1979, the Office of Special Counsel has worked with a
staff of approximately eighty individuals and with an annual budget
in the neighborhood of $4.5 million.
468
During the 1985 fiscal year, the OSC received 1,280 complaints
alleging prohibited personnel practices and other violations of civil
service laws (excluding the Hatch Act). 469 It completed 155 field
investigations and filed approximately ten cases with the MSPB
for disciplinary action based on prohibited personnel practices.
470
During the 1986 fiscal year, it received 1,307 complaints, initiated
4" See infra text accompanying note 488.
4" See U.S. GENERAL AccouNTINrG OFFIcE, AGENCY ADmINmSTRATIW SYSTEMS NEED
ATENTnoN, GAO/FPCD 83-15, Dec. 22, 1982.
4 Id. at 5.
4M Id. at 1.
4' OPM regulations indicate that the Office will review these systems to determine their
compliance with its regulations. See 5 C.F.R. § 792.304 (1988).
" See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL CoUNsEL/FIScAL YEAR 1987 at 2 (draft).
'0 OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE OFFICE OF TE SPECIAL
COUNSEL/FscAL YEAR 1985 at 7, 11, 12.
4 Id. at 11.
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approximately eight disciplinary actions before the MSPB, and
completed 197 field investigations.
471
During the 1987 fiscal year, the Office received 1,325 new
allegations and complaints. The largest number (245) of allegations
and complaints was related to reprisals for whistleblowing and the
next highest number (234) was related to discrimination (where
the Office usually defers to the EEO process). 472 It completed 145
full investigations during the year, some of which had been initi-
ated the prior year. 473 Of the investigations closed during 1987,
the Office initiated formal corrective or disciplinary action in
eleven cases and sought or obtained informal corrective action in
thirteen cases. 474 Additionally, as a result of initial examination of
complaints and full investigations conducted before or during
1987, the OSC initiated or obtained eight formal corrective actions
(i.e., referral to agencies following a finding of a prohibited per-
sonnel practice with no need to ask the Board for assistance),
thirty informal corrective actions, and nine disciplinary actions.
475
Clearly, there is a consistent pattern of substantial winnowing
out from the point of intake to final disposition. Lack of resources
is not offered as an express reason for the failure to institute more
investigations or to take more corrective or disciplinary actions.
476
The judgment of the Office is that many complaints are either
outside OSC jurisdiction or simply groundless determined on the
basis of initial investigation.
477
Recent judicial decisions that point to the OSC as the avenue
of last (or only) resort for many federal employees, 478 along with
the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, which establishes that
the primary role of the Office is the protection of individual
employees, 479 raise serious questions regarding whether the Office
4" OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
CoUNsEL/FIscAL YEAR 1986 4, 7.
4' OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM TE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
COuNsEL/FSCAL YEAR 1987 (draft) at 18, 20.
47I Id. at 25.
474 Id.
47, Id. at 27.
476 See, e.g., Testimony of Mary F. Wieseman, Special Counsel, Before the Civil Service
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service Concerning The
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987, H.R. 25, March 10, 1987. This position received
support from the GAO in 1985. See WISTLEELOWER COMPL ANNrs RARELY QUALIFY FOR
OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL PROTECTION, GOA/GGD 85-53, May 10, 1985.
,' Id.
4m See supra text accompanying notes 305-07.
See infra text accompanying notes 584-88.
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can adequately perform its intended function. OPM statistics, for
example, note that during fiscal years 1984 to 1987, 4,038, 4,717,
4,365, and 5,338 federal employees respectively were discharged
where there were no appeal rights available.4 0 These figures do
not cover the multifarious types of personnel actions where re-
moval is not involved and there are no statutory appeals available.
Even assuming that many allegations of prohibited personnel prac-
tices and other violations of civil service rules are groundless, the
statute requires some type of investigation where allegations are
presented. 41 A substantial increase in allegations presented to the
OSC in response to both the current judicial approach and the
role of the Office envisioned by the 1989 whistleblower legislation
will seriously tax the Office's ability to do an adequate investiga-
tory job in view of the rather meager financial resources available.
Clearly, if the Office goes beyond mere preliminary investigation
to a full field investigation and institution of corrective and/or
disciplinary action in many more cases than it does currently, its
resources will be depleted long before many claimants receive
satisfaction.
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 was motivated in part
by a desire to simplify and expedite the procedures for handling
federal employee appeals. 4 2 While the MSPB, EEOC, and FLRA
have over the years made substantial efforts-some successful,
though ironically, also in part controversial-to speed up the
process, simplicity is hardly a characteristic of the system as it
currently exists. Nor is it likely that the flow charts now gracing
federal personnel offices can be radically streamlined. A decade
has not seen the passing of some of the fundamental concerns and
political forces that were in large part responsible for the contours
of the 1978 reforms. In addition, there is good reason to question
the wisdom of certain possible ways to eliminate existing compli-
cations. For instance, despite its problems, the overall system is
4w U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, SUMMARY OF SELECTED INFORMATION ON
DISCHARGES, SuSPENsIoNs, AND CHANGES TO LOWER GRADE (July 1988).
41, See supra text accompanying notes 99, 105.
4m See, e.g., 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at 10. See generally FNAL STAFF REPORT,
supra note 63, at 58-62. See also Ingraham, The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Its Design
and Legislative History, LEGISLATING BUREAUCRATIC CHANGE: THE CIvIL SERVICE REFORM ACT
OF 1978 1, 13-28 (1984).
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working reasonably well. Ten years have allowed at least some
managers and employees to develop some familiarity with its "in's"
and "out's." To start from a substantially new script will itself
impose many costs. However, experience under the CSRA and
close scrutiny may clear the way for some modest simplification.
Federal unions are, without doubt, wedded to arbitration as
the means for solving workplace employee problems. Absent the
substantial erosion of their political capital, elimination of the
negotiated grievance process is not likely. Assuming adequate fi-
nancial resources could be assured to the unions, the alternative
of limiting bargaining unit members to the grievance process might
be acceptable to many union officials. This type of change would
certainly simplify matters. In addition, this alternative would pos-
sibly result in earlier settlements, expedite final resolution of those
cases (particularly discrimination matters) that go to hearing, and
reduce agency processing costs (e.g., in discrimination cases) .
483
It is not clear, however, that federal employees would find this
solution acceptable as long as the choice to go to arbitration lies
in the hands of the union. Even if the choice were the employee's
and unions could levy a service charge on bargaining unit members
to defray the costs of the arbitral proceedings, would employees
trust the unions to adequately protect their interests in all cases
and would they trust the arbitral process in important performance
and disciplinary actions where they lack the procedural protections
of a quasi-judicial proceeding?
Such a change might increase individual agency expenses over-
all since agencies would presumably have to share some part of
the cost of arbitration with the unions in all cases (not just EEO
matters). It may also increase overall governmental expense for
dispute resolution since the MSPB process would have to remain
in place for non-unit members.
Allowing the MSPB to deal exclusively with mixed cases may
be unpalatable to various groups because of distrust of the ade-
quacy of its processes to faithfully vindicate the purposes of the
anti-discrimination laws. It is not so much that the MSPB is
perceived as hostile to equal employment opportunity. Rather, an
alleged lack of knowledge of EEO law by the Board's presiding
officials and a strong sense for the nuances of its application and
the factual patterns that may suggest discrimination, a perceived
See infra text accompanying notes 507-08.
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focus on civil service rules and policies (narrowly conceived not
to include discrimination law), and the current emphasis on avoid-
ing delay, which may undercut the ability to develop an adequate
case on the discrimination issues (among other factors) may com-
bine to support continued EEOC involvement in mixed cases. It
is clear that the dismantlement of the old Civil Service Commission
and the vesting of its functions in two separate entities-the Board
and the OPM-has not dispelled the view, in some quarters at
least, that the MSPB is "management oriented" in ways that may
undercut achievement of equal opportunity goals.
However, while the available statistics are not plentiful and
their meaning might be disputed, the perceptions that the EEOC
must be involved in mixed case processing in order to protect
those goals must be carefully examined. This is particularly im-
portant in view of the costs occasioned by the delays and confusion
that arise from the current structure of mixed case appeals. Vesting
concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction in EEOC in these cases may
only further complicate the system without creating off-setting
benefits.
A. The Negotiated Grievance Process and the Federal Labor
Relations Authority
As the discussion previously indicated, grievance arbitration is
apparently functioning reasonably well in the federal sector. It is
unlikely that its operation now departs substantially from what
Congress in 1978 foresaw as the probable outcome of the CSRA.
From most reports, the negotiated grievance process offers a
reasonably expeditious way of resolving disputes. Federal arbitra-
tors are gaining a better grip on the complex rules and regulations
that confine their discretion. Awards are afforded a degree of
finality that, even if it is less than in the private sector, is still
substantial. At least some agencies and unions are experimenting
with ways to make the system work better, such as use of panels
of arbitrators with more expertise in federal civil service law.
Suggestions for change are not absent, however.
1. Judicial Review and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Outside the context of Chapters 43 and 75 actions, the FLRA
has exclusive authority to review non-Postal Service federal sector
grievance arbitral awards. Several unions favor vesting jurisdiction
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to review these in the courts and not the FLRA484 along with direct
judicial enforcement of awards. 48 The first proposal is apparently
fueled in part by the fact that the FLRA is generally unreviewable
when it deals with arbitration awards. Perhaps related to this
objection is a perception that the Authority has in the past been
overly intrusive in its review (presumably in such cases sustaining
agency objections) by reversing an arbitrator where his reasoning
may be flawed but the bottom-line result is permissible. 486 Statistics
indicate that over the past ten years, unions have filed more
exceptions to awards with the FLRA than agencies and yet their
rate of success has been much worse.48 7 With regard to the second
proposal, it is not clear how often agencies, which are bound by
statute to give effect to unappealed awards, disregard their obli-
gation in that regard.
From the management perspective, the view expressed by some
that arbitrators are not sufficiently faithful to the demands of
federal personnel law might suggest that all awards should be
directly reviewable by either the MSPB or the courts. Alterna-
tively, the OPM might be granted the right to appeal at least some
FLRA decisions relating to arbitrations. Such proposals may be
premised on a lack of confidence in the FLRA's ability or will-
ingness to police compliance with applicable law as the Board
interprets it, and the fact that arbitration decisions may present
important issues of personnel law that require judicial considera-
tion as well as uniformity of treatment. Moreover, the joint juris-
diction over discrimination cases of the MSPB, EEOC, and FLRA
presents the potential for confusion by managers regarding appli-
cable personnel rules and forum shopping by employees for fa-
vorable personnel law.48
While some in management and some unions might find ju-
dicial involvement of some sort preferable to the current arrange-
Title VII of Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
104 (1978) (statement of Kenneth T. Blaylock, National President, American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO).
411 See supra text accompanying notes 429-30. See also Koren, Adverse Action Arbitration
in the Federal Sector: A Streamlining of the Appellate Procedures, DA Pam 27-50-135 at 38.
4 Title VII of Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
135 (1978) (statement of Robert Tobias, National President, National Treasury Employees
Union).
" See supra text accompanying notes 448-52.
4 See supra note 463 and accompanying text. Not knowing whether discrimination will
be raised may cause a manager to pause where there is differing MSPB/FLRA precedent.
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ment whereby only Chapters 43 and 75 awards are reviewed outside
the FLRA, it is not clear that both sides would agree which courts
should have jurisdiction and under what circumstances, given the
differences in their perspectives regarding the problems to be solved
or avoided. For example, from the point of view of unity of
personnel law, concentrating appeals in the Federal Circuit makes
good common sense. To the extent that the focus is on the need
to assure the final and binding nature of the results of arbitration,
that there is an uneasiness regarding a perceived pro-management
approach of the Federal Circuit to personnel and labor relations
matters, or that there is a desire for a mechanism to permit
development of divergent lines of legal authority so as to facilitate
Supreme Court review, review in the district or regional courts of
appeal would presumably be an acceptable and preferable ap-
proach.
Recognition that judicial review may provide some valuable
benefits suggests that Congress should at least consider substituting
judicial for FLRA review of grievance arbitral awards (at least
where unfair labor practices are not alleged by the grievant, in
which cases the FLRA has greatest expertise) or, alternatively,
permitting limited judicial review of the FLRA's disposition of
those awards. Eliminating the FLRA from the review process (or
adding judicial review on the top of a layer of administrative
review), however, will have consequences that must be taken into
account. For example, such changes may cause delays in the final
resolution of controversies because of courthouse queues. In ad-
dition, litigation expenses will increase for all parties due, for
example, to the requirement of legal representation in the courts
where it does not now exist (as in the case of FLRA review).
Agencies would lose the discretion which they now possess to seek
review. Presumably, seeking judicial reversal of an arbitral award
on behalf of the government will require the consent and partici-
pation of the Department of Justice as well as the OPM. Finally,
it should be reiterated that available information does not dem-
onstrate that disuniformity in governing legal principles is cur-
rently a significant problem created by the FLRA's scope of
jurisdiction, though it could become so in the future.
Related to the issue of judicial review of arbitration awards is
the matter of enforcement of arbitral decisions. Under existing
law, enforcement takes the cumbersome form of filing and adju-
dicating an unfair labor practice charge before the FLRA. This is
the case even when the award relates to Chapters 43. and 75
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actions. This method threatens significant delays when one of the
important benefits of the arbitration process is expedition. More-
over, the FLRA is forced to divert resources from what are its
principal functions: overseeing the representation and collective
bargaining processes and adjudicating unfair labor practice com-
plaints that impinge on the heart of those processes.
Therefore, Congress should provide for direct judicial enforce-
ment of grievance arbitral awards in the federal courts. Uniformity
in terms of federal personnel law would generally not be at risk
at the enforcement stage considered in isolation. Going beyond
this limited proposal, consolidation of review and enforcement
proceedings in the same judicial forum and occurring at the same
time might expedite final resolution of arbitrated controversies. In
that case, transferring reviewing authority from the FLRA would
seem to have additional support.
2. Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards in Non-Mixed
Chapters 43 and 75 Actions
The Federal Circuit's current narrow approach to granting
OPM's petitions for review of arbitral awards in Chapters 43 and
75 actions is conditioned in part on deference to the arbitration
process. 489 In effect, the court has applied a standard for review
and reversal similar to the statutory standard applicable to FLRA
examination of arbitral awards. 490 The standard of review expressly
established by the 1978 statute with regard to both the MSPB and
arbitration-at least in the case of employee appeals-is largely
similar to that contained in the Administrative Procedure Act. 491
That standard is allegedly more intrusive than that generally ap-
plicable to the results of an arbitration proceeding. There is some
reason to suggest, however, that a more deferential standard should
be adopted in the case of employee appeals. As a matter of
"procedural innovation", imposing APA-type review on public
sector labor arbitration creates an animal that is neither fish nor
fowl. The courts are likely to ignore the express statutory phrases
in favor of the traditional deferential approach to arbitration.
Alternatively, they may be entirely confused by the role expected
of them.492 The existing disparity of treatment of the government
40 See, e.g., Devine v. Nutt, 718 F.2d 1048, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
110 Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 422-23.
491 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1982) with 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
49 Cf. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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and the employee might be seen as necessary to fully protect
employee rights, including due process considerations. 493 Yet the
employee in a Chapters 43 or 75 action has the opportunity initially
to choose between the MSPB and the NGP. His or her interests
would appear to receive adequate protection given this option,
even if the finality of the arbitral process is respected regardless
of which party appeals.
It is unlikely that this change would either create substantial
incentives for forum shopping or discourage use of the negotiated
grievance process for informal resolution of workplace disputes.
Given the deferential nature of the existing review of the MSPB,
it would seem that employee choice of route would focus more
on the structure and expected functioning at the initial hearing
stage. While a more deferential scope of review creates the poten-
tial for more inconsistency between the results reached by the
MSPB and by arbitrators, it is unlikely that the permissible range
for inconsistency is increased substantially over that which already
exists. Finally, to the extent the results in arbitration are more
favorable to employees than those obtained before the MSPB, this
additional isolation of the arbitrator from reversal is unlikely to
adversely affect employees in a practical sense.
In short, a substantial argument exists in favor of amending
the CSRA to impose a uniform scope of review applicable to
arbitration awards, including Chapters 43 and 75 matters. That
scope should be similar to that currently applied by the FLRA in
non-Chapters 43 and 75 matters. Such a standard would not
prevent the courts from enforcing uniformity between the MSPB
and arbitral processes with regard to the statutorily mandated
procedures and the substantive rules applied.
3. Judicial Review of Non-mixed Chapters 43 and 75 Arbitral
Awards at Goverment Request
Judicial review at government request, whether of MSPB de-
cisions or arbitral decisions, in Chapters 43 and 75 matters should
be conditioned now and in the future on error in the interpretation
of civil service law having a "substantial impact". This proposi-
tion is supported by a need for expedition and finality in resolving
employee disputes. Because of potential constitutional problems,
those needs cannot be achieved by a similar limitation when an
49 Cf. Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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employee loses in the administrative process and seeks judicial
intervention.
The "legal error/substantial impact" test is not always easy
to apply, though it captures within its confines the appropriate
type of case where judicial intervention is most defensible. The
recent decision in Homer v. Garza,494 however, raises a crucial
issue: how should the standard for review be construed to apply
when the congressionally mandated uniformity between MSPB and
arbitration processes is squarely at issue? As noted previously, the
Garza court's refusal to grant an OPM petition, when an arbitrator
has clearly not followed rules equally applicable to the MSPB and
arbitration, will mean either that such uniformity may not be
obtained or that only the FLRA will be in a position to do the
job that Congress gave to the Federal Circuit. 495 In short, either
the Federal Circuit or Congress should expressly repudiate Garza.
496
B. Appeal Routes
1. Choice Between NGP and MSPB Process
As noted previously, with regard to Chapters 43 and 75 actions
(even those not involving discrimination), a statutory right exists
to avoid the negotiated grievance process and file an appeal di-
rectly with the Merit Systems Protection Board. 497 One possible
modification would be to eliminate this option. At the current
time, however, this would be inadvisable for a variety of reasons.
First of all, it must be recognized that even if this choice were
eliminated, it would not have an impact on employees who are
not members of bargaining units or on employees whose collective
bargaining agreements exclude Chapters 43 and 75 matters from
the NGP. Thus, the MSPB process must be kept in place for these
individuals.
With regard to unit members, the available statistics do not
demonstrate exactly how many exercise their choice for the MSPB
over the NGP process. All they show is that there are many more
1- 832 F.2d 150 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 424-30.
" See supra text accompanying notes 430-31.
416 Homer v. Garza, 832 F.2d 150 (Fed. Cir. 1987) expresses an approach that is hard
to square with the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Devine v. Nutt, 718 F.2d 1048, 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom, Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985).
"97 See supra text accompanying note 204.
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Chapters 43 and 75 actions decided by the MSPB than are decided
by arbitrators. 48 Given the number of federal employees that
belong to unions and the scope of most grievance procedures, 499
and in view of the magnitude of the discrepancy between the
numbers of Chapters 43 and 75 actions decided by arbitrators in
the NGP each year and the volume adjudicated by the MSPB, it
is probably true that the MSPB is the preferred route even for
unit members. The likely reasons for this preference suggest that
the statutory choice continues to make sense from an employee's
point of view: the union controls access to arbitration; the arbitral
proceeding may often lack the procedural protections and oppor-
tunities (such as discovery) found at the Board; and unit employees
who are not dues-paying members of the union (and even some
that are) may not entirely trust the union to faithfully protect
their interests in what are, after all, the principal adverse personnel
actions.
The first two reasons implicate difficult and unresolved con-
stitutional issues regarding the degree to which the federal govern-
ment could consign exclusive adjudicatory responsibility in
employee performance and disciplinary actions to the arbitral
process as it is currently structured.50 Such problems might be
solved, of course, but with the possibility of some serious conse-
quences. For example, elimination of the union's right to choose
whether or not to invoke arbitration could undercut the ability of
the arbitral process to serve as an efficient and effective method
of dispute resolution, 01 as well as impose costs on unions that
could only be met if Congress authorized imposition of a repre-
sentation fee on employees included within bargaining units. More-
over, even if current arbitral procedures meet due process
requirements, to provide employees in the arbitration arena pro-
cedural protections similar to those afforded by the MSPB may
so change the nature of arbitration that it can no longer serve the
function envisioned by Congress and union proponents in 1978.
In the process, the overall cost of dispute resolution for all in-
volved-employee, government and union-might increase sub-
4" See supra text accompanying notes 384-92.
49 See supra note 384.
'1' See generally Comment, Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the
Duty of Fair Representation, 89 HARv. L. Rsv. 752 (1976). For example, if the union chooses
not to go to arbitration, are due process "hearing" requirements abridged? See, e.g., Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
"I1 Comment, supra note 500, at 784.
[VO.L. 78
FEDERAL PERSONAL COMPLAINT SYSTEMS
stantially, particularly since the MSPB must remain in business
for non-unit members.
It may, moreover, be a distinct advantage from the union's
point of view for employees to have an option other than the
NGP. With only one forum open to a unit member, a union might
be particularly fearful that a refusal to take a case to arbitration
would result in its own liability to the employee on the basis of
lack of fair representation or otherwise. Further, would employees
vote for union representation 50 2 if it meant foreclosing appeal
options, particularly since federal unions lack the power to bargain
over such important issues as wages and thus do not offer some
significant benefits in return for the surrender of procedural op-
tions?
2. Choice Between the NGP and the Statutory Process for
Discrimination Complaints
In considering retention of the current right to opt out of the
NGP in EEO matters at the beginning of a case (as opposed to
the stage when an arbitral award has been entered) and pursue
administrative statutory avenues, the existence of the right to trial
de novo'03 in the district courts, either as an alternative or as a
supplement of non-judicial remedies must be considered at the
outset. Such a right does not presently exist in cases where dis-
crimination is not an issue, the administrative and arbitral reme-
dies with limited judicial review being the only ones available.
Available statistics do not indicate clearly how often a federal
employee resorts to the courts in order to vindicate his or her
statutory rights to be free of discrimination in personnel matters,
though there appear to be less than nine hundred of these cases
filed each year °.5  Despite the fact that the district court has the
authority in these cases to appoint counsel for plaintiffs and award
attorneys' fees, the judicial arena may appear intimidating to
potential plaintiffs and the stakes at issue may not be that large
in many cases. Accordingly, the option may only be theoretically
available. The possibility that the non-judicial process is the only
- In the federal sector, the Supreme Court recently held that fair representation claims
cannot be the basis for a private cause of action in the federal courts but must be pursued
through FLRA unfair labor practice proceedings. See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1282 (1989).
' See supra text accompanying notes 202, 208, 210.
Source: Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
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realistic route for many employees suggests caution in limiting unit
employees to arbitration, albeit with a right to later resort to the
courts.
In addition to reasons that are perhaps distinctive in the dis-
crimination cases 505 factors similar to those that push ordinary
Chapters 43 and 75 actions into the administrative routes5°6 may
operate with regard to EEO matters. The same constitutional and
other difficulties 07 that would attend vesting exclusive jurisdiction
in the NGP, though, might either not be present or be present but
not to the same extent. In fact, the more the EEO process is
improved, the more resistance to eliminating options is likely to
arise.
It should be noted that at least one agency, the Department
of Health and Human Services, has analyzed the costs of EEO
processing from its own point of view and has concluded that it
would be less costly to process these matters through the grievance
machinery. Accordingly, one of its collective bargaining agree-
ments with the National Treasury Employees Union creates incen-
tives for the union to take these matters to arbitration. The agency
has agreed to pay seventy percent of the costs of arbitration, and
the procedures for fact discovery and record production have been
enhanced. However, while these arrangements are worthy of study
by other agencies and unions, it is questionable whether individual
employee options should be limited without some assurance that
the same types of protections will be negotiated in other cases.
Yet, requiring that such modifications be made in the arbitral
process as it applies to ordinary EEO matters raises some of the
political and other difficulties that may confound similar tinker-
ings with the process as it applies in ordinary Chapters 43 and 75
actions.5 0
8
In addition, with regard to mixed cases that involve Chapters
43 and 75 actions, it would be difficult to defend a proposal
consigning those actions exclusively to the NGP process with a
right to trial de novo in the district courts while employees in-
volved in Chapters 43 and 75 actions that do not contain allega-
tions of discrimination could choose the NGP or the MSPB process.
This proposal might be seen as a disguised attempt to discourage
"I See supra text accompanying notes 436-39.
506 See supra text accompanying notes 431-35.
"7 See supra text accompanying notes 500-01.
Imd.
[VOL. 78
FEDERAL PERSONAL COMPLAINT SYSTEMS
raising discrimination claims, and it might in fact operate in that
fashion. Futhermore, any proposal, such as eliminating resort to
the statutory processes, presenting the possibility of increasing
docket congestion in the federal courts must be scrutinized closely,
given the existing workload of federal judges.
Finally, the fact that the administrative processes for EEO
matters appear to be the overwhelming choice today bodes ill for
any proposal that seeks to modify the current statutory structure
by eliminating the option to choose the statutory over the NGP
route for unit members. In short, the existing right of a unit
employee to choose the statutory over the NGP route in discrim-
ination cases (both mixed cases and others) should be preserved.
Future improvements of the EEO process in terms of quality and
expedition of decision-making will likely further solidly support in
favor of retaining this option.
3. Appeal to the MSPB and EEOC from the NGP in
Discrimination Cases
Where discrimination is alleged and an NGP covers discrimi-
nation claims, unit employees may obtain MSPB "review" of
arbitral awards and FLRA decisions in mixed cases5 9 and EEOC
"review" of agency, arbitrator, and FLRA decisions in other
instances. 10 While conceivably both the MSPB and EEOC might
have taken the position that they could conduct a searching review
for factual and legal error and also order record supplementation
in appropriate cases, neither has done so. Rather, by adopting to
a great extent the traditional deference exercised by reviewing
bodies with respect to arbitral awards, both the MSPB and EEOC
accept the record created below and examine largely for errors of
legal interpretation. 1 Unless the federal sector arbitration process
-' The MSPB will not review an agency decision on a grievance filed in the NGP. See,
e.g., Parks v. Smithsonian Inst., 39 M.S.P.R. 346 (1988); Gillman v. Dept. of the Air Force,
7 M.S.P.B. 192 (1981). This approach might be criticized because of the inability of the
employee on his or her own to invoke arbitration. It might be argued, however, that one of
the risks of taking the grievance route is the refusal of the union to go to arbitration. As long
as the employee is thus advised so that he or she can opt initially for the MSPB/EEO process,
this approach may make sense because the record for review where there is only an agency
decision on a grievance is likely to be almost nonexistent.
510 See supra notes 181-210.
"I See supra text accompanying notes 207, 210. But cf. Marenus v. Dep't of Health &
Human Serv., 39 M.S.P.R. 498 (1989) (where Board modified arbitration decision finding,
inter alia, that appellant had not established a prima fade case of handicap discrimination).
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is to be transformed into a system bearing little resemblance to
that found in the private sector, that result was a foregone con-
clusion.
To date, relatively few requests for review have been received
by either agency. 12 To some extent this may be attributable to
lack of notice to the employee in the arbitrator's decision or
otherwise regarding the right to further proceedings .13 (Where an
EEO complaint is processed through the employing agency and
outside the NGP, a formal notice of the right to take the matter
to the EEOC is expressly afforded. 514) At the same time, most
EEO matters appear to be processed currently outside the negoti-
ated grievance process and this situation is unlikely to change to
any significant extent, at least in the short term. Given the variety
of considerations impacting the choice of the statutory processes
over the NGP in the discrimination context, the absence of the
opportunity for a limited appeal from the NGP to the MSPB or
EEOC probably will not contribute significantly to the forum
choice. Moreover, the employee who chooses to prosecute a dis-
crimination case through the NGP will retain any rights that
currently exist under the CSRA to sue de novo in district court. 515
If parity of treatment with non-federal employees protected by
the anti-discrimination statutes is desired, the proposal to eliminate
the right to obtain MSPB and EEOC review can still be justified
with relatively minor additional statutory changes. Currently, non-
federal employees, both in the public and private sectors, can
prior to suit in the federal courts, invoke the efforts of the EEOC
to investigate charges of discrimination and, if there is reasonable
cause to believe that the charges are well-founded, engage in
informal "conference, conciliation, and persuasion.' '516 Rather than
affording federal employees a limited opportunity for third-party
involvement at the end of the arbitration process, where it may
have little practical value, Congress could mandate that collective
bargaining agreements, whose negotiated grievance processes en-
compass claims of discrimination, must provide for investigation
and mediation by third-party neutrals at the request of the em-
ployee at the pre-arbitration stage. Currently, unless a collective
512 See supra text accompanying notes 340, 375-77.
-" See infra note 600.
114 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1613.221(e) (1988).
M, See supra note 273 and infra text accompanying note 519.
516 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
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bargaining agreement provides otherwise, employees opting for the
NGP in a discrimination matter lose all of the benefits of the EEO
agency process other than counselling.5 17 The statutory modifica-
tions suggested would reduce this discrepancy between the two
appellate routes and, as a side benefit, eliminate one of the incen-
tives to avoid the NGP, which may be more expeditious and
cheaper for all parties as a way to deal with discrimination cases.
5 18
Whether or not this change is adopted, Congress should specify
that any required exhaustion of non-judicial remedies occur at the
time the agency issues its decision on an employee grievance or,
if the union invokes arbitration, at the time the arbitral decision
is issued. Along the way it should also eliminate existing uncer-
tainty in some quarters and provide expressly that opting for the
NGP does not constitute a waiver of the right to trial de novo in
the district court.5
1 9
There may be some concern that the proposal to limit the
opportunity for EEOC review will result in splitting claims. In
defense of a personnel action, an employee may raise both dis-
crimination and other issues, such as violation of civil service
rules. Generally speaking, the latter issues will not be resolved in
the EEO process. For bargaining unit employees, the NGP may
be the only process with jurisdiction to examine all related matters.
Addressing this problem in part, EEOC regulations currently spec-
ify that once the grievance process has been invoked, even if no
claim of discrimination has been raised, later filing of an EEO
complaint regarding the same "matter" must be rejected and the
employee informed that he or she should pursue the discrimination
claim in the NGP.5 20 This provision, however, does not deal with
the situation where the EEO complaint is filed first and later the
non-discrimination aspect of the case is presented in the context
of the grievance process.
If the option to appeal to the EEOC in discrimination cases is
eliminated, would this result in more spitting of claims and the
inefficiencies and confusion that may ensue, on the argument that
employees will have a greater incentive to file first in the EEO
process rather than take the whole case to the NGP? As noted
earlier, most discrimination claims appear now to proceed through
57 See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.219(b) (1988).
" See supra text accompanying notes 507-08.
"' See supra note 273.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.219(b) (1988).
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the statutory process anyway and it is unlikely that elimination of
the appeal option will by itself change this situation. Improvement
of the NGP in terms of its capacity to assist the employee in
investigating the merits of an EEO matter prior to arbitration can
only encourage consolidation of all issues in the NGP. It should
also be noted in this connection that currently with regard to non-
bargaining unit employees and those bargaining unit employees
whose NGP does not encompass discrimination claims, splitting
of discrimination and non-discrimination aspects of a personnel
action between, for example, the agency administrative grievance
system and the EEO process may be required. The bottom line
appears to be that the proposed elimination of review by the EEOC
and the MSPB of the results of the NGP is unlikely to create
problems or aggravate existing ones.
4. The Right to Trial De Novo in Discrimination Cases
Under present law, federal employees may obtain a trial de
novo in United States District Court on allegations of employment
discrimination where the administrative and arbitral processes have
not provided requested relief. In one respect, this option raises
significant issues. In mixed cases, an employee may avail himself
or herself of a full trial-type hearing at the MSPB (including
subsequent EEOC and Special Panel review) and, if unsuccessful,
obtain a second de novo adjudicatory hearing in the district court
on the discrimination claim. While the same substantive anti-
discrimination protections apply to employees in the public and
private sectors, it is only federal employees that have the right to
two full hearings on the same claim.
Relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,
conservation of judicial and other resources, and permitting reli-
ance on adjudication as a final resolution of controversies underlie
the common law doctrines of preclusion that generally bar suing
two or more times on the same claim.5 21 Moreover, current budg-
etary constraints and docket congestion in both administrative and
judicial fora provide additional support in favor of the application
of the principles of claim preclusion absent extremely compelling
circumstances.
These general policies and concerns that appear equally appli-
cable in the discrimination context, as indicated by recent Supreme
2' See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JuDGmENTs § 24 (1982).
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Court precedent,522 suggest that where an employee has been af-
forded a full trial-type hearing before the MSPB in a mixed case,
he or she should be entitled only to the limited judicial review
generally applicable to administrative determinations and not the
full trial de novo currently permitted. This assumes that the ad-
ministrative procedures would afford a fully adequate opportunity
to litigate all relevant matters that are to be precluded.
In order to implement this proposal, Congress must revise the
relevant statutes. Operation of the common law of preclusion is
now foreclosed in part by various provisions of the CSRA and
the anti-discrimination statutes as construed by the courts.523 For
clarity's sake, the statutory amendment should indicate expressly
that an employee in a mixed case has the right to an MSPB
hearing or a judicial trial de novo but not both. The scope of
preclusion should extend in this context, as it does normally, to
matters that could have been but were not raised 24 before the
MSPB to avoid splitting a claim with the personnel side adjudi-
cated by the MSPB and the discrimination issues by the district
court where much the same evidence may be relevant to both.
For many matters of extreme importance to individuals-other
than discrimination-Congress has deemed an administrative ad-
judication followed by limited judicial oversight to be sufficient
protection for the interests at stake.5 25 If few people currently
resort to court after an unsuccessful administrative trial, elimina-
tion of a trial de novo may adversely effect few employees. If, on
the other hand, dual proceedings are more common, substantial
savings may result from elimination of this option.
The opportunity for some administrative investigation and con-
sideration of the merits of a mixed case prior to filing suit in the
federal courts has much to recommend it and this is generally
mandated in the case of both public and private sector employees.
Requiring initial resort to a process that provides for the investi-
gation of a claim and an attempt at its informal resolution permits
the agency whose action is questioned to remedy the claim on its
In See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90 (1980). But see Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
M See, e.g., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976). Cf. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788.
See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984). Cf. Spears
v. MSPB, 766 F.2d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
See, e.g., Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-430, § 8, 102 Stat.
1629-34 (1988) (choice between administrative hearing on a housing discrimination practice
claim and a district court proceeding).
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own without the intervention of outside authorities and, to the
extent a settlement of the dispute is arrived at, to conserve party
and judicial resources. The effectiveness of the process may turn
on the involvement of a neutral third party to assess the merits,
make recommendations, and facilitate settlement discussions. The
EEOC now has the authority to adopt procedural regulations to
require this type of informal dispute resolution and in fact its
existing regulations establish at least the foundation for this type
of process. 526 Some modifications, such as requiring involvement
of a neutral third party, would be appropriate for those mixed
cases where employees intend to avail themselves of the option of
suing de novo in district court. Where an employee does not
choose the MSPB or NGP processes for adjudication of a mixed
case, he or she should have to exhaust the method provided by
the EEOC's regulations applicable to informal dispute resolution
of mixed cases prior to resort to federal district court for a trial
de novo 27 except in the case of an age discrimination complaint
(where the relevant statute does not require exhaustion).
Under current EEO regulations, an employee complaining of
discrimination with regard to an action that is not appealable to
the MSPB cannot invoke a quasi-judicial proceeding equivalent to
that of the MSPB. For example, in the current EEO process, a
hearing may be held by an EEOC administrative judge but the
administrative judge's findings can be rejected by the agency.
5 28
Also, under the negotiated grievance process, absent union re-
quest, an arbitral hearing is not at all available and, even if
requested, is relatively informal. Accordingly, the right to ask for
a de novo judicial proceeding following exhaustion of the EEOC
or NGP route should be retained, even if it is only of theoretical
value for many employees.5 29 For similar reasons, an employee
pursuing a mixed case through an NGP should not forfeit the
right to a later trial de novo in district court.
5 See supra 29 C.F.R. subpart D (1988) and supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
- This appears to be required by existing law. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702(a)(2), (e)(1)(A)
(1988).
S2S On October 31, 1989, the EEOC proposed revised federal sector regulations which
attempt both to expedite final dispositions of EEO matters and eliminate the conflict of interest
presented by agency power to reject recommended decisions. For example, the hearing of right
before an EEOC administrative judge will come after, rather than before, the agency decision
on an EEO complaint. See 54 Fed. Reg. 45,747, 45,748 (Oct. 31, 1989).
529 This is the case outside the federal sector and, in part, for the same reasons mentioned
in the text. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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5. Judicial Review in Mixed Cases
It bears reiteration here that mixed cases are those involving
personnel actions of the type that generally fall within MSPB
jurisdiction and involve claims of prohibited discrimination of
certain kinds.5 30 They may be Chapter 43 or Chapter 75 actions
or others, such as within-grade pay denials or reductions-in-force.
The retention of the statutory option for discrimination matters
allows, for example, that all mixed cases-even those that are,
absent discrimination, within the exclusive scope of a NGP and
FLRA jurisdiction-may be brought before the MSPB as an initial
matter. In addition, the statutory right to trial de novo in district
court at the insistance of an employee applies today regardless of
the appeal route chosen, though some agencies take the position
that selection of the NGP constitutes a waiver of this right.
5 31
Accordingly, following MSPB adjudication or arbitration of a
mixed Chapter 43 or Chapter 75 case, an employee suit can now
be brought in federal district court, though not the Federal Circuit
that has jurisdiction only in non-mixed Chapters 43 and 75 ac-
tions.5
32
Under the "one shot" approach suggested above5 33 where a
personnel action allegedly infected with prohibited discrimination
is adjudicated by the MSPB, the employee should forfeit the right
to a de novo proceeding in the district court. Instead, the employee
should be afforded the type of limited-scope judicial review of
findings of fact and law afforded by the Administrative Procedure
Act, 534 or perhaps somewhat more searching judicial scrutiny on
the fact findings relevant to the discrimination issue. This proposal
dictates that non-bargaining-unit members should have the choice
of going directly to the district courts for a de novo trial in mixed
cases following exhaustion of special administrative remedies535 or
litigating through the MSPB administrative process, but not both.
For those bargaining unit employees whose negotiated grievance
process encompasses discrimination claims, they should be able to
choose between a trial de novo in district court (following ex-
51 See supra text accompanying notes 218-20.
"I See supra text accompanying notes 503-08.
332 But see infra notes 576-78.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 521-25.
5- See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
131 See supra text accompanying notes 526-27.
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haustion of special administrative remedies536 or the NGP process5 37)
and an MSPB hearing, but not both.
Currently, judicial review in mixed cases takes place in the
district courts in oddly structured proceedings where the court
conducts a fully de novo proceeding (both as to record and scope
of review) on the discrimination issue and a limited record and
restricted scope of review on the personnel issues (where there has
been prior MSPB adjudication). The decision of the federal district
court is then appealable only to the United States Court of Appeals
whose circuit embraces that district.5 38
Under the proposals made here, where an employee has chosen
not to have an MSPB hearing, the type of bifurcated review
prevailing at the district court level can be abandoned. Where any
available NGP process has not been invoked, the district court
should hold a fully de novo proceeding, applying MSPB substan-
tive law on the personnel side and the type of procedural rules
pertaining to such matters as burden of proof that are demanded
by discrimination law. If the discrimination issue is disposed of
unfavorably to the employee, the personnel aspect of the case
should be analyzed as consistently as possible with the burdens of
persuasion that would otherwise apply in an MSPB proceeding,
e.g., a lesser burden on the agency in a Chapter 43 action. 539 If,
however, the NGP has been invoked and there has been an arbitral
award, the district court should give as much deference to the
arbitral findings on the personnel side as is appropriate without
undercutting the plaintiff's right to a full de novo proceeding on
the discrimination issue 4.5  At least in Chapters 43 and 75 actions,
MSPB substantive rules should control on the personnel side. In
these ways, forum shopping may be discouraged and some degree
of uniformity between MSPB, arbitral, and district court processes
achieved, as was intended by Congress in 1978.
5 See supra text accompanying notes 525-27.
S37 See supra text following note 518. As noted previously, an employee has no right to
arbitration and any arbitral proceeding is usually informal. Accordingly, preclusive effect is
not appropriate.
Under current law, a collective bargaining employee can opt out of the NGP in a mixed
case and, like non-unit members, file either an appeal directly with the MSPB or a mixed
complaint with his or her agency and, following the agency decision on the mixed complaint,
see supra text accompanying notes 198-99, file directly in district court. See 5 U.S.C. §
7702(a)(2) (1988).
Im See Williams v. Dep't of the Army, 715 F.2d 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
M See supra text accompanying notes 396-98.
-0 See supra text accompanying notes 489-93. This approach is consistent with Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. 36.
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The legislative history of both the 1978 CSRA541 and the 1982
Federal Courts Improvement Act, 42 the latter of which created
the federal circuit, clearly indicates a concern for the unity of
federal personnel law. Moreover, the CSRA incorporates various
special mechanisms to ensure that at least those Chapters 43 and
75 actions that do not involve allegations of discrimination are
treated uniformly. 43 One mechanism is the provision for judicial
review of both MSPB and arbitral decisions (outside the mixed
case context) in the federal circuit. Regional circuit review in mixed
cases may substantially undercut the ability to achieve these goals.
544
The complexity of the statutory scheme established in 1978
and the fact that the 1982 legislation had a broad focus not
confined to the civil service area suggest that Congress may not
have directly confronted the question of whether the goals of
uniformity in personnel law and in treatment of employees in-
volved in Chapters 43 and 75 actions are less deserving of protec-
tion in mixed than in MSPB appealable non-mixed cases.5 45 If
those goals are of preeminent importance, the CSRA should be
amended to provide for judicial review at employee request of
MSPB and district court decisions in mixed cases in the federal
circuit. A concern for uniformity in at least the basic elements of
personnel law can be defended on various grounds, including,
mitigation of managers' uncertainty regarding the limits on their
discretion in dealing with employee problems, reduction in con-
fusion suffered by employees in deciding which appellate route to
take, and avoidance of discrimination in legal treatment between
similar cases where there is a lack of adequate justification.
To the extent that under the recommendations made here an
employee must choose between a full trial-type hearing at the
MSPB and one in the district court, there must be some concern
'41 See 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at 62-63.
-42 See S. REPORT No. 13.4-275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
' See, e.g., 1978 S. REPORT, supra note 70, at I11.
'" In 1978, judicial review of the MSPB in non-mixed cases was placed within the
jurisdiction of the regional circuits, allegedly for uniformity purposes, id. at 63, though the
district courts were to retain jurisdiction in discrimination cases. Id. However, in 1978, the
choice of the Federal Circuit was not available and the Senate did not address directly the
question of which circuit should hear appeals from the district courts in EEO matters.
-" But cf. Williams, 715 F.2d at 1496-97 (Bennett, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
1982 Federal Courts Improvement Act's concern for unity of personnel law pointed to Federal
Circuit review in mixed cases). See also Dep't of Treasury v. FLRA, 58 U.S.L.W. 2170, No.
88-1159 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasizing MSPB "primacy" in personnel law and the Federal
Circuit as the device to ensure uniformity).
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for eliminating inappropriate incentives to forum shop. This was
another concern that underlay the design of the 1978 CSRA which
permits bargaining unit employees to choose between the MSPB
and NGP processes in Chapters 43 and 75 actions. Accordingly,
the scope of judicial review of MSPB and district court decisions
in mixed cases should be the same or as nearly identical as feasible.
In addition, as will be discussed below, 546 where the government
loses at the MSPB level, the opportunity for it to obtain direct
judicial review should be limited to instances where the Board
erred in interpreting civil service law and the decision will have a
substantial impact. This limited right of review helps to expedite
final disposition of cases. These same limits should be applied to
the government's right to seek appellate review in the instance of
district court disposition of mixed cases.
6. Administrative Jurisdiction in Mixed Cases
This brings us to one of the most difficult issues: should the
responsibility for administrative adjudication of mixed cases be
vested in the MSPB or the EEOC or both to some degree? Cur-
rently, mixed cases are funnelled through the MSPB, involving
the EEOC only when the employee petitions for EEOC consider-
ation of an MSPB final decision.5 47 The available statistics do not
establish that the MSPB process is substantially less likely to result
in a finding for an employee in a discrimination case than the
EEOC process as currently structured.5 48 Moreover, over the years,
it has been comparatively rare for the EEOC to differ with the
Board regarding the latter's conclusions on discrimination issues
presented in mixed cases. 549 The interpretation of the statistics here
may be disputed for a variety of reasons 5 0 though at a minimum
they should cause hesitation in concluding that continued EEOC
involvement in mixed cases is necessary in order to give adequate
protection to equal employment opportunity goals. The delays and
confusion plaguing the mixed-case process over the years551 suggest
caution in concluding that the existing statutory scheme for shared
' ' See infra text following note 579.
147 See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 362-72.
141 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 341-46. It might also be argued that the
possibility of EEOC review has kept the MSPB on the "straight and narrow."
" See supra text accompanying notes 347-49, 374.
" See supra text accompanying notes 236-70.
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MSPB/EEOC involvement should be retained. This is true even
if the right to proceed de novo in district court is eliminated for
those employees who proceed through the administrative process.
a. Option 1: Exclusive MSPB Jurisdiction
If the design of an appellate system to handle mixed cases
could be arrived at without regard to the baggage of history and
the political crosscurrents that have or may control, vesting ad-
ministrative jurisdiction solely in the MSPB would seem eminently
sensible. After all, the Board's expertise lies in the personnel area.
Mixed cases call for a fine appreciation for not just EEO law but
also the complicated web of personnel law. In fact, the crux of
mixed cases is often the personnel side as the agency asserts and
the complainant tries to question the official reasons for the
action. Moreover, unless the EEO process is substantially re-
vamped, the MSPB process today offers many advantages over
the EEO framework: it is faster, independent of the employing
agency, and the judicialized procedures protect the employee.
552
And even if the EEO process is ultimately changed to mitigate its
current perceived weaknesses, it is far from clear that the new
framework would necessarily be superior to the MSPB from the
employee's point of view.
Certainly, the EEOC has over the years accumulated signifi-
cant experience in the application of federal personnel law. If
mixed cases remain outside its jurisdiction, the EEOC will continue
to be confronted by personnel law issues in the context of the
ordinary EEO process. However, it would be hard to maintain
that it is better equipped than the MSPB with regard to its knowl-
edge of existing and developing personnel principles. While the
dispersal of the major performance and disciplinary actions be-
tween the MSPB and NGP may create some risk of less than fully
informed decisions in the area of personnel law by arbitrators and
there is no support for the proposition that the EEOC (including
its hearing officers) is less expert in this regard than arbitrators,
fragmentation of responsibility for the major performance and
disciplinary actions (along with other personnel matters such as
5 2 EEOC is currently proposing significant revisions to its federal sector regulations. See
supra note 528.
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reductions-in-force) can only be justified if substantial benefits are
likely to be obtained.5 53
b. Option 2: Concurrent MSPB/EEOC Jurisdiction
One alternative to exclusive Board jurisdiction is to vest con-
current jurisdiction in the MSPB and EEOC in mixed cases. This
would ensure parity between the two agencies and allow the em-
ployee to choose whichever forum he or she believes more favor-
able. The option obviously expands EEOC authority beyond that
contemplated by Congress in 1978 but, by itself, that certainly is
not objectionable. There are, however, various administrative
problems posed by this approach, many of which are directly
traceable to the difficulties of identifying a case as mixed at the
time of filing, particularly for pro se claimants who today consti-
tute a large portion of the MSPB's appellants and probably the
majority of those using the EEO process.
At the outset, the nature of the "mixed case" must be noted.
A mixed case may involve a controversy wherein the employer
purports to justify its action by reference to performance inade-
quacies or allegedly service-connected conduct, e.g., the commis-
sion of a crime. The employee's defense may be premised solely
on the argument that the agency's explanation masks a discrimi-
natory motive. In other cases, the employee may not only raise
the discrimination argument but may also contend that, even if
discrimination was not present, the agency's action is not sup-
ported by documented performance inadequacies or other conduct.
As is clearly evident and as recognized by Congress in 1978, the
mixed case presents two sides of the same coin, thereby creating
substantial difficulties and diseconomies in trying to resolve it in
two separate proceedings.
Under the concurrent jurisdiction scenario, if an employee files
first in the MSPB process without initially presenting a claim of
discrimination but later raises such issues, should the opportunity
to choose between the MSPB and EEO routes be reactivated so
as to allow a mid-course change of forum? It is not uncommon
today for discrimination charges to be added late at the MSPB
" That jurisdictional choice turns in part on the MSPB "appealability" of the personnel
action at issue raises the possibility of "ping-pong" matches between the MSPB and EEOC,
see supra note 188, though this problem seems to be a relatively minor one today. One
solution might be to require a case filed in the ordinary EEO process to be stayed on agency
request for MSPB determination of its jurisdiction.
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and currently provision is made in appropriate cases for their
consideration. The fact that many employees are not represented
by attorneys magnifies the likelihood of failures to present claims
of discrimination at the outset. However, allowance of mid-course
changes to accommodate the disadvantages suffered by appellants
(whether or not represented by counsel) may substantially increase
the costs of adjudication for all parties since the effort and ex-
penses already invested may have to be duplicated on the change
of forum.
If the employee files first in the EEO process under a mistaken
notion that unlawful discrimination is implicated and the com-
plaint is dismissed early on (as in the manner of Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), after a
hearing, or somewhere in between, should the employee be able
to take any purely personnel law objection to the agency action
(e.g., in a Chapter 43 removal, that his or her performance was
fully adequate) to the MSPB? If so, the interrelationship of the
personnel and discrimination claims that is typical of mixed cases
will often mean that much the same evidence will be presented
both in the EEO process and at the Board. Based on available
statistics indicating the relative infrequency of findings of discrim-
ination in the EEO process, this duplication is likely to be a very
common occurrence-unless employees are exhausted by the time
the EEO process reaches its terminal point and choose not to
proceed further.
This second problem could be eliminated by a provision to the
effect that once the EEO route is selected, the employee can prevail
only on the discrimination claim and will be deemed to waive any
purely personnel law matters. Currently, EEOC does not have the
authority to deal with the purely personnel aspects of a case but
the MSPB, like the NGP, can deal with all issues raised. The
employee in these circumstances has a choice, but it will have to
be made with great circumspection and with potentially disastrous
results. The potential unfairness of this scheme to the employee
will be explored further below.
Turning to other types of difficulties posed, it is very possible
that joint jurisdiction in mixed cases will result in the application
of different rules of personnel and discrimination law, depending
on the forum chosen for the action. Since today there is no
opportunity for direct judicial review of EEOC decisions by the
government and government relitigation of both the factual and
legal aspects of an EEOC finding in favor of a complainant may
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be foreclosed in the district court,554 the potential for forum shop-
ping and discrimination in terms of different rules applied is
substantially increased.
From an employee's point of view, the multiplication of appeal
routes may appear to be an improvement of sorts. In order to
make an intelligent choice, however, employees must be clearly
informed at some point regarding the procedural (if not the sub-
stantive) differences between the MSPB and EEO processes. The
available statistics relating to the MSPB in mixed cases and the
EEO process in non-mixed cases suggest that in relatively few
cases does an employee succeed in proving discrimination. Both
those statistics and the impressions gathered during the interview-
ing process leading to this article suggest that many employees
fervently believe that there has been discrimination where it either
does not exist or may be difficult to prove. Add to all this the
fact that many employees in both the MSPB and EEO processes
proceed pro se, and there is some question whether it is reasonable
to expect that employees can make adequately informed decisions
regarding the best forum for their cases. Their dilemma would be
considerably heightened to the extent that choice of the EEO
process constitutes a waiver of the purely personnel law matters
they could raise in the MSPB process.
In short, joint MSPB/EEOC jurisdiction may present decep-
tively simple choices for a large class of employees. However,
ultimately, they may forfeit the opportunity to a full, timely, and
consolidated trial of all of their contentions.
c. Option 3: Exclusive EEOC Jurisdiction
A final option is to vest exclusive jurisdiction over mixed cases
in the EEOC. This would simplify matters considerably. However,
the current EEO process is afflicted with a variety of problems,
including lack of resources and delays, some of which may not be
remedied at least in the short term.55 5 To force employees into this
route is not likely to be perceived as fair. Moreover, many of the
same or analogous problems that accompany vesting mixed case
jurisdiction in both the MSPB and the EEOC are presented by
this option, e.g., the employee will have to consider whether or
not to raise any discrimination claim based on perhaps incomplete
understanding of the procedural and other consequences.
-4 See Moore v. Devine, 780 F.2d 1559 (1lth Cir. 1986).
"I But see supra note 552.
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There are in fact ways to improve the attractiveness of a
proposal to vest exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction in mixed cases
in the MSPB. Perhaps with congressional ratification, MSPB could
relax its focus on the 120 day deadline that may interfere with the
ability of the employee to develop his or her case on the discrim-
ination issues. Presiding officials should make particular efforts
to assist pro se appellants, particularly in the area of factual
discovery. Such efforts may not be entirely lacking today on the
part of at least some administrative judges.55 6 The burdens of
proof in Board proceedings in mixed cases must be modified to
accord more closely with those applicable in the district courts in
discrimination cases (something that may require some legislative
tinkering). More emphasis might also be placed on educating
Board presiding officials on various aspects of discrimination law,
including its nuances and the factual patterns suggesting the exis-
tence of discriminatory motive. Pronouncements and decisions by
the Board could trumpet the fact that principles of discrimination
law are not a "hostile" outsider but are part and parcel of per-
sonnel law and must be implemented accordingly throughout the
Board's various decision-making processes.5 57
Finally, a way to institutionalize some formal involvement by
the EEOC in the mixed case process should be explored. The
EEOC might be authorized to intervene in MSPB proceedings
presenting issues of discrimination law and petition for judicial
review of such cases. EEOC rights in these regards could be limited
in the same manner as the OPM's current opportunity for involve-
ment with Board cases.55 8 Alternatively, they might be more broadly
defined to include, for instance, the right to judicial review.
To the extent that the Board is granted exclusive administrative
jurisdiction in mixed cases (outside those processed through the
NGP), bargaining unit members and non-members alike should
retain the choice to file an appeal directly with the Board or with
the agency in accordance with EEO's mixed complaint regulations
(with a hearing at the MSPB level).
The mixed complaint process has a variety of advantages. It
serves to filter out complaints that might otherwise clog the Board's
Cf. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.155(b) (1988).
The Board's administrative judges are currently excepted service attorneys serving at
the will of the Board. Affording these officials the protections in terms of salary and tenure
of administrative law judges is an additional possible change that might alter perceptions of
the Board and ease the way for exclusive MSPB jurisdiction.
5' See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(d), (e); 7703(d) (1988).
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processes. For the unrepresented, the investigation stage may dis-
cover material unavailable to them in the Board's processes be-
cause of time constraints or the inability to master discovery
techniques. Settlement possibilities can be explored in an atmos-
phere where perhaps the employee is less intimidated and where
the invocation of formal processes does not solidify the positions
of the main actors. Finally, the agency is given the opportunity to
resolve matters that affect its own employees. 559 Efforts to improve
the EEO process at the agency level may make the mixed complaint
process even more valuable in these respects.
The existing mixed appeal/mixed complaint regulations are
not, however, the easiest to understand.5-6 Despite the inherent
complications of the process, more could probably be done to
clarify and simplify the procedures. 56 In addition, while perhaps
not a frequent occurrence, in some instances there are parallel
EEO and MSPB filings that, under the regulations, should not
both be allowed to proceed. There may also be duplicative filings
involving the NGP, which also is not permitted by the CSRA.
Better communication among personnel, EEO, and labor relations
offices would reduce these multiple proceedings and the wasted
time, energy, and other resources.
7. The Fate of the Special Panel
Since 1978, there have been three Special Panel proceedings. 62
Congress did not anticipate that the Panel would often be called
upon to resolve disputes between the Board and the EEOC.5 63
Since the Special Panel apparatus was originally put in place
to insure some adjudicatory role for the EEOC in mixed cases 56
4
by definition, a conclusion that continued EEOC involvement is
" These procedures may have to be differentiated from those applicable to mixed cases
where there will be a trial de novo in district court, see supra text accompanying notes 526-
27, though the option to choose the MSPB over the district court should remain open as long
as it is feasible.
'60 Neither are other parts of existing EEOC regulations. For example, a less than
experienced practitioner or employee might take the regulations defining the relationship
between the NGP and the EEOC as applicable to mixed cases, which apparently they are not.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.219, .231, .401-.421 (1988).
561 The newly proposed EEOC regulations are, in part, an attempt to more clearly define
the federal sector process. See 54 Fed. Reg. 45,747 (Oct. 31, 1989).
'6 See supra text accompanying notes 236-57.
10 See 1978 CONFERNCE REPORT, supra note 219, at 142.
'1 See supra text accompanying notes 218-24.
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unnecessary would consign it to a place in the history books alone.
The problems and disputes that have arisen during its brief tenure 65
seem not to recommend its continuation in any form.
The prevailing approach to the authority of the Special Panel
(laid down in Ignacio v. United States Postal Service) is complex
66
and suggests that the convoluted arrangement creates incentives
for the ultimate decision-maker (the Panel) to avoid rather than
make its own decision on the merits. Moreover, the structure is
so self-evidently contrived as a political compromise rather than a
rational approach to design of a structure for the fair and expe-
ditious resolution of personnel disputes that it evokes cynicism
rather than confidence on the part of the clients of the system.
If, however, it is thought desirable to retain some form of
EEOC review of Board decisions in cases that are significant
beyond the individual facts presented, a revision of the Special
Panel machinery might be devised to accord with what the Senate
proposed in 1978. The Senate bill envisioned the MSPB/EEOC
dialogue as focusing on cases where the MSPB order would have
"a substantial impact on the general responsibilities of the Com-
mission for implementing the anti-discrimination laws." 567 Accord-
ingly, "decisions and orders which propel case law in a new
direction, or which raise significant conflicts with the policies or
interpretations of the Commission may be considered.
'5 68
Section 7702 of Title 5 could, therefore, be amended to specify
that the EEOC can accept a petition only if it believes (1) that the
case presents an important legal issue of discrimination law or the
relationship between civil service and discrimination law, and (2)
that the MSPB was incorrect in its disposition of this legal issue.
On reference back, the MSPB should be able to disregard the
EEOC decision and certify the matter to the Special Panel only if
it believes that the EEOC was incorrect in resolving an issue of
civil service law or the relationship of civil service and discrimi-
nation law. The current composition of the Panel would remain
unchanged under this approach, thus assuring an EEOC voice on
the Panel. However, requiring MSPB concurrence regarding the
10 See supra text accompanying notes 236-70.
561 See supra text accompanying note 240.
-6 1978 S. REPoRT, supra note 70, at 57-58.
' Id. at 58. The existing statutory language permits the EEOC to exercise its discretion
in this sparing fashion-but the EEOC has chosen to accept most petitions filed for merits
review. Congress should, therefore, make its intent clear-if the Special Panel is retained-if
for no other reason than cutting down the potential for delay in the system.
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EEOC's assessment of the nature of the issue presented and its
importance raises the possibility of stalemate. Despite the possi-
bility that the EEOC could make its findings merely to prevent
the MSPB from having the last word, it should be assumed that
that Commission will not engage in such overreaching.
In addition, the rules of Ignacio69 that prevent a decision on
the merits should be abolished by Congress. Rather, once certifi-
cation occurs, the Panel should be directed to resolve the substan-
tive issues presented with an appropriate deference to the respective
expertises of the Board and the EEOC.
Moreover, in order to elevate the importance of the Special
Panel proceeding and to deter improvident references, its resolu-
tion of the legal issues should be made explicitly binding on both
the MSPB and the EEOC absent either judicial reversal on direct
appeal or rejection of the Special Panel's resolution by the Su-
preme Court in other cases or the "overwhelming" weight of
circuit court precedent.57 0 As in the case of MSPB orders, judicial
review of the Special Panel decision (or the EEOC decision where
the MSPB does not make the specified finding) should be placed
within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit though under a very
limited scope of review.
8. Government Access to Judicial Review in Discrimination
Cases
At the present time, when an agency loses a case involving
allegations of discrimination before the MSPB, EEOC, the Special
Panel, an arbitrator, or the FLRA, its procedural opportunity to
obtain judicial reversal is, at best, very limited. When approaching
this situation two scenarios should be distinguished: where the
underlying personnel action at issue is of the type that could be
appealed by the employee to the MSPB, and where this is not the
case.
With regard to the latter situation, a discrimination complaint
now-and under the proposals contained earlier in this article
57 1-
may be adjudicated by the EEOC if the employee chooses to opt
-" See supra text accompanying note 240.
570 The Board has made it clear that it will follow Special Panel decisions deferring to
the EEOC on matters of discrimination law even where the Panel decision is inconsistent with
lower court precedent (which Ignacio was at the time of its issuance and continues to be). See
Ellis v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 503 (1988).
"I See supra notes 503-08.
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for the statutory appeal route, or by an arbitrator if the NGP is
used. There are no statutory provisions that expressly allow an
agency to appeal directly to the courts from an adverse EEOC or
arbitrator decision. Rather, the agency may refuse to comply with
an EEOC decision, in which case any judicial review would occur
in the course of the employee's de novo suit in federal court,
though preclusion prevents government relitigation of at least some
issues .572
In the case of an arbitral award, while an agency may appeal
to the FLRA, there is no direct judicial review of the FLRA's
decision on the award.573 Refusal to comply with the award may
result in an unfair labor practice proceeding before the FLRA,
whose disposition of the case is judicially reviewable, though ju-
dicial scrutiny of the underlying arbitral decision may be very
narrow indeed-if it exists at all.
57 4
With regard to MSPB appealable actions, the situation may
be somewhat different. The statute provides that "any final order
or decision" of the Board is appealable to the federal circuit by
OPM if the "substantial impact on civil service law" test is met.
575
This authority is not limited by express statutory provision to non-
mixed cases. While the federal circuit has held that it lacks juris-
diction in mixed cases, 576 the jurisdictional issue should arguably
be treated differently where it is the government, and not the
employee, that is dissatisfied with the result of the administrative
(or arbitral process).5 77 In that context there will need be no
impingement on the employee's right to obtain a de novo hearing
on the facts in district court.
578
Politically, it likely would be difficult, if not impossible, to
make a case that the OPM should be able to appeal MSPB, EEOC,
arbitral, or FLRA decisions where it is seeking to contest a factual
"2 See Moore, 780 F.2d 1559.
-17 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
"4 American Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA, 850 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
-5 See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d) (1988).
576 See supra text accompanying note 277.
'n The Federal Circuit reviews arbitral awards in Chapter 43 and 75 actions outside the
mixed case context and the CSRA provides for such review on the same terms as apply to
review of MSPB decisions. Other MSPB appealable actions within the NGP that are arbitrated
go to the FLRA. Accordingly, in mixed non-Chapter 43 and 75 actions that are arbitrated,
the government's opportunity to review, if any, is largely identical to that which exists in
discrimination cases that are not MSPB appealable.
See Homer v. Schuck, 843 F.2d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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finding of discrimination. Allowing the OPM to contest a legal
interpretation in the area of pure discrimination law may encoun-
ter less resistance but still is difficult to justify to the extent that
the OPM's area of interest and expertise is seen to rest in the
arena of pure personnel law.5 7
9
The fact that a refusal to comply with administrative or arbi-
tral determinations is necessary before review can be requested
(assuming it is then available) is not only inefficient but, by raising
the spectre of agency defiance of authority, it casts a pale of
illegitimacy over what may be an entirely justifiable claim of legal
error. The happenstance that issues of personnel law arise in the
context of discrimination cases does not suggest that there is less
need for direct judicial review than is available outside the dis-
crimination context. Many of the most important issues of per-
sonnel law today are those that require inquiry into the relationship
of civil service rules and the anti-discrimination statutes.
In fact, the combination of limitations on the government's
right to appeal and employees' rights to choose among several
appeal routes means that different legal rules may be applied in
the administrative, arbitral, and judicial fora in discrimination
cases. For example, the interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act
adopted by the first Special Panel proceeding s ° is currently applied
by both the EEOC and the MSPB but it has been rejected by the
courts. The confusion thereby engendered and the discrimination
in terms of applicable legal doctrine are hard to justify.
Accordingly, Congress should clearly provide that the OPM,
the agency responsible for the overall administration of the civil
service rules and the one agency with a government-wide perspec-
tive, should have the same right to directly request judicial review
in discrimination cases that it has in other contexts. Specifically,
where the Director of the Office believes that a decision of the
MSPB, EEOC, FLRA (assuming its arbitral review jurisdiction is
In the latest episode of the Lynch saga, see supra text accompanying notes 250-56,
the Board held that the discrimination laws administered by the EEOC are not "civil service"
laws for the purpose of OPM's statutory right to ask for Board reconsideration and do not
come within the purview of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d) (OPM's right to petition Federal Circuit for
review). Lynch v. Dep't of Education, 39 M.S.P.R. 319 (1988). The Federal Circuit has
granted OPM's petition to explore at least this jurisdictional issue. Where a matter raised
involves the interrelationship of pure personnel and discrimination law (generally the grist for
the Special Panel mill), a reading of Section 7703(d) to permit Federal Circuit review is clearly
reasonable. However, in Lynch, the merits issue presented appears to be one of pure discrim-
ination law.
30 M.S.P.R. 47 (Spec. Pan. 1986).
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retained), or an arbitrator constitutes an incorrect interpretation
of civil service law that may have a substantial impact, the Director
should be expressly authorized to petition for judicial review. The
grant of that petition should remain within the discretion of the
reviewing court. Moreover, consistent with the goal of ensuring
the uniformity of federal personnel law and uniformity in treat-
ment of the major personnel actions and with current provisions
vesting review jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit in non-mixed
Chapters 43 and 75 actions, Congress should consider vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit to hear appeals by
OPM. To the extent that the Federal Circuit has exclusive juris-
diction in at least mixed cases, the forum for judicial review will
not vary depending on whether the government or the employee
seeks judicial review.
9. Agency Administrative Grievance Systems
Given the trend of recent judicial opinions in the area of
implied statutory rights of action under the Civil Service Reform
Act, 81 agency administrative grievance systems take on increased
importance as perhaps, in some cases, the only avenue of redress
that can be invoked by the individual employee (other than the
potential assistance of the Office of Special Counsel). Interviews
disclosed mixed perceptions regarding whether employees and their
representatives do or should trust the ability of these processes to
fairly dispose of cases, given the fact that the agency is ultimately
the judge in its own case. Clearly, agencies vary in the elaborate-
ness of the procedural protections afforded. But details regarding
the nature of the variation government-wide are not currently
available. Statistics regarding the usage and effectiveness of these
systems, among other things, are lacking. Efforts should be un-
dertaken in order to ensure that these systems in fact provide a
fair and efficient method of resolving workplace disputes.
To the extent that non-unit employees now resort to the EEOC
process for workplace disputes lacking substance as discrimination
matters in order to obtain the intervention of third party neu-
trals5 8 2 improvement of the agency administrative grievance sys-
tems (by, for example, providing for investigation and
recommended decision by a third party) may relieve some of the
'81 See supra text accompanying notes 301-07.
' See supra text accompanying note 352.
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pressure on the EEO framework and, along the way, expedite
resolution of disputes in both arenas.
10. The Office of Special Counsel
One of the most problematic areas for potential reform relates
to the role of the Office of Special Counsel. Criticism of its
effectiveness was not mooted even by a 1985 General Accounting
Office study that failed to find substantial flaws in the OSC's
treatment of whistleblower reprisal cases.5 83 Whether the OSC has
in fact failed its assigned task and, if it has, why this has occurred
apparently are not questions that are answered easily in a dispas-
sionate fashion. At a minimum it would seem fair to say that, in
view of the breadth of its jurisdiction to investigate and seek
corrective and disciplinary action from the MSPB, the financial
resources currently available to the Office (and perhaps likely to
be available in the foreseeable future) may very well be inadequate
to allow the Office to serve effectively as an avenue of resort for
federal employees allegedly injured by prohibited personnel prac-
tices or other violations of civil service law in the manner desired
by the Office's critics.
It may seem alluring to give the Office additional powers and
duties. It would be ideal if the Office were staffed (as it may now
be) with aggressive individuals endowed with a sense of mission
to ferret out and correct abuses of the merit system. Without a
larger budget, however, heightened expectations for the operation
of the Office are likely to be dashed.
This brings us to the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.584
The House and Senate voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Act
against a background of years of criticism of the operation of the
OSC in terms of its ability or willingness to protect the interests
of federal employees. As late as 1985, the Office took the position
that its statutory mandate was to protect the integrity of the merit
system through prosecution of those who violated the law and
that it was not empowered to "represent individual employees.
'585
See WHI STLEBLOWER COMPLAINANTS RARELY QUALIFY FOR OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
COUNSEL PROTECTION, GAO/GGD 85-53, May 10, 1985.
5" Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989); see 134 Cong. Rec. S15,328-35 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1988).
U3 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL
COUNSEL/FISCAL YEAR 1985 at 2, 3 and 8. Such a view received some support in judicial
opinions. See, e.g., Frazier v. MSPB, 672 F.2d 150, 162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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The next year, however, it announced that "[tihe focus of all
OSC operations is protection of the rights of employees under the
merit system through corrective actions and when warranted, the
discipline of those who violate the law. ' 516 That emphasis contin-
ued in 1987 as its annual Report to Congress noted that "OSC's
most significant achievement during this reporting period was its
pursuit and accomplishment of more corrective actions on behalf
of more federal employees than in any one year since 1981, as a
result of the Office's emphasis on corrective actions, particularly
in aid of employees victimized by reprisal for whistleblowing.
' '5
8
7
Such reassurances apparently fell on deaf ears in Congress.
The 1989 legislation establishes that "the primary role of the
Office ... is to protect employees, especially whistleblowers, from
prohibited personnel practices" and "that the Office ... shall act
in the interests of employees who seek assistance" from it.5 18 While
this statutory "clarification" of the OSC's role is beneficial in
some respects, it should be noted that the existence of such a
declaration may very well be used by dissatisfied federal employees
suing in federal court as support for the proposition that the court
should order the Office to prosecute corrective actions before the
MSPB where there are indications that a prohibited personnel
practice has occurred. Federal judges might in some cases accept
such arguments589 despite the presence of what appears to be
discretionary language contained in the 1978 statute and retained
by the 1989 legislation. 90
The 1989 legislation does not address the current policy of the
Office not to routinely investigate allegations of prohibited dis-
crimination falling within EEOC jurisdiction.5 91 At the same time,
it deletes the existing authority592 to defer investigations of "activ-
ities [other than prohibited personnel practices] prohibited by any
56 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL
CoNsEL/FiscAL YEAR 1986 at 5.
58 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL
CouNsEL/FIscAL YEA 1987 (draft) at 1.
See Section 2(b)(2) Pub. L. 101-12.
Compare Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (where, unlike the CSRA
however, the statute used "shall" not "may" with respect to both investigatory and prose-
cutorial authority).
5- See 5 U.S.C. § 1206(c)(1)(B) (1988) and § 3(a)(11) of Whistleblower Act (adding §
1214(b)(2)).
, See supra text accompanying notes 287-89.
' See 5 U.S.C. § 1206(e)(1)(D), (2) (1988).
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civil service law, rule, or regulation ' 593 and grants authority to
the OSC to seek corrective and disciplinary action in these cases. 94
The legislative history of the 1989 Act suggests that such authority
is meant to cover only "major abuses of the civil service proc-
esses." 595
In view of the focus of this study, perhaps the most striking
aspect of the 1989 legislation is its creation of the right of indi-
vidual employees to seek corrective action from the Board with
respect to any "personnel action" allegedly taken as a reprisal for
whistleblowing-after having requested (but not received) OSC
action where the personnel action is not otherwise appealable to
the Board. 596 Given the apparently applicable statutory definitions
of "employee" and "personnel action, 5 97 these provisions give
to many more federal employees with respect to many more types
of personnel actions than is currently the case the individual right
to seek redress from the MSPB-though only in cases where
reprisal for whistleblowing is alleged. The impact on the Board's
docket is unclear but may be very substantial indeed, particularly
if allegations of reprisal for whistleblowing are made routinely in
personnel disputes largely to obtain access to the Board's proc-
esses. It would be very difficult to come up with a method to cull
out meritless claims of reprisal early in the process without raising
charges that the Board is insensitive to the protection of whistle-
blowers.
The 1989 legislation fails to address the interaction between
the new right to invoke the Board's processes and section 7121 of
Title 5,598 which makes the negotiated grievance process the exclu-
sive means for resolving many matters within its scope (which
could include allegations of reprisal for whistleblowing). The leg-
islation does not expressly prevent an employee from proceeding
simultaneously or sequentially through an NGP with a whistle-
blower matter and to the MSPB under the new right of action.
(New Section 1222 of Title 5 expressly preserves existing statutory
rights and remedies outside of Chapters 12 and 23 of Title 5).
These are perhaps only a few of the unresolved issues that the
new legislation raises in this area.
"I See supra note 590, § 3(a)(11) (adding § 1216(b)).
514 Id. (adding § 1216(c)(2)).
19 135 Cong. Rec. H749 (Daily ed. March 21, 1989).
9 See § 3(a)(11) (adding § 1221).
5- See 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1988).
- 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (1988).
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The silence of Congress regarding Section 7121 perhaps augurs
a tendency toward less than comprehensive consideration of the
entire statutory framework established in 1978 in dealing with
particular issues that arise. A persistent pattern of focusing on
discrete issues without a substantial effort to ascertain the wider
ramifications throughout the system of any proposed change will
lead to one or more baneful results. Agencies, private attorneys,
and the courts will be left with the task of trying to invent a way
to put all the pieces together, which is a task that properly lies in
the hands of Congress. In addition, the system may evolve into
an even more complicated morass that will make its current level
of intricacy seem quaintly straightforward even to those who have
been able to wade this far into this article. The inefficiency and
confusion that would thereby be created and redound to the det-
riment of everyone-but particularly the hapless federal employee
and manager-must be avoided.
11. Better Communication Within Agencies and to Employees
Even if all of the changes urged above are instituted by legis-
lation or otherwise, the system for federal employee complaints,
grievances, and appeals will remain fragmented and complicated,
though choices may have been narrowed and simplified somewhat.
To the extent federal managers see "too many reviews/appeals"
as an obstacle to taking formal action against employees,5 99 the
situation may be improved somewhat from a manager's point of
view.
A premium must, however, be placed on clarity and simplicity
in drafting implementing regulations. Personnel, labor relations,
and EEO administrative staff must be well-educated in the system
and continually brought up-to-date on the latest changes in the
law that impact on the various processes. More consistent patterns
of communication among these groups, something that now ap-
pears to occur fitfully at best in many agencies, must be estab-
lished, if only to avoid the costs of parallel, duplicative proceedings
in the MSPB, the EEO framework, and/or the NGP. In some
" See U.S. Maarr SYS'MS PROTECTION BoARD, FEDERAL PHEsoNNEL PoucIES AND
PRAcncEs-PEnsPncnvEs FROM Tim WORKPLACE at 11-12 (1987) (41% of supervisors ques-
tioned viewed "too many reviews/appeals" as an obstacle of some significance in taking
formal action in performance cases; 32% viewed it as an obstacle in taking formal action in
misconduct cases; but 88% indicated they would take formal action when informal measures
fail).
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instances, internal organizational restructuring might assist here-
or systems of computer case tracking.
Finally, the intended beneficiaries of the system-federal em-
ployees-must have easy access to materials that, in as straight-
forward and as clear a fashion as possible, provide necessary
information regarding their rights without swamping them with
unnecessary detail.6w
1o THE GUIDE TO RIGHTS AND RESPONSiBILITIES IN RESOLVING DISPUTES IN THE FEDERAL
GovRNMNT (Nov. 1987) is a good start, though even it may be too detailed and intimidating
for most employees.
It might be questioned, for example, whether the dearth of MSPB appeals from the
grievance process in mixed cases is due to the lack of express notice in the arbitral award
regarding the existence of further appeal rights. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Dep't of the Navy,
37 M.S.P.R. 560 (1988) (an opinion that seems to confuse agency notice of the right to
initially appeal to the Board or file a grievance in the NGP with notice of the right to appeal
from the NGP to the MSPB) with Marenus v. Dep't Health and Human Serv., 39 M.S.P.R.
498 (1989) (Board waives time period for filing given "mistaken" first filing with EEOC).
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